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*THE BALANCE OF
EMOTION AND INTELLECT*

AN ESSAY
INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF
PHILOSOPHY

BY
CHARLES WALDSTEIN, PH.D.

.C LONDON
C. KEGAN PAUL & CO., 1 PATERNOSTER SQUARE.
1878

~~III. 544~~

Phil 5400.12

1879, Dec. 5.

Walker fund.

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P R E F A C E.

WE frequently hear of the 'Dignity of Science,' and a book is often characterised as falling between the scientific and the popular. What this 'dignity' means, and whether there is this empty space between the scientific and the popular is very questionable.

On closer examination we find that this dignity is frequently merely an anachronism. Science, strange to say, has been very conservative in its constitution. Though it has been the potent agent in bringing on the downfall of the Middle-age caste-spirit, it has still retained many of the outward peculiarities of those ages. The Latin language (*la langue*), which in former days severed erudition from the people, has been abandoned, but to some extent the scientific idiom (*le*

langage) has still been retained and encouraged as appertaining to the aristocratic guild of 'hommes de lettres.' The scholar-guildsman is no longer outwardly distinguishable from the joiner-guildsman, but still great emphasis is laid upon the 'dignity of science.'

Science is for human beings, and reflects upon human life; and there is no reason for disconnecting the two. In the field of the knowable, nothing transcends human life, nothing is more dignified than human life. Hume (in the first Section of his *Enquiry*), has well said: 'Man is a reasonable being, receives from science his proper food and nourishment. . . . Man is a sociable being, no less than a reasonable being—and man is an active being.' We must be sociably-scientific and scientifically-sociable; as Hume proceeds, 'Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.'

In one case this so-called dignity, or rather unpopularity, is admissible, nay, even advisable and necessary:—when it means a saving of time and trouble, when it is a matter of convenience, hastening the progress of knowledge and culture. Science has invented symbols which simplify and

facilitate the thinking process. It has a terminology which contributes to exactness and speed, and in many cases it would be impracticable to translate these symbols into a relatively great mass of terms of common language. But the final test of the utility of scientific truths must be their translation into the language in which our forefathers and we have thought from very infancy.

These being my views, it is highly probable that many scientific readers (should they accord the book any notice) will consider many propositions, examples, and analogies as superfluous and trite; while some of the unscientific will find that certain portions require far greater exertion and expense of comprehensive energy than others. But I think that it is rather a disciplinary advantage when a book varies in the easiness of its style. If possible, a book is to be like life: varied and chequered, appealing to the different faculties and inclinations of man. I contest the view that 'style' means sameness in the manner of expression—nay, I even believe that the desirable style is that which adapts itself to the subjects with which it deals at different moments.

This book has not grown up uniformly ; but several facts have contributed to make it a whole. A part has been delivered as a lecture. In the lecture I attempted to counteract one out of the whole group of fallacies which I considered were vitiating correct thought and actions based upon thought, namely, the false opposition of Emotion and Intellect. Later on, I felt that there was need of counteracting other fallacies of the same group, namely, those with regard to the opposition of Science and Common Thought and Philosophy and the Exact Sciences. This being the origin of the book, there will necessarily be several immediate aims. But they all combine in the one ultimate aim : to bring forth the feeling for philosophy, the philosophical spirit and mood, 'der philosophische Sinn,' as the Germans would call it.

Contrary to recently-expressed views, I found that the best means of producing this mental attitude was to give a short history of Philosophy, after giving a matter of present discussion as a fixed point of departure on the historical journey into remote ages. The further removed the

subject, the greater is the appeal to the sympathetic power, and therefore I have dealt more explicitly with the earlier philosophers and their systems; assuming that the novice can proceed more easily alone, after he has been led, until he has become acquainted with the aim philosophers had posited to themselves, the spirit with which they were imbued, and the language they spoke.

Though there exist several excellent short histories of philosophy, there may still be need of a book treating the subject more as an introduction and incentive to that study than those which have hitherto appeared. It was therefore deemed inexpedient to encumber the body of the work with exhaustive expositions and numerous references. However, I feel bound to remark that the works and teachings of Professor Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg have strongly influenced me in the composition of this essay.

It may be a mistake to write a book with any aim besides that immediately contained in the question it discusses; and it may be impolitic to challenge comparison between the loftiness of the

intention and the imperfection of its realisation. However this may be, there always remains a consolation in the fact, that the aim was worth striving for.

THE AUTHOR.

BRUNECK, TIROL, *Sept.* 20, 1878.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE one feature of which we become conscious in reflecting upon all developments is—progress from the simple to the complex. From the Protoplasm upwards, we notice a splitting up of one body into parts, a step from the uniform to the manifold: *General Differentiation*. The seed of one plant is developed into another separate organism; a single human family becomes the origin of widely extending tribes; states found colonies which become independent states,—everywhere a transition from the single and simple to the multiple and complex.

The same process is noticeable in the growth of mind. Feelings are at first distinguished quantitatively, *i.e.* in regard to their intensity, duration, and volume; and then we distinguish certain qualities of feeling. At first we feel fear, and can only perceive a difference in the intensity of this feeling at certain moments,—stronger and weaker fear; but later on we distinguish different species of fear independently of their strength. We may call one subjective state a 'numb' fear, a dead fear, another a thrilling fear, still

another a vague fear, or a distinct fear, or a restless or a wasting fear, etc. Formerly all fear was the same to us; perhaps it only existed in our consciousness, not by its own right, but by right of the simpler feeling of pain of which fear may be a complex state. We have now differentiated these great general masses into smaller special groups.¹

Man is originally, by nature, a very hasty generaliser. We perceive one attribute in things, just as such an attribute is related to our subjectivity, *i.e.* as such an attribute is or is not related to our interests, and we class together all things that possess this one attribute. Because all men with whom the infant makes acquaintance have beards to pull, or watches that tick, like the infant's father, all men are called

¹ Music, which for a long while has been the art appealing so immediately to our senses, is a good guide as an analogy to represent this process of differentiation. In its earlier and simpler stages all musical composition might have been classed into two great groups, and the pretensions such compositions raised did not seem to surpass such a classification. There was joyful music and sad music, and though the different destinations, the occasions and places of their performance, provided them with names, such as dance music, sacred music, serenades, etc., still, the turning-point in their classification to all hearers was the sad or joyful tone. To a great extent these two great divisions still cling to music; but it has frequently become quite secondary, and we have independent, self-sufficient subdivisions. A piece of music has more and more been consciously written to express, and we receive it as the expression of, all the different fine shadings of joy, from silent mirth to passionate rapture, and of sadness, from sweet melancholy to despairing frenzy. Nay, it has associated with its tones complex intellectual attributes, from the restless toiling and battling of a great mind to the cheery innocence of a child and the tender solicitude of a mother. We can frequently frame a more vivid picture of a distant nation from one of its national melodies than from volumes of description.

'papa,' or 'uncle,' or 'man ;' and it is by long struggle and great expense of mental energy that we are at last presented by infants with an individuality. Thought in its progress tends to distinguish between things that were formerly mixed together. We rise from the chaotic whole to the cosmic multiplicity, from the general and vague to the individual and definite.

It has been one of the great tasks of Science thus to establish differences, and to recognise the many subtle features which constitute the special nature of things, and it has thereby facilitated our correct action upon them. But along with this tendency of mind there is another, which has been and is the cause of great error—the spirit of Antagonism. It is this spirit which, as an instinct, we notice in ants, when they consider all that are not of their own tribe to be enemies, and accordingly fall upon the stranger and kill him. It is the spirit which made the word 'dislike,' originally meaning the absence of positive fondness, synonymous with mild hatred. And this spirit of antagonism manifests itself in the world of thought, and especially in that direction of thought which I have just mentioned. The step from perceiving two things to be different to supposing them to be directly opposed is but a short one. This, together with our natural desire to make what is but transient lasting, what is but relative absolute, has driven us to make things that are but relatively different, *i.e.* different under certain aspects, at certain times, *absolutely*

different, different in their very essence. When once we have distinguished between two aspects of the same thing, and habitually do so, we at last only speak of these elements of difference until we forget or ignore their fundamental agreement. It is needless to show how vicious are the results of such a fallacy, and how erroneous becomes our whole consideration of such objects. It is the duty of those engaged in philosophy and criticism to lead us back to the original agreement of these wrongly opposed things, and, after emphatically demonstrating it, to define anew their difference ; to show the harmony and then to point out the different tones which together constitute the harmony.

Such an ill-used pair of correlatives are Emotion and Intellect, and the disturbing influence of a false opposition of these two elements of mind reaches further than may at first be supposed. Many fallacies concerning the most tangible as well as the most abstract subjects can finally be traced back to this elementary false opposition. It shall be my task in this essay to expose this fallacy, together with some kindred errors, and to attempt to remedy them.

CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.—THE RELATION BETWEEN EMOTION AND INTELLECT.

IF by an effort we rise to a point of view in relation to matters of life above our ordinary one,—if we attempt to be not merely a link in the continuous chain of social life-struggle, but mentally to step out of it and try to overlook the interlinking of life, and to acquire a bird's-eye view of the whole,—we can perceive what are termed general tendencies.

If we make this effort in regard to thought, we may notice a tendency among some men of science respecting the question we have to deal with,—the relation between Emotion and Intellect. There is a tendency to favour Intellect, and to disfavour, if not actually to repress, Emotion.

The chain of reasoning runs thus : Children are more emotional ; grown-up people are more intellectual and less emotional. Mankind in its childhood, in earlier days, was more emotional, and has grown, and is still growing, more intellectual and less emotional. This is the course of development, and we ought to act in accordance with it.

This is faulty reasoning, for, first, the true nature of Emotion and of Intellect has been lost sight of; and, second, such a conception of development is fatalistic. Mental development is the sum and result of all mental action; it is not a something that from without pushes us in a certain direction; but the united action of our faculties gives both motion and direction.

Another reason for the misconception concerning the true nature of Emotion is a more personal one.

When, in endeavouring to teach arithmetic, your pupil persists in saying twice 2 is 5, and not 4, and instead of proving it simply says, 'He *feels* that it is so,' it will be natural for you to be indignant both with him and with the principle which furnishes a pretext for this absurdity. Well, some men oppose the laws and truths of Science, and, when pressed, seek to justify themselves on the ground of Emotion. I do not say that it is done in bad faith; with the greatest number it arises from a misunderstanding of the true nature of Emotion and its relation to Intellect.

What is more natural and *human* for those who in turn oppose these men, than to combat both their faulty conclusions, and, in the heat of the combat, the supposed allied power? But an old proverb says, 'One must not pour out the child with the bath-water,' and the whole confusion can be overcome by learning thoroughly what Emotion and Intellect are, and what is the relation between them.

Emotion, then, is the moving power of mind, and Intellect the guiding power.

The simplest, lowest form of this moving element in

man we call Sensation. We notice still lower forms of the same element in animals and plants. But here we are only dealing with man and the human mind. The highest and most complex form of this mental motor power I call the Emotions, and of these we have three large classes: the Ethical, the Æsthetical, and the Cognitive Emotions—having for their corresponding objects the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Emotion is the bridge over which all action must pass; be it through feelings, like pleasure and pain, liking or dislike, admiration or disgust, we must have felt before we can be driven to outwardly-manifest action, or even inward mental action,—thought. Even a cognition must be supported by an emotional state before it can be an effective guide to conduct.

SECTION II.—FEELING AND KNOWING.

The Cognitive Emotion is called Belief. It is the subjective state of mind corresponding to truth; the ultimate test of each belief is its power to drive us on to its corresponding action. There are numerous inward tests of belief; but the only true test of a firm belief is this moving power. Many a man believes in the strength of his character; but if he represents with vivid imagination the alluring temptations which he is to undergo, his belief may waver. The best instance of such a test is afforded by George Eliot in *Romola*, where a great man, convinced of his prophetic vocation, has to submit to this final test his belief in a super-

natural intervention on his own behalf, by walking through fire. "Not that Savonarola had uttered and written a falsity when he declared his belief in a future supernatural attestation of his work ; but his mind was so constituted that while it was easy for him to believe in a miracle which, being distant and undefined, was screened behind the strong reasons he saw for its occurrence, and yet easier for him to have a belief in inward miracles, such as his own prophetic inspiration and divinely-wrought intuitions ; it was at the same time insurmountably difficult to him to believe in the probability of a miracle which, like this of being carried unhurt through the fire, pressed in all its details on his imagination, and involved a demand not only for belief, but for exceptional action."

What do we mean by saying a truth is clear to us?—when we suddenly clap our hands, rise from our desk and pace the room, saying, 'I see, I see!'—when after a long conversation in which A endeavours to explain to B the relation between Heat and Force, Labour and Capital, B suddenly opens his eyes, taps his forehead, and exclaims, 'I have it now!' We have read the same words before, heard the same sentences over and over again ; we have understood every single part, but we have not put them together ; there was no *Synthesis*. At last, we hold it all, as it were, with one grasp, and we no longer say, 'I see,' but '*I feel how true that is.*'

Every time, as children, the words 'Honesty is the best policy,' or, 'Procrastination is the thief of time,' were repeated to us, the effect upon our mind was, that at first we hardly understood their verbal meaning ;

afterwards, they were so frequently repeated, and became so truly commonplace, that they had no power to stimulate our thoughts, and we either paid no attention to them, or even discredited them. Suddenly, one day, a cleverly-hidden dishonesty is discovered; or we find how much we really accomplish by doing things immediately. The vast amount of truth in such a rough-and-ready epigram, before underrated, now stands before us—and we say, ‘How true that is! The proverb ought to be reserved for moments like the present. The inventors even of the proverb have not fully understood its drift.’ We feel as though we had newly invented it—it is born anew, at least in that deep signification. And what has caused all this? We understood every word in the adage before; not a word has been omitted, not a word has been added: the subject-matter is the same. Well, we have now for the first time *felt* the weight of the whole; it is clear to us, a part of us; it can move us on to action; *it has become emotional*. A great truth—a law of nature—is only then our own when we have fully mastered it, and embodied it into our mind; when it has become part of us—then only can it be of any effect in our action, and become a motive.

We knew our multiplication-table by heart long before we had really grasped it. We have had the law of the Conservation of Energy preached to us, and we assent to every particular part of the whole, and yet do not fully conceive its all-pervading influence. Only when we are thoroughly imbued with it, when it has gone over ‘*in succum et sanguinem*,’ into flesh and

blood, can it be a guide to our actions. A great philosopher has said: 'You may adopt all the signs of highest enlightenment, and still not be as enlightened as he who has the little he possesses well founded in his brain.'

Your cognition must become an instinct which will drive you on to action; but, not as the other instincts, now to good, and now to bad actions; but always to the same. In this sense we can understand Professor Huxley's words: ¹ 'It is important, not so much to know a thing, as to *have known* it, and known it thoroughly.' You may not remember a single date in history, and still have a keener and a more philosophical sense for history, a stronger power of sympathy with a distant age, than he who knows every historical event, every date, every name by heart. A dialogue of Plato; a Parthenon frieze; an ode of Horace; a canto from Dante; a stiff, angular picture of Albrecht Dürer; a troubadour's song, or one of Hans Sachs, the master of the poets' guild; a scene from Molière, or a pastel of Boucher; a novel of Fielding;—these may waft to you a fresh odour from the Academy gardens, or the Acropolis in old Athens; a warm breeze from Tiburnum; a reviving breath of the Renaissance; a soft and strong rustling in the branches of a middle-aged oak; a whiff of air from under some stiff Gothic arch of old Nürnberg, where each profession had its garb; a puff of perfume from the handkerchief of an enamelled, high-heeled Rococo lady; and the sound of a heavy well-meant oath, of an old English country gentleman.

¹ *American Addresses.*

SECTION III.—SCIENCE AND ART.

To produce such an entire frame of mind, a mood, is the remoter aim of Science, as it is of Art. Art and Science correspond to some extent respectively to Feeling and Cognition, and, like them, are apt to be too strongly opposed to one another. This, however, as we shall see, is also a mistake.

Both must bring forth a whole mood of mind in order to impel us to action,¹ but they fulfil the same end from different directions: the one—Science—through single representations, brings forth a mood; the other, through a mood, enables us to form single representations. Here, too, I must remark that in some instances the line between Art and Science is very difficult to be drawn: some art has so much of the scientific element in it, and some science so much of the artistic. Some parts of Shakespeare are so deep, that we cannot say whether it is beauty or truth that moves us; the architecture of some of Mr. Herbert Spencer's books is so beautiful, that for some moments we cannot tell whether it be the harmony of form or depth of meaning that impresses us. But let us take extreme instances, where we can more readily draw the line. Let us take Logic and Music.

A chapter of Mill, through many single thoughts, at least if we have mastered it, brings forth a mood, which may have its effect upon our actions: through

¹ By action, I mean both inward mental action (thought) and outwardly-manifest action.

numerous ideas we may arrive at a general mood, and so Logic may become a guide to conduct. Our cognitions must become emotional.

A fine piece of music, with far greater directness, puts us into a certain mood, relatively vague; but out of this mood, again, we can call forth single ideas. Who, on hearing a fugue of Bach, can help seeing before his mind's eye some more or less graphic representation of a vast interweaving of sound, well bounded by a strict and almost Philistine sense of order and law? Who can hear a great sonata or symphony of Beethoven without numerous pictures pressing themselves forward upon his attention, it may be, half-consciously and involuntarily? Who has heard a Hungarian rhapsody of Liszt, and has not heard the sound of the Lower Danube, a melancholy, deeply sentimental strain, or a sudden bacchanalian outburst from the land of the Magyars?

There is unmistakably a tendency in the development of Music to define and hedge in the field of ideas thus conveyed by it; as the language of words must have grown more and more distinct, gaining more and more power to mark out particular portions of the large vague classes formerly denoted. Our general moods stimulate to special cognitions.

Science and Art are not the implacable foes that seek to possess the mind exclusively, or not at all; they are friends that extend hands to greet one another, and strive together for the advancement of humanity. Were a scientific work not harmonious in its structure it would not be what we call clear; the deepest truth in

the philosopher's brain must take a harmonious shape in order to become clear to others, and even to himself. And the most laboured conception of art will be monstrous, and can never call forth in us the feeling of beauty if it be not one executed according to fact and nature.

As a true point of difference within the agreement between Science and Art, we may mention that Art *qua* Art (*i.e.* the less it adopts the means of Science, as Poetry uses logical language) calls forth representations arising out of the mood, which are not directly and essentially determined by the stimuli which evoked the mood, so that, as we have seen, the mood caused by the hearing of a piece of music may call forth anything but musical representations. But the cognitions resulting from the scientific mood will be directly and essentially determined by its stimuli to that mood.

If Emotion is thus the stimulus to all action, it is unreasonable to suppose that, as long as we can conceive human mind and human action, it will be or ought to be repressed, and that we can get on with the guiding power alone.

CHAPTER II.

SECTION I.—COMMON AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (ORIGIN OF SCIENCE.)

I MAINTAIN that this marked antithesis of Intellect and Emotion is a typical instance of a fallacy, as common as it is easily committed, as readily accepted as it is pernicious in its results upon thought. It is the fallacy with respect to the Opposition of Propositions, which consists in not distinguishing the contrary of a proposition from the contradictory of it. There groups around this pair of contradictories, Intellect and Emotion, mistaken for contraries, a number of similar correlatives, similarly misconceived. And, avowed or merely tacitly implied, these antitheses are related, be it as cause or as effect, to the fundamental opposition of Intellect and Emotion. Such correlatives thus misused are, *e.g.* Theory and Practice, Common and Scientific Thought, Science and Practical Life—and even Philosophy and the Exact Sciences.

Apart from the interest attached to an elucidation of these questions themselves, they have such an immediate bearing upon our more restricted topic, that to overlook them would be like contemplating the central piece of a landscape and closing our eyes to the

fore- and back-ground. In practical life we act more by instinct, more by our feelings, and do not dissect these instincts, do not build up theories as to the motives of our actions—our actions are directly the outward manifestations of our Emotions. In theoretical life, in Science, we are, on the contrary, to rid ourselves as much as possible from all subjective feelings, and examine the objects of our research as they present themselves, and not as we would have them; we are more guided by our Intellect. So Practical Life and Science are nothing more than Emotion and Intellect as they manifest themselves to us when we view them from the point of manifest action, of Life—of their results. But both Practice and Theory spring from human Emotion—both are born by the moving power of the human mind, and are merely different forms of a unit,—not absolutely opposed to one another.

How did theory, scientific thought, originate with man? There is no doubt a difference between Common and Scientific Thought, though it be merely in time, as sooner or later in the individual, or in the history of the human race, lower or higher in the evolution of mind.

As in the great economical organism of the social world, so also in the individual man, we find a tendency to economise labour with regard to thought, to get the greatest profit with the smallest expense of energy.¹

Instead of following the sides of a parallelogram, there

¹ An interesting treatise has recently been published by Dr. R. Avenarius, on *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses*. Leipzig, 1876.

is a natural tendency to find and follow the diagonal ; instead of running zigzag across country, one seeks and constructs the straightest, shortest road. In common thought men run across field, one this way, another that ; there is no uniformity, no recognised shortest way. At last the road is found and proclaimed, and now all go smoothly by this road, saving time and trouble. Language itself seems to point to this fact : the later, higher acquisition of the human mind is the road-finding and the following of the road, *μετὰ ὁδός=μέθοδος*=method, in contradistinction to common thought.

Now (to keep to the metaphor) I must lay stress upon the fact, that the difference between the scientific and the unscientific man does not lie in the latter's walking and the former's not walking at all ; they both walk. But the methodical mind follows the safe road, saving time and trouble, accomplishing more—finding new roads on other fields—*progressing* ; while the unmethodical hastily rushes on, stumbles, plunges into quagmires, and finally arrives at the goal (if at all) long after the other has left and has found new roads for his fellow-strivers.

Let us take a definite instance. An old farmer tills his fields for sixty years. He has learnt, by personal observation and the bitter experience of bad crops, the rules governing the rotation and alternation of crops. Many other things he has learnt concerning the soil, and the weather, and the seed, and the cattle. Now let a sudden change take place in the constitution of the soil, or let him remove to a different farm, he will be

helpless, and through much guessing and blundering he will struggle on. This many call the 'not abstruse knowing.'

In some universities and academies there is taught a science of Agriculture. Besides its special branches, this science has for auxiliaries Chemistry (a special branch called Agricultural Chemistry), Physics, Zoology, Botany, Mineralogy, etc. By means of a simple analysis the young student can ascertain the component parts of any soil of which he has a small specimen; he can also ascertain, by referring to his books, how each kind of soil should be treated. Of such a nature is his training. He has an equal chance of gathering personal experience with our farmer. But let us see what advantage the methodically-trained farmer has.

He has the advantage over the old farmer: first, that no revolution of the soil, no change can affect him—he is equally at home on every soil; and, second, his mind has been so trained that he can more readily receive and put into their proper place all the data he acquires through personal experience; he is not overpowered by the mass of material, his head is not muddled; and so he can make better use of his experience after having properly grasped and mastered it; he has a trained mind.

This, of course, many call 'abstruse knowledge'! The science of Agriculture is nothing more than the amassed experience of many clever farmers and other specialists. It is like an old farmer, many thousand years old, with silver-white locks and clear eyes—a venerable old man!

SECTION II.—SPECIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY.

There is also a science¹ called Philosophy. It is commonly held to be, of all that is 'abstruse,' 'the most abstruse.' Well, it is not so 'abstruse' to those who take the trouble to see what a name means. But, like all honest striving for truth, it is moral, and, when we look deeper into its nature, it is simple.²

I have represented the science of Agriculture to be the amassed experience of individual farmers, which amassed experience again reacts upon the individual, enabling him to gather new data more readily, and to see what might before have been unseen by him. So there is a continual action and reaction between the individual, as a knowing being, and the mass of former individual experience, together with his immediately-surrounding mental atmosphere. As in a state with a representative form of government the individual is guided in his conduct, in so far as he is a citizen, by the laws passed by Parliament, but again is expected to cast his vote in choosing the representative member, thereby influencing the character of the laws passed.

As the individual farmers were to the science of Agriculture, so are the special sciences to Philosophy. The special sciences furnish the material for philosophic generalisations, and Philosophy again furnishes the

¹ This use of the word 'science' may seem unwarranted to those who have fixed the denotation of that word to the exact sciences. But such an arbitrary limitation has been a source of frequent error.

² The great question concerning the first act of experience or unconscious experience, etc., we cannot treat of in this essay.

specialist with the groundwork on which he can gather experience, jump from what is known to what is as yet unknown, espy the relation between the things he sees and himself, both as a purely mental knowing being, and as a living, a digesting being, and turn this experience to use in discovering its bearing upon conduct: thereby adapting his conduct to circumstances.

Philosophy contemplates phenomena in their more immediate bearing upon man. When a chemist makes an analysis, he does not, at the moment he experiments, consider the relation between this phenomenon and his own self or human mind; he does not consider the relation between the object of his examination and the subject that examines. It is the business of philosophy to attempt to do this. Philosophy is more conscious knowing, because it brings everything nearer the focus of the subject itself. And so it again reacts upon science and individuals.

I have likened Special Science to Parliament, the legislative body. That part of the political organism which carries out these laws and enforces them, whose business it is to see these laws in their bearings upon the essence of state, namely, the individuals which compose it, which more directly deals with the welfare of citizens, is called the Executive body. Similarly does Philosophy deal with phenomena in their most immediate connection with the subject which perceives phenomena, viz. human mind.

There is circulation as well in the intricate organism called a state as in the mental organism called human knowledge. The people, in constitutional states, sur-

render the right of ruling into certain hands, still reserving some influence through electing representatives. Parliament passes laws, the Executive enforces them, and thus again reacts upon citizens,—watching over the legality of their acts, directly furthering education and commerce, protecting the country within and without, etc. This again makes citizens more able to use their influence in the proper manner, in selecting their government:—and so there is a continual action and reaction.

Individuals, in common thought, classify their experience on certain subjects, thus generating the special sciences; and this experience forming the special sciences, when further generalised, gives us Philosophy. Philosophy reacts upon individual thought, making it more methodical, less liable to go wrong, and giving a firm ground on which to collect all experience—so again influencing the philosophy that follows this ameliorated special thought and science. Here also continual action and reaction. Our analogy holds good even on closer examination.

This state of the circulation of thought is not necessary nor invariable. Men may think, and have thought, without a manifested philosophy; and sometimes the special sciences are omitted, and there is an immediate jump from common thought to philosophical speculation. That is as true as it is that men can be conceived to live, and have lived, without a state organisation, in the present meaning of that phrase, and that there have been states without a legislative body or parliament mediating between individuals and the executive.

SECTION III.—CLASSIFICATION OF DIFFERENT
BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY.

Now this Science of Philosophy is divided into several branches, according to the objects it is specially concerned with ; but there is in all of them the one point of agreement, that they study phenomena in their most immediate relation to the subject which knows—*i.e.* the human mind.

Psychology.

As numerous philosophers have pointed out, in nature '*non datur saltus*,' there are no hiatuses in nature. Nor is there a leap in our classification of the sciences. It is one of the most difficult and hazardous tasks to find and draw the line between nearly-related things. Between the special sciences and philosophy lies that department of investigation which we call Psychology. It means literally the science of the soul. We mean, by soul, that which thinks. Anatomy deals with the structure of the body, and Physiology with its functions. Now Psychology deals with the functions of mind, namely, thought and feelings (in their lowest and highest manifestations), and, as far as they have been ascertained, with the 'organs' of thought, or rather with those physical phenomena which appear to be concerned in thought. So Psychology has two great fields from which it draws knowledge. The one is reflection upon mental phenomena—introspection ; or, as we might inadequately express it, 'inward

experience ;' and the other is the vast field of physical science (especially physiology)—'outward experience,' in so far as it throws light upon the nature of the mind.

This double nature of Psychology has been expressed by an eminent German psychologist (Fechner) in the word 'Psycho-Physic : ' 'psycho' laying stress upon the introspective, and 'physic' on the experimental element. Psychology has for its aim to show how thoughts and feelings arise, and *what thinking is*.

Logic.

Logic learns from Psychology the powers of thought ; but its aim is not to show how we think, but *how we ought to think*, *i.e.* how we are to think correctly, and how we are to avoid fallacies. Whenever we think correctly we are logical, whenever we commit an error we are illogical. Now we are all liable to make mistakes, as well the most scientific thinker as the uneducated labourer ; but the logically-trained is far less liable to make a mistake, and, when he does, is far more likely to discover it and correct it ; and he will think far more effectively than the untrained. The untrained speculate as well as the scientific ; but their generalisations, resting only upon a few occasional data, appear insecure both to themselves and others ; they float in the air without a solid footing ; they at every moment construct a haphazard logic of their own. They are like tourists who buy a pair of thin slippers for their long walk : their feet ache, they drag along over sharp stones, and at every station must buy a new pair ; they suffer from the

pain their cut feet cause them, they can hardly move on, and frequently lie down in despair on the road-side, and dream of lands where they need not walk at all, and are even recompensed for not walking. Those, however, who have trained themselves to think logically are like tourists who, making a greater outlay once for all, buy a pair of stout walking boots; their feet are not cut, their spirits are high, they move over the ground at a rapid pace, and leave the foolish, obstinate foot-sore travellers behind.

The logical thinker has always his testing apparatus with him; he need not at every instance construct an unsafe testing apparatus while he ought to be testing. When we have once found an algebraic formula to be correct, we make use of it, and save a great deal of trouble. Without such a formula we should waste much time continually reconstructing the simple truth which it embodies. Logic is an apparatus for testing past thoughts and their expression, and at the same time a guide to the discovery of new truths.

But in this general survey of things in their relation to the human mind, we find that truth is not the only thing we recognise and strive after. There is also Goodness and Beauty. The science which deals with things (including thoughts, etc.) in so far as they are good is called Ethics; that which deals with them in so far as they are beautiful, *Æsthetics*.

Ethics.

Ethics may be and has been split up into two parts.

(1.) Things may be good inasmuch as they bring

advantage, give pleasure, remove pain; and thoughts may be good inasmuch as they lead to advantageous and pleasure-bringing actions. Then the ultimate test for the good thought would lie in the result of its corresponding action; more precisely, in the advantageousness or pleasurable-ness of this action: its utility, or its power of giving pleasure. The further question, upon whom this utility or pleasure reflects, is answered by some with, The individual, the *Ego*; by others, Humanity; still by others, The greatest number of people, etc. And so we have the division of Moralists into Hedonists and Utilitarians and Egoists, etc. These philosophers have generally been dissatisfied with the word 'good.' They have said that it does not stand for a simple or ultimate idea, and they have also pointed to the numerous misuses and abuses to which this word has been subjected.

(2.) The second great division of Moralists split Ethics into two great classes, Ethics proper and Pragmatics—the science of the Morally-Good and of the Pragmatically-Good, *i.e.* the Useful. For them things are never morally-good; nor are actions good as actions. Merely the conviction, the thought is good. And their criterion is a fundamental ethical law, for which they claim universal recognition. The results of an action may be useful or harmful—they do not make an action good or bad; but the congruity or incongruity of our thoughts with the fundamental law of our conscience does determine its moral character. When a man has done a pragmatically-good action, we say, 'How wise or discreet he is!' When a man has done a

morally-good action, whatever be the results, we say, 'How good he is!'

The Utilitarian does not recognise this twofold distinction. He says the morally-good is an emanation of the pragmatically-good, and the ultimate test of the morally-good cannot be left to a personal, vacillating feeling, but lies in the results of the action.

The difference between the two may be summed up epigrammatically:—

The Utilitarian, the Hedonist, etc., says: The *Good* is the *good for* (me, humanity, the majority, etc.)

The other says: The Good is the good conviction which is in harmony with the supreme ethical law.

Ethics, therefore, in defining the nature of the good, becomes a guide to conduct.

Æsthetics.

Æsthetics deals with things inasmuch as they call forth in us the feelings of beauty. If we regard things in the light of our desires, of our interest, we should not be likely to discover their beauty; we should not be likely to find in them those attributes of beauty which would be accorded to them by all people. There would be no uniformity of opinion whatever, and we could never approach a science of the laws governing beauty. Opinions would be as different as human interests are, which latter, luckily for us, do not converge upon the same point. In judging a chair according to comfort, one would disapprove of its straight back, another would dislike its long legs, still another

would find that the seat was not sufficiently slanting, and so on. But when viewed æsthetically, *i.e.* disinterestedly, merely in regard to the beauty and harmony of its form, every one with normally human senses would admire the roundness of the curved arms, the fine lines of the carving, the delicate design of the embroidered coverings. And this uniformity of admiration is the more guaranteed the less our individual desires and interests come into play.

The science which attempts to lay down the general laws of beauty in every form is called *Æsthetics*. It has to deal with all the manifestations of beauty up to the present day, the whole history of art, and must also attempt to show what ought to be done in the future. Like Logic, it is to be a guide as well as a test; or rather, a guide by being a test.


Metaphysics.

Finally we come to *Metaphysics*. This word has suffered the most singular usage not only by the unphilosophical, but also by philosophers. It has been twisted and cramped and stretched in all directions and into all dimensions. It was first affixed to those treatises of Aristotle which came after *Physics*, *i.e.* (according to some) which goes beyond *Physics*, which treats of the transcendent, the supranatural. Aristotle meant it to be the science of First Principles, of the Essence of Things, and probably called it *Πρώτη Φιλοσοφία*, or *Μέθοδος περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης* (Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, ii. 2. 58, note). By essence

was meant that which remains of a thing after one subtracts all its physical accidents,—the *pure existence*. So, later, especially in the Middle Ages, Metaphysics became the Science of Being, and was called Ontology. Another view is, that certain books were called ‘those following the Physics’ (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικῇ), because they actually did follow the treatises on Physics. This sounds like a very superficial interpretation of a fact which has been dug for far below the ground.

With us Metaphysics now means the science of the highest generalisations. It sums up all knowledge ; shows us the field of the *Knowable*, and points to the dim regions of the *Unknowable* (as Mr. Spencer would term it) ; or (using the language of Mr. Lewes) it shows us the region of possible experience, the *Empirical*, and warns us against that which surpasses experience, the *Metempirical*. It deals with the postulates which precede all Psychology, Logic, etc. Only by force of its assumptions can we go on laying down laws of Logic. It is the groundwork of Philosophy, and treats all the other philosophical studies as special data for its supreme generalisations. Knowledge has here fulfilled its circle ; for it has come to the final stage in the generalisation of experience, which exhibits at the same time the necessary elements of all experience. When human thought has passed through all these stages of Philosophy, it is prepared to return to special investigation with far greater success. Let us represent this curriculum in the following scheme, in which *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., designate common thought and the special sciences

before they have passed through Philosophy, and A, B, C, etc., the same sciences after they have added their special tribute to universal knowledge, and have become philosophised, more scientific.



SECTION IV.—WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY?

The word Philosophy is composed of two Greek words meaning 'love' and 'wisdom.'¹

An object which evokes love draws us toward it, we feel the want of it and we *strive* towards it.

We call a man wise when he suits the proper means to the proper ends. But, in order thus to adapt means to ends, we must *know* the end and the means and the relation subsisting between them. And we must not be

¹ An eminent contemporary philosopher, Professor Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg, is wont to begin his lectures on the History of Philosophy with this literal definition.

mistaken about the relation between things, but they must be the *true* representation of things and their relation, *i.e.* Truth. Philosophy then in its widest signification would be the Striving for Truth ; though it is commonly used to signify the body of truth itself.

But, one may say, the essential nature of truth is, that it is *one*, excluding change. How then can there be a *history of truth*? 'If you have truth, then be done with it ; if you cannot find it, then cease from seeking!' This conception of truth may be quite adequate for him who still believes that the earth is a plate-like body resting firmly in noble repose on something else, which again lies in noble repose, and so on ; but not for him who knows that the earth revolves. If there were no change, no progress, no development, no life,—in fact no existence,—then would this be a conceivable representation of truth. But, happily for us, there is this change, this life, this development. Nature is continually changing, new forms are continually being evolved ; so the relation between things is in continual transmutation, as also the relation between things and the conceiving mind. Mind itself is also subject to evolution. I have said before, that we call him a wise man who adapts himself to his surroundings. Now, if the surroundings of man change, if he himself, by means of his reason, changes his surroundings, must not he, then, adapt himself to his environment in its new form, *i.e.* must he not become conscious of this changed relation? It is true, we do not know all. Nor would it be desirable. There would be no striving for truth,

there would be no thought ; for we should not have the mother of all thought, the feeling of our ignorance. Just because truth has not been shed over us like a golden rain do we think at all. The great Lessing says : ‘ If the Almighty came to me and said, “ My son, here, in my left hand, is truth, pure, unmixed ; and here, in my right, is truth mixed with error,—which dost thou desire ? ” I should say, “ Lord, give me thy right hand ! ” ’ There is a striving for truth which is as natural as hunger and thirst. By means of truth man originally found with what to sate his hunger and slake his thirst. Man grew and grows more and more conscious, *i.e.* he perceives more and more the relation between things and his own mind—he becomes more and more self-conscious. Philosophy is the most conscious knowing.

We are most likely to know a thing perfectly when we see how it became what it is. We know a man best when we have seen him grow up, watched his education, known his parents, and traced up his character through all its forms, until it became moulded into its present shape. We know ourselves best when we know how we have come by our knowledge, how we are a member of our society, of our nation, of our time. We know our society and our nation best when we see how they differ from others, when we study other societies and other nations. And, finally, we know our own time best when we know how it grew up out of former time, when we study the *culture* and *thought* of former ages. And the history of Philosophy is the quintessence of

the culture of former ages, it is the manifested self-consciousness of historical epochs.

But we are taught and know every trivial event in the history of Greece, and are ignorant of the spirit which brought forth these events. We know every single great deed, even many of the domestic affairs, of Alexander the Great, and are not ashamed to be ignorant of the great thoughts of his teacher, Aristotle. We know that there lived a good man called Socrates, who had an ill-tempered wife, and who was forced to drink poison at the instigation of bad men called Sophists. Well, for us, who know so much about that good man, Socrates never existed. If we do not know the thoughts of past ages, nor even the tendency of thought in our own, we do not know the past nor the present—we are ignorant; because we do not like to ‘indulge in those unpractical abstruse speculations.’

Let us attempt to cast a rapid glance over past ages, and see how different epochs have manifested their spirit in the expressed thoughts of philosophers, in the history of past man’s struggle for truth, in the history of philosophy.

We shall begin with the stage in which truth and knowledge were sought more for their *own* sake, and not as the casual efflux of some expressed religion. We shall not treat of the intensely interesting religious speculations of Chinese and Indian theology, but we begin with the dawning of that light which has added to the brightness even of our own culture,—light which for centuries had been rendered dim (though never

totally extinct), by a mystic veil thrown over it, allowing but few of its rays, altered and discoloured, to gleam faintly upon the later world, until it was 'born anew,' and has now mingled with and become part (as it was parent) of our own light,—I mean Greek Philosophy.

AN OUTLINE OF A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

A. GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER III.

PRE-SOCRATIC PERIOD.

SECTION I.—ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE INDIVIDUAL, AND DIVISION OF GREEK PHILO- SOPHY.

YOUTH is by nature egotistical. Without studied or conscious selfishness, a child considers things and persons only in the light of its own desires, its pleasure, its pain, its liking and dislike. Nothing is more unconsciously and sweetly selfish than a baby. It soon begins to feel its great importance in the household—and parents, older brothers and sisters, and even visitors, are expected to take great heed of the *tel est notre plaisir* of these little frocked tyrants. When we grow up to be boys, the fields only exist for us inasmuch as we have good games on their bread-giving plains; the brooks, merely because we can let our little boats drift about on them, or wade about in them; our uncles, as sources of occa-

sional revenue ; our schoolmasters, as sources of constant annoyance. Everything is reflected in the little mirror of our own wants and desires.

When we draw nearer to the threshold of manhood we grow more pensive, and one day, lying idly on the green field of our sports, by the little brook of our play, we suddenly look upon things in a new light. We do not think of cricket or of boating, a new and unwonted vision rises before our eyes—the mystical and tempting figure of the ‘Why’ and the ‘Wherefore’ stands before us. The meadow and the brook appear in quite a new light, in fact they seem now only to be truly perceived by us. Before, not they, but the cricket and wading were what existed ; only now the meadow and the brook really seem to exist, *i.e.* exist for us to ask what they are. What are the brook and its water, and the meadow and its grass, and the hills, and the valleys, and my school, and my home, and my books, and my teacher, and what does he teach me ? *What, in short, is nature ?*

The question the thinking boy thus asks himself, though he does not, or cannot, express it in so clear a manner, resolves itself into the following : He sees the meadow changing every day he looks at it ; new grass, changing in tint, now erect, now excited by a gust of wind, or trodden down by the heavy foot of the pasturing cattle, or bending beneath the light weight of a stray butterfly. He sees the sky change and the people change ; and, as a type of change, the brooklet, the same, yet ever new :

‘For men may come, and men may go,
But I go on for ever.’

He sees—that his seeing consists in perceiving a *multiplicity* of things.

And he desires to see that which remains in all this change, the unity in this multiplicity, the thingness in these many things, that which binds them all together and keeps the universe (Kosmos) from being a muddled and confused mass of differences (Chaos);—call this the principle, the essence, the substance of things, the element, the divine idea, the λόγος, the world-soul, or by any such name which implies that great question!

Now, later on, when the boy has sated himself with asking such questions, and ‘with feeble hands and helpless, groping blindly in the darkness,’ he has exhausted himself at attempting to answer them, there will come a moment when again a new light is thrown upon the dark regions. Here he has been asking what nature is, what this thing and what that thing is, what constitutes this *object*; and he has never thought of asking, What is the *subject* that perceives these objects, the subject without whom the object cannot be conceived? He now asks, What am I? and how do I come to be asking at all? how do I come to apprehend the parts which compose this puzzling multiplicity? *What, in short, is man?*

And then only can he ask, with renewed consciousness, and with better prospect of a satisfactory answer: What is nature?

Very similar to this natural flow of thought in the individual has been the course of thought in Philosophy.

We may divide Greek Philosophy into two great parts,

according to the manner in which the ancients thus put their supreme question. There is a third part to Greek Philosophy, which marks its gradual decadence.

In the first great part the chief question asked was: What is nature? What is the essence of things? And the history of the Philosophy of this period consists in the struggle to answer this question. This period is called the Pre-Socratic Period.

Positively Socrates, and negatively the Sophists, have the great merit of having changed the form of the question, and of having turned our glance away from the Macrocosm, Nature, to the Microcosm, Man. The question now ran: What is Man, and hence, what is Nature? We might call this period the Socratic period, inasmuch as the positive impulse came from him; but the luminous stars of this era were Plato and Aristotle. The period of decadence is marked by the tendency of thought to return back to the previous unscientific stage of common life, the period when the boy considered the fields but as cricket grounds. Things are studied not so much to learn their own nature, but for some mediate interested aim. Philosophy becomes more and more directly practical, until it merges into something else. This period we call the Post-Aristotelian period.

With the fall of Greek Philosophy we enter the Christian era, in which the Roman Catholic creed becomes the axletree in the revolving wheel of events. And so Philosophy becomes a kind of accessory to this creed whenever this creed becomes a matter of speculation, when we have what was called Christian *Gnosis*.

The chief representatives of philosophy during this period are called the Schoolmen.

At last comes the Renaissance. Greek Philosophy is as it were 'born anew.' The old Greek authors and philosophers are rediscovered, and, with the aid of the new invention, printing, the knowledge of them is spread. The Reformation, at the same time, breaks through the sealed portals of absolute and dogmatic authority which enveloped theological learning, the study of the Bible and of dogmas, and all the treasures which were considered the birthright of the clergy. With a renewed and almost furious energy, people devour the long-buried treasures of antiquity; again, in a few years, live through the centuries of Greek Philosophy, and open the field for the research of modern time. Then we enter the great era of Modern Philosophy, which still endures—though, as I hold, in our own age, a new phase of development begins to be marked, as grand a period as any which history remembers.

It may be difficult for people of our age, who grow up with the continual use of the telescope, the microscope, the spectroscope, the telegraph and the steam-engine before their eyes, to sympathise with thinkers who lived over 2500 years ago. 'Why, he does not even know the simple facts of Chemistry and Physics and Mathematics which I learned when a child at school.' The fault is with us, not with the ancient thinkers. We can, even now, learn much that is positively useful from these ancient philosophers. But discard this; let the person who is thus judging of the infancy of philo-

sophy, recur to the infancy of thought in himself,—let us say the boy who was asking such peculiar questions while seated on the meadow by the running brook,—then can he readily account for the answers that a remote age gave to similar questions.

SECTION II.—IONIC MATERIALISTS.

I. *Thales.*

Thales of Miletus, who was born about 640 B.C., and died 550 B.C., is the first we have to record as having attempted to solve the philosophical question. He was one of the 'seven sages,' and noticing the various lengths of the shadow of a pillar, is said to have invented the sun-clock. Herodotus reports that he predicted an eclipse of the sun. He asked, 'What is the one element which lies beneath all this change? what is the unit of which all this multiplicity is but a variation of form, out of which things grew, and into which things return?' And looking about in nature, this incipient philosopher saw that of all things the most life-full, the all-encircling, was water. He saw islands that to him seemed to rest upon water; he saw wells dug far beneath the earth's surface, and he was led to think that the earth rested upon water; he saw clouds rising, bearing in them the life-giving element, and returning to the earth in fruitful showers; he saw that living bodies were moist and mobile, and extinct bodies were stiff and dry. And so we can understand how he arrived at the proposition (the only one handed down

to us), Everything springs from water; everything returns to water. Cicero says of him, '*Thales ex aqua dixit constare omnia.*'

2. *Anaximander.*

Thales was the founder of the school called the Ionic Philosophers of Nature—or the Hylozoists (finding the essence of things in matter, ὕλη). They all sought this element, underlying all things, and found it in different forms. So *Anaximander* of Miletus (born 611 B.C.), the pupil of Thales, who is said to have been the first to construct geographical maps of bronze plate, maintained that the principle of things, the first element (ἀρχή) is unbounded, inexhaustible, all-encompassing (ἄπειρον). Now it might appear as if Anaximandros had conceived as the principle an idea; but his ἄπειρον was to him a boundless matter in its simplest form—a form in which we do not perceive it; but one which precedes the simplest forms in which we do perceive matter,—namely, water. The process by which he explains this transition from his simplest form (ἄπειρον) to the manifest forms of matter, is something akin to chemical dissolution; through the 'eternal motion' which is inherent in his first element the primary contrasts of heat and cold originate, and through them again matter is changed into the different forms in which it manifests itself.

3. *Anaximenes.*

Anaximenes, the pupil of Anaximander, is the combining link between his master and Thales. He also

conceives the first principle to be the all-embracing and ever-moving 'boundless;' but he draws nearer to Thales. As Thales thought that water was the principle of all life, Anaximenes, considering the phenomena of breathing, living beings and breathless death, and how the atmosphere encompasses all, found in air this first principle. 'As our soul, being air, makes us one whole, so does breath and air encompass the world.' There were other followers of this first school, such as Hyppo (surnamed Atheos), Ideus of Hidera, and Diogenes of Apollonia.

SECTION III.—THE PYTHAGOREANS.

Now, suppose we were to start in our speculation from the difference of things, and examine closer what constitutes this difference. Formerly, we strove immediately to find the principle of unity without dwelling any longer upon the difference than to be stimulated by it to find the point of agreement. But now let us dwell upon the difference, in hopes that by resolving the nature of difference we may discover unity. We may find that difference consists in difference of form, the different distribution of particles. Difference of form means difference of dimensions. But we only appreciate comparative dimensions by the number of times they contain certain units. To become conscious of different dimensions means that we become conscious of certain *numerical* proportions. (*E.g.* When I perceive the dimensions of an obelisk, become aware of its form, I see the numerical proportion that obtains

between a certain unit, let us say its base, and its height, and depth, etc., be it by calculating exactly, or in one rapid glance inexactly and almost unconsciously.) This numerical proportion will be 'number' as we have it in arithmetic. So we shall not be astonished if a philosopher reasons thus: That which constitutes difference is the form; that which constitutes form is dimension; and dimension again consists in numerical proportion, and the only unvarying basis to numerical proportion is our system of numbers. We shall not be astonished if he finally come to the proposition, 'Number is the essence of things.' For if we deduct all special peculiarities from two things, there may still remain in our mind a numerical relation between the two things, be it in time or in space.

Pythagoras arrived at the above-mentioned proposition, and it was the central point of his doctrine. He was born in the island of Samos about 548 B.C., and died about 504 B.C. He emigrated from his native town and settled in Crotona, a town in one of the Greek colonies of Lower Italy. The Pythagorean League, founded by him, aimed at a moral and political reform of Greece. It is reported to have been a well-constituted body, whose members passed (like Freemasons) through several grades; the laws were very rigorous, and tended to make its members lead a pure and useful life. Its chief and very commendable rule was strict division of time. Every hour had its special occupation,—meals, baths, walks, gymnastics, music, mathematics, medicine, etc. Self-abnegation and friendship were much cultivated.

Number was the essence of Harmony. They sought for harmony in life, and they found it as the leading principle in nature. The physical expression of numerical proportion and harmony they found in sound, in tones, in the harmony of tones, in music. Their conception of the universe is in accordance with these principles: it is an orderly whole, a Kosmos ; it has a centre, which is the unit from which everything radiates to a certain distance, in a certain numerical proportion ; the revolution of the spheres recurs in a certain fixed order, and so do the seasons,—all is harmonious like music ; nay, they let this cosmic harmony weld with musical harmony, and from them comes the phrase, ‘harmony, or music of the spheres.’ The different spheres of the universe are at fixed distances from one another, which distances correspond to the musical intervals of the octave. Every body that revolves uniformly gives a tone, and so these revolving bodies being at distances corresponding to the musical intervals give the diapason.

We shall not enter further into their mathematical, musical, and cosmical combinations, many of which were extremely fantastic. But their leading ideas cover a depth of thought which an admirer might not unfairly consider to have been developed by much of the exact science of our own day.

CHAPTER IV.

THE METAPHYSICAL QUESTION.

SECTION I.—THE ELEATICS.

BUT whilst trying to find unity in all this surrounding difference and motion, we have not made sure that there is this difference and motion at all. May not all this change and multiplicity be only *seeming* change and multiplicity; may it not be a deception? In fact, there are reasons to believe that it is deception. For on what conception does it rest? Change rests upon motion, that a thing 'becomes' that 'has not yet been,' *i.e.* is generated; or, in another form, that *one thing* so far changes, that it becomes to me *another thing*, *i.e.* viewed from its later form; it has become one thing not having been that thing before. Now it will be seen that this latter form corresponds to the phenomenon of multiplicity. Change means that one thing becomes others, which give us the notion of many things. The chief difficulty now lies in the conception of genesis, the becoming.

If we examine closer what 'becoming' means, we meet with irreconcilable contradictions. It is evident that a thing cannot be two different things at the same

time. If we examine the idea of existence under the light of this truth, we find that a thing must either exist or not exist at every moment. Therefore, there cannot be genesis, becoming ; for becoming means, that at some moment a thing is not wholly, or, rather, that it is, and at the same time is not. This was the reasoning of the Greek philosophers called the Eleatics (from a town in Lucania,—Elea, *Lat.* Velia). The founder of this school was Xenophanes (taught from 550–500 B.C.), its chief representative was Parmenides (born about 520 B.C.), and its negative character was principally developed by Zeno (of Elea, born 495 B.C.).

Xenophanes.

The opinions of Xenophanes may be summed up in the proposition, ‘All is a unity, and this unity is God’ (*ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι*). This is the first time we meet with what is called Pantheism, the One and All (*ἐν καὶ πᾶν*). He warred against the polytheistic religion of his country. ‘There is but one God, dissimilar to man both in form and thought. He ever remains the same. He has neither become nor does he end—he is eternal. But man makes his gods like himself, just as, could lions paint, their god would be the most beautiful lion.’ He argued against the low attributes that were assigned to the gods in the public religion of his time.

Parmenides.

The luminous centre, however, of this school was Parmenides, a man known to antiquity not only for

his depth of thought, but also for the morality of his principles and the purity of his life, so that 'to lead a Parmenidean life' became proverbial with the Greeks, and Plato speaks of him as 'Parmenides the great.'

The idea of genesis is inconceivable. There is only one being, and that *is*; it has neither become nor does it pass away, but remains without beginning or end, and without parts—it is *one whole*. All is continuity, and there is no empty space, nor is there succession in time. The figure symbolical of this is the circle: it has no beginning and no end, but simply *is*. Only so can we conceive things, do we think them, and therefore, only so do they exist. Thought and existence are one and the same, are identical. The idea of existence includes non-existence as its correlative, as the idea of the conceivable includes the inconceivable. Multiplicity and succession are the inconceivable, are the non-existing ($\mu\eta$ ὄν). This is the world of seeming, in which our senses deceive us and go contrary to reason.' Such are the essential points of the doctrine of Parmenides.

Zeno.

His pupil Zeno adopted his positive opinions, but chiefly exerted his energy in showing the absurdity of opposing views. His proofs of the non-existence of motion and multiplicity are exceedingly clever, so that they puzzle many a thinker in our days, and are extremely important in the development of the negative character of philosophy. His *reductio ad absurdum* consists in applying the conception of infinite divisibility and infinite progression to motion and multiplicity; *e.g.* if a

thing is moving, it must at every moment either be in a certain place, or not be in that place ; to be in a place wholly, means to rest there, and by dividing this space into its different parts he finds that it does not move at all, *i.e.* its so-called motion consists of a long stage of resting-places, which together make one large repose.

So also he maintains, that, if there be multiplicity, things must—1st, be reduced to units, which are indivisible, but something indivisible cannot have extension, which means, *it is nothing* ; 2nd, if everything has extension, then it must be distinguished from other things, but then between any two things there must be something that separates them, and again, there must be something between each of the original things and the separating thing (or else they would be *one* thing), etc.,—*things are therefore infinite, unbounded in number* ; 3rd, but finally there cannot exist more nor less things than there really are things, *therefore there is a bounded and limited number*.

Thus Zeno attempts to show that all conceptions of motion and multiplicity lead to contradiction. He is also the inventor of the famous puzzle called ‘Sorites :’ if in upsetting a bushel of wheat there is a certain noise, there must also be a noise in dropping one grain of wheat ; for the bushel consists of single grains. If we measure with sufficient exactness we shall find that the point where we, with our gross hearing, do perceive the sound is marked by the addition of one grain, which is therefore the immediate cause of our hearing the sound. This leads to the absurd proposition that one grain of corn makes the noise of a bushel.

Zeno was the founder of what is called 'dialectic,' and we shall meet this manner of reasoning with the Sophists, Socrates, the Megaricians, and the Sceptics. The last and least important of the Eleatics was Melissus, who merely continued the course of Zeno.

SECTION II.—HERACLITUS.

We have just seen how motion may be regarded as a deception of our senses. Who tells us whether *rest* is not such a deception? Does not the evidence go to show that all is in continual motion? Myself, 'am I not dying life, and living death?' And nature around me, is it not continually changing its robes, doffing its old ones and donning new ones? Even the rock by the sea-shore, is it not wearing away, and does not the ocean throw new materials on its shores? This streamlet here is in perpetual motion; it is true, that 'were I to rise in the air like an eagle, it would *seem* like one continuous resting silver band,'—may not all seeming rest be a similar deception? All flows, is in continual motion, and the idea of rest and stagnation is one of the hasty prejudices of the mind.

So thought Heraclitus of Ephesus (born about 500 B.C.), surnamed the 'Obscure,' on account both of his stern and gloomy character, and of the sententious style of his expression. His opinions are all clad in aphorisms, they are gnomical.¹

¹ Some of these aphorisms admit of different interpretations, as *e.g.* when he compares the harmony of the universe with bow and lyre, as

Such aphorisms are, *e.g.*, 'All flows—no one can descend twice into the same stream; for it continually accumulates and disperses, flows hither and flows on again.' These two propositions contain his opinion, that all is in continual motion; others show the nature of this motion, and at the same time attempt to account for continual motion. There is not merely continual motion and striving; but it is a com-motion and conation, there is action and reaction. Things do not move in empty space, but against one another (*ἐναντιοτροπή, ἐναντιοδρομία*). Difference, contradiction, strife is essential to all motion and life, and even to harmony. Everywhere in nature there is contrast and opposition of elements and forces,—life and death, and motion and rest, waking and sleeping, etc. And in thought: every single thought implies its contradictory, as existence has in its company the idea of non-existence. Everywhere contrast and strife. 'Strife is the father of all,' he says. If we had not this strife there would be no multiplicity, no interaction of things—no life: 'All would pass away.'

But all this difference and contradiction is resolved in harmony. In fact, without this difference there could be no harmony; for harmony means the accord, the combination and welding into unity, of *different* things. With total sameness we could have no harmony. We

being one whole with antagonistic parts. Some have seen in the lyre and the bow two parts of the same instrument; some saw the analogy in the form of each; another maintained that it really read, bow and chord; and still another maintains that it is merely symbolical of the Apollinian worship, this god having as attributes lyre and bow,—the world-lyre and the sun darting its rays.

are reminded of Lessing's epigram on 'the quarrelsome couple,' which pictures with short traits what even life would be if there were total sameness of feelings and desires :—

‘Such harmony we must admire :
What to possess is his desire,
She also wishes to acquire !’

These principles of Heraclitus are essentially opposed to the principles of the Eleatics. There is however one great point of agreement between them, namely, Pantheism. Heraclitus too conceives the world as an ‘All in one,’ the great Harmony of Difference, the World-Harmony, the World-Lyre. Physically he conceives fire to be the one element out of which all things are evolved (if I may use so modern a word). He chose fire, because it is the restless element, ever fertilising and consuming. It passes through all different stages (*τροποί*), and all returns to it.

His principles in short were: All is in continual motion, a world of difference; but with the greater resultant unity and harmony. And he goes so far in this conception of harmony that he considers it an intellectual principle, a world-soul; ordering all, as the word orders thoughts, and so he calls it Logos (*λόγος*).

Heraclitus is the deepest of the pre-Socratic philosophers. In his conception of strife as the principle of life, and fire as the one element, we may almost see a vague anticipation of the theory of the ‘struggle for existence’ and the law of the conservation of energy.

CHAPTER V.

ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILING ELEATICS AND HERACLITUS.

SECTION I.—EMPEDOCLES.

AN attempt to reconcile the Eleatics and Heraclitus was first made by *Empedocles of Agrigentum* (born about 495). He agreed with the Eleatics that existence out of nothing, as well as annihilation of something once existing, was inconceivable; but he also agreed with Heraclitus in his conception of multiplicity and motion in the universe. He reconciled these two views by supposing an original and lasting, but narrowly limited multiplicity, to which all varied existence may be and is ultimately reduced. This he found in the four elements, viz., fire, water, earth, and air. But if these are truly elements, they must be the ultimate, the simplest forms of existence. And so he cannot explain the process of their modification, as Heraclitus did, by maintaining that the inherent contrast gave motion—for with him they are simple. He must therefore assume that motion and change are caused from without by some force. But even with this force, there is no absolute birth or absolute destruction, but it merely

causes different positions, different congeries (mixture and severing, as he calls it) of the elements.

This philosopher—half a poet—assumes two forces—Love and Hate (attraction and repulsion), and he thinks that originally all elements were mixed to one vast Chaos (*Spheros*), held together by the attractive force, Love; then the repelling, severing force, Hate, came into action and tore this one complex existence into the numerous individual existences; and now life and motion consist of the continual wrestling of these two forces. His theory of perception is very interesting, and forms a stepping-stone to the subsequent materialistic views. Starting with the proposition: ‘Only the similar in nature can perceive the similar,’ he argues that man contains all the substance of the outer world, and so he says: ‘With earth (in us) we perceive earth; with water, water; with ether, ether; with fire, fire; with love, love; with hatred, hatred.’ Sensation also results from a mixture of the elements. Thought is a consequence of material existence.

He also believed as Pythagoras did in Palingenesis, or the existence of the soul previous and subsequent to this life, a wandering of the soul into different bodies, and to different spheres. His moral principles were very high. He relinquished all prospects of political honours, which his noble birth and popular character afforded him, and made it his task to search for knowledge and to be of use to his fellow-men.

It was evident that the four elements which Empedocles assumed as the original forms of the universe

were not really simple. We shall now meet with attempts to explain the universe on the hypothesis that it ultimately consists of innumerable minute particles, which may be conceived in two different ways: either as qualitatively different from one another or qualitatively the same. The former of these two views we have in Anaxagoras, the other in the Atomists.

SECTION II.—ANAXAGORAS.

Anaxagoras of Clazomene (born 500 B.C.), settled in Athens, which town became the seat of almost all the subsequent great Greek philosophers. He had among his pupils Pericles, Phidias, Euripides, and Socrates. Sharing the friendship of Pericles, he became obnoxious to his enemies, and having been accused of atheism for explaining the signs and tokens of augury according to natural laws, for giving a moral meaning to the myths of Homer, and for interpreting allegorically the names of the gods, he was imprisoned, and only through the exertions of Pericles liberated. He left Athens and died in Lampsacus.

He too held that once all was Chaos. The innumerable, indivisible particles, of which there were as many different kinds as there are different things, were all mixed up and huddled together in one great disorder. The unity of Chaos was severed, the first shock of motion was given, by a force from without. This force is not like the Hate and Love of Empedocles, but is intelligent force; intelligence, mind itself, the great world-soul,

νοῦς. Νοῦς gave the first shock of motion which severed Chaos, and drove all these particles about, so that the similar ones united with their similars to form things, as they now are ; but motion still persists, and so things change continually.

Now, though Chaos has been severed, the individualisation of things is not complete, and in every one thing there are some of these minute particles of everything else remaining ; and thus we have no absolute difference, but there is still a certain continuity—things are not, as he expresses it, ‘chopped asunder as with a hatchet.’

There are organic germs floating about in the air, and so the earth produces plants and the higher organisms. Both animals and plants have souls, the one greater, the other smaller. These souls are individualised, severed parts of the world-soul, νοῦς itself.

SECTION III.—THE ATOMISTS.

The ultimate particles of Anaxagoras do not present a satisfactory solution of the question : they are not simple. In fact, this hypothesis begs the question, inasmuch as these ultimate particles have already all the differentiated characteristics of all individual things. An explanation seems very round-about, in which, from the outset, one seems to posit all different things, split them up into their smallest parts, each of which has all the attributes of the whole thing, and then, after having huddled all particles together, call for a wondrous intelligence to give the first impulse, to

sever these particles, and let them combine into things. This *voûs* coming at the opportunate moment to lend his assistance where reason could find no help, was rightly called by Aristotle a *deus ex machina*, a god from behind the scenes. The expression was used by Plato, who says that bad philosophers are like bad dramatists, who, finding that the natural flow of events and characters has woven their drama into an insoluble knot, caused some god from behind the scenes to cut it through.

These difficulties were felt by the Atomists, and they made an attempt to solve them.

Of the founder of this school, *Leucippus*, we only have the fact that he was the founder and the teacher of its chief representative, *Democritus* of Abdera (born 460 B.C.).

Instead of the complex units of Anaxagoras, Democritus assumes indivisible units without qualitative difference,—atoms. And instead of the supernatural world-soul as cause of motion and change in these units, he assumes a natural cause of motion inherent in the atoms. Though atoms have no qualitative difference, they differ in quantity—some larger, some smaller. These units, in order to be units, must be distinct ; they are separated by empty space. If they are similar in quality, but different in quantity, they must necessarily differ in weight, and being in empty space, unsupported, they must have a tendency to fall. So all atoms fall downwards ; but, meeting with resistance, they rebound upwards—and so, we have continual motion to and fro.

But in this act of falling and rebounding, he thinks,

atoms of equal size, and therefore weight, will fall and rebound with equal rapidity, and so meet, congregate, and generate uniform things.

The cause of motion is mechanical and not intellectual. Therefore he considers the universe, not as the great manifestation of some Intention (teleological), but as the necessary effect of previous causes (mechanical); not voluntary effort (τέλος), but *necessary* predisposition (είμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη).

SECTION IV.—TELEOLOGY AND CAUSALITY.

This twofold manner of viewing things is of such importance in the development of thought, both in the past history of philosophy and even to-day, that it may be advisable to acquire at the first occurrence of the question a proper conception of its nature.

Suppose a traveller sets out on a journey; but before reaching the railway station, a stone gives way under his foot, he falls and sprains his ankle. He is taken home, and unable to move, he must postpone his journey.

Now, if in examining this mishap, we maintain that the accident occurred *in order that* the traveller might not set out upon his journey, *i.e.* if we more or less consciously posit some *will* which made the accident its *aim* of action, we view the accident *teleologically*.

But we may, on the other hand, rest contented with explaining the mishap by the *necessary* flow of events, *e.g. because of* the position of the stone, *because of* the

manner in which our traveller stepped upon it, *because* of the reality of the law of gravitation, etc., the person lost his balance and necessarily fell. We are then viewing the incident in accordance with causality.

In the first case we posit an aim, a will, an intention, and we are led to suppose that this intention might have been replaced by some other desire, we conceive some possibility of the event not taking place ; because our idea of this aim, will, intention, is some analogy to our own will, which may be fickle and vacillating, a mere caprice. But in the second instance, we view the whole event merely as the necessary effect of certain natural causes.

If in contemplating the universe, we subposit human intention, or something similar to it, so that things might have been or might not have been according to the will of an intelligent agent, and consider the universe to exist in order to bring forth a certain defined end, we regard it teleologically.

If we contemplate the universe merely as the necessary effect of certain causes, we view it as a mechanism.

CHAPTER VI.

SOCRATIC PERIOD.

SECTION I.—GREECE IN THE TIME OF THE SOPHISTS.

TO a normal man in full health, life gives an object for every day ; he is busy. He has a good appetite, and eats regularly ; and he has no time to question whether he is hungry or no, or whether such a thing will agree with him or not. He has many tasks, and rejoices when he succeeds in fulfilling them, and feels grieved when he fails. He has no time to think of the far future, or even death, or of the worth of life, or its pleasure or its pain.

When there is a revolution of his system, he begins to question and fret ; what before was natural and spontaneous now becomes 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought ;' he even questions its existence, or, at least, its right to existence.

Greece, during the period we have just rapidly scanned, was in that unconsciously-healthy and vigorously-active state. And so we find each philosopher eagerly intent upon solving the one question just before him—he had no time to doubt of his capacity of solving it.

But the second half of the fifth century was marked by a revolution of the social and political system. The Greeks lost their unconsciously-conservative tone of mind, in which they performed their tasks within the bounds of these unquestioned institutions, and they began to weigh and compare these institutions—they became critical.

In order to criticise or compare at all, we must have two or more things in our mind; we must have difference, be it merely that of 'twoness,' in order that we may see the points of agreement.

Though the Persian war had temporarily bound the Greek peoples together, it at the same time gave them that knowledge of the 'other' which renders possible comparison and criticism. When the war was over, in which common danger made them feel their unity and their agreement, they began to notice their differences; the Athenian felt that the Spartan differed from him in customs, taste, and institutions, and in interests. They began to hedge themselves off more and more; and when neighbours, whose paths must meet, are essentially different, strife is always imminent, their interests must clash; the outgrowth in the Greeks' case was the Peloponnesian war. The marked political character of this period was, that the different states became more and more conscious of their points of disagreement, they became *consciously* individual and particular.

If the individual notices this of the external policy, he will soon apply it to internal policy and to social institutions. The state will gradually lose its unques-

tioned organic solidarity ; the individual will more and more feel his own importance, and, instead of regarding himself merely as a member, a unit of the complete whole, he will approach the view that the state is a combination of individuals, and its aim the welfare of individuals.

So we find in Athens (the town we are chiefly interested in) party-feeling and party-hatred gaining footing, the interest of Athens being repressed to make room for the interest of one of its political parties, and within these parties the individual sacrificing the party-interest to his own prosperity. The chief aim of the individual becomes to shine, to get on—and the rest are minor considerations. The best instance of a man driven by such feelings is the famous Alcibiades.

Even in art this tendency is to be noticed. The grand spirit of unity which gave such a broad stamp to the genius of Phidias, drove him to produce great and eternal types in gods and heroes, so that he transfigured sublimity into marble, fades away and gives place to that spirit which, in Scopas and Praxiteles, produced the lovely and the sweet, turned productive imagination upon fleeting life and moments of passion, upon special features of whole types, individual beauty and individual strength, and finally led to the development of the portrait in Lysippus. The heroes of the drama are no longer only heroes of pure fiction or of the past ; but men of the very time are brought on the stage, as in the '*Clouds*' of Aristophanes. This general tone of mind could not fail to have its influence upon philosophical speculation. Social and political revolution,

with the critical and individualistic disposition, manifested itself in the class of philosophers of that time called the Sophists.

SECTION II.—THE SOPHISTS.

The main contradictions in the system of the Eleatics and Heraclitus, rest and eternal motion, unity and multiplicity, were not satisfactorily solved by the three philosophers with whom we have last dealt.

‘Now,’ the critically disposed will say, ‘the Eleatic maintains that motion in the universe rests upon deception of our senses ; Heraclitus, that we are deceived when we believe that we perceive stagnation in the universe, —may they not both be right in their imputation, *i.e.* may we not be deceived both ways? Nay, by their very statements I will prove that both were deceived when they thought that true perception was even possible. If, according to the Eleatics, there is but one immutable being, no special existences, then is there no difference at all, and we cannot have object and subject, the perceiving and the perceived, without which all perception is inconceivable. If, according to Heraclitus, all is in continual fluctuation, the things perceived and we ourselves perceiving must vary with every moment—and we cannot speak of a true perception.

‘There is no cognition, no truth.’

We become conscious of things through our impressions—everything is as it appears at every moment. If

we add to these philosophical views the individualistic tendency of the time, we can well understand the proposition of *Protagoras*: 'The measure of all things is man.'

Some of these Sophists, such as *Protagoras*, are not to be condemned with one sweeping assertion; they were very subtle thinkers, and acted in accordance with elevated convictions.

The inferior sort were Sceptics, *i.e.* they said that all knowing consisted of personal opinion, which is ever varying,—therefore there is no uniform cognition. The proposition, 'Man is the measure of all,' is easily changed to 'men,' or rather, 'Each man is the measure of all things.' There is but a small step from this point to the principle,—A man's aim is to put himself forward, to further his own interest, to make as much of himself as possible. And so the smaller fry of Sophists rapidly degenerated into mercenary charlatans. Their main object was to make show of themselves, and to teach others how to do the same. They became all-knowers, polyhistor, and taught young men everything. They travelled about from town to town teaching for fees, a course never before pursued among Greek philosophers, who, up to that period, had even sacrificed their own fortunes to follow science. They showed their immense amount of knowledge, or rather dexterity, so that the people stared with wonder. At every moment they were ready to deliver orations on any subject; on candles, on salt, on the immortality of the soul, and on virtue. They taught young men rhetoric, philosophy, politics, fencing, dancing, gymnastics,—everything.

Their chief aim was to baffle their adversaries with dexterous fallacies, and putting the question in such a manner that the answer could but be absurd. A Sophist would propose to speak in favour of a subject, and immediately after against it. Thirst for truth became thirst for distinction, quality became quantity, truth immediate interest, and wisdom became skill.

When a normal healthy man has passed through a revolution of his system, some acute illness, convalescence follows, a rapid regeneration of his whole organism. He exerts his energies with renewed vigour, and feels his strength with renewed consciousness. His illness has cast off many morbid germs which before lay hidden from view, and he now feels what a blessing health is. He is conscious of his strength, which before mastered him, and can now economise it and turn it to greater advantage. The blessing of his illness is, that he now knows his own powers, and can thus adapt them as means to the ends which they can master.

The great merit of the Sophists who mark the period of systematic revolution, was, that they turned man's eyes inwards to the subject, made him consider his own powers there, before he attempted to study the world.

We have the positive expression of this in Socrates.

SECTION III.—SOCRATES.

There are events, facts, feelings, thoughts, and doctrines which hold a markedly independent position in our mind ; their right of existence seems to rest wholly

in themselves, and we need not call the agents of their existence to help us in apprehending them—they are of a self-sufficient nature.

No person now-a-days would need to bring before his consciousness the mother country of the United States of America—England—in order to apprehend that State ; but no one could at present conceive politically Canada, unless there were some representation of Great Britain, as it were, accompanying it in immediate proximity, or at greater distance within his consciousness.

The old Norse saga the '*Edda*,' and the German '*Nibelungen-Lied*,' exist in the consciousness of the people perfectly distinct from their authors—unknown to the present day,—and the question of the authorship of these wonderful works is one taken up by people specially interested in these matters, who in fact have made research in this direction their vocation. But when we read some of the lyrics of Heine, of Leopardi, of De Musset, or of Shelley, we sub-consciously and sub-voluntarily place some personal conception of these authors in the background of any special representation of their works, which lets these individual emanations stand forth in bold relief. Our representation of the solar system, of many of the laws of nature and of thought, may exist in our minds, without any allusion to the originators of these conceptions.

The doctrines of St. Augustine and St. Thomas have been amalgamated with the whole of Christian Dogmatics, and most people know nothing of their origin ; but there are religious doctrines and principles which are

essentially knit up with grand and deep figures in history;—without these personages they would be empty and void. Such were the teachings of the German and Netherlands mystics in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, deeply rooted in the hearts of the teachers (mighty and grand men), and mightily and grandly moving all that listened to them. Such men were Eckhardt, Heinrich von Berg, Johann Tauler in Germany; and in the Netherlands, Johann Rusbrok, and Geert de Groot, and Thomas Hamerling. Later on in Germany (sixteenth and seventeenth century) the same Protestant movement by men like Schleugler, Franck, Weigel, Boehm, and others, and in England the great type of this anti-dogmatic practical religious nature in Wesley. Religion in him, and men of that sort, was a fact, an action, a feeling in itself, not a feeling of something else; it filled their whole nature at every moment, and was not an adopted method of viewing life and things—it *was* their nature. And so every one of their actions and their expressions was part of their teaching—a Christian life and not a Christian creed. This cannot be imitated; it can only be lived through. When once the whole mental atmosphere of a time, and the lively interest which at such times attaches itself to personalities, changes and becomes extinct, a repetition of such teachings may become lifeless and soulless. Such principles may be carried out and carried on, but not repeated.

A life cannot be completely imitated. An attempt at this proves to be imitation of certain features in such a life.

In Socrates we have Philosophy and the life of a great person firmly knit together in one whole. We have no system of Philosophy handed down to us, or scattered about as quotations in later authors ; but we have records of his acts, his conversations,—his biography is for us his system.

Philosophy with Socrates was an *act*. I have strongly emphasised this sentence, because it will thus serve us to understand his teachings.

‘*Philosophy* was an *act*’ indicates the essentially practical character of his speculations, and the thoroughly ‘biographical’ nature of his ‘philosophy.’ ‘*Philosophy* was an act’ points out how action can be, and ought to be, tested by thought ; how thought or its absence, true thought and erroneous thought, insight and oversight, alter and influence the vital nature of all our actions.

The wise man will be the good man, as the good man will be wise ; and the foolish will be bad, as the bad are foolish. He says : ‘One cannot do good without knowing what is good.’ ‘The actions of the wise, who know the good, are good ; for to act means no more than that we prefer one action to another, because we have recognised it to be the better.’ ‘Who does evil knows not the good, or he is unwise, for he holds the worse to be the better.’

Socrates was both good and wise.

The systems of the first period had lost their way in their rapid onward flight, and had lost sight of the origin and aim of their thought—human mind ; so that the Sophists with their scepticism could draw away all

foundation on which human thought rested. Socrates finds this firm ground in human life and action, which even the Sophists could not deny. But he does not stop here.

In order that we, our life, may become good and right, we must be wise; we become wise in knowing ourselves and the true nature of things in their relation to us. The beginning of knowledge is the feeling of our ignorance. Ignorance that is felt pants for knowledge, as the dark night pants for the early dawn. 'I know that I know nothing' is to him the beginning of all thought, not the end. Truth must be sought after, for it does not bear itself, it must be born, and Socrates assists in the birth of truth. He lays stress upon this last-mentioned fact, and wittily refers to his mother's profession. The best method for finding truth is to seek for it in common, in conversation,—but conversation not to show one's own skill and to baffle one's antagonists, as the Sophists practised it, but conversation with the earnest aim of finding Truth. And so he begins with practical questions, keeping to definite instances, and rises higher and higher until he comes to a general truth. This is a kind of induction. To know a thing, we must know the parts of which it is made, and we must see its difference and similarity with other things, hedge it off from other things, *i.e.* define it. He laid great stress on the proper definition of things. He strove to arrive at the precise meaning of words, to go to the very foundation of things. His plan was to question his pupils, and following up their answers with other questions, he brought their

own answers fully before their consciousness ; so leading them on to find truth, assisting in the birth of truth. His questions were masterpieces of art and method. He seemed to hold that a properly put question was half an answer, if not more. He was wont to assume an air of perfect ignorance, thereby forcing his pupils to think and speak precisely and thoroughly, and, at the same time, giving them a striking and catching example of 'pregnant ignorance' and of the truest and deepest modesty, which forgets its self, and its desires of self-affirmation, in striving to attain a good end. This feature in his conversation has since been called 'Socratic irony.'

His aim and his nature were deep, and alien to the frivolous juggling of most Sophists. Unceasingly he strove to better himself and those about him, ever watchful to find anybody who had the holy spark of the desire for truth in him, so that he might give him his whole energy, and help him to satisfy that noble hunger,—he was an implacable enemy to untruth and to the evil, and pursued and combated them ; but he was friend to all men, and would help them to fight the common enemy even in themselves. No wonder that such a man in turn should have enemies, who ignorantly or wilfully mistook him for a Sophist, whose principles he ever militated against. He was accused of all the evils, the very contraries of which made up his life. And when he stood before his judges, the modest Socrates said, in full confidence of his own worth, 'You ought to thank me instead of punishing me!'

And so he died, happily and serenely and grandly, drinking his poisonous draught, as only he can do who has a conscience void of offence.

SECTION IV.—THE INCOMPLETE SOCRATICS.

I have mentioned above that a life cannot be completely imitated, and that an attempt at this proves to be an imitation of certain features or sides of such a life ; it cannot be complete, it is essentially one-sided.

We have three schools branching out from Socrates, which each take up one side, one feature, of Socratic life and develop it into a special system, though they are also influenced by other schools, such as the Eleatics and certain Sophists.

We may meet with a portrait in which the lower part of the face and the eyes all express the greatest cheerfulness, almost lightness of character, but by adding the person's habitual subdued frown, the whole face may be toned down from light cheerfulness to an expression of balanced thought and mirth, sternness and cheerfulness thoroughly blended ; the frown subduing the marked cheerfulness, and the cheerfulness of the other parts of the face subduing the frown. If we hold our hand over the lower parts, and present to view merely the forehead with its frown, this feature will stand forth more markedly than in the real face—it will be exaggerated in its stern expression. Such was the fate of single features in the character of Socrates in the hands of the three schools called the ' Incomplete Socratics.'

a. *Cynics.*

One striking feature in Socrates was his serene freedom from common need. His whole striving, being of such an intense and inward nature, rose beyond the petty requirements of life, and he was contented, for his contentment depended upon himself, and not upon other things or persons. This independence taken by itself as *the* moving power in life, becomes exaggerated, and may even lead to caricature: it led to Cynicism. All outer forms of life, they maintained, are truly mere forms, and are not worthy of attention. If one is careful about them, they make life wretched. Only he who has no needs and wants can acquire the inward peace and quiet of soul which is alone desirable.

This is the essence of the teachings of *Antisthenes* and of the famous *Diogenes* of Sinope: the latter especially realised these principles in his life. Though they imputed vanity to all who strove for what was commonly held desirable, they exhibited the greatest vanity (as Plato observed) in their extreme and showy self-sufficiency, 'which needed not fatherland, nor friend, nor wife,' and their contempt for other persons and things sometimes lapsed into loss of self-respect.

b. *Cyrenaics.*

Another striking feature in Socrates, an outgrowth of the before-mentioned one, and of his whole character, was his cheerfulness up to the very last moment. He enjoyed life, because life to him consisted in a series of moments, each of which had its task; and, more-

over, tasks whose performance depended upon his own exertions, and not upon incalculable outer influences which cause uncertainty, and call forth the crepuscular feelings of fear, bearing the essence of despair and pessimism. Tear this feature of cheerfulness out of its environing elements, and you have such an effect as when you hold your hand over the forehead in our portrait; as there cheerfulness becomes exaggerated to levity, the smile becomes a grin, so here, contentment may become amusement,—nay, even dissipation.

Such was the effect of the imperfect Socratism of *Aristippus of Cyrene*. He was a man of the world, and his philosophy is worldly; his motto was 'to grasp circumstances, not to be grasped by them' (*ἔχω καὶ οὐκ ἔχομαι*); and thus to acquire immediate pleasure (*ἡδονή*). *Theodorus* and *Hegesias* developed and modified his principles. The former substituted for immediate pleasure (or rather pleasures) as the aim of life, lasting pleasure as a lasting frame of mind; the latter was pessimistical, and maintained that our aim ought to be to rid ourselves of pain: not to seek pleasure, but to avoid pain, for pain prevails in life.

c. *Megareans.*

Finally, a striking feature in Socrates was his argumentative power; his power of showing people their mistakes and leading their propositions to absurd conclusions.

This feature was developed to a deformity by the Megareans. Their founder *Euclides of Megara* seems to have treated subjects far more earnestly than his

followers (such as Eubulides). They were also influenced by the Eleatics (Zeno) and the Sophists; and at last they occupied themselves chiefly in refuting all possible arguments, and indulging in catching fallacies after the manner of the inferior Sophists. Some of these dialectic puzzles have come down to us, and go by the name of 'the hidden,' 'the covered,' 'the Electra,' etc. Their quibbling process was called 'Eristic.' It stands to reason that they should be driven into Scepticism, or the negation of human cognition.

The founders of these three schools were pupils of Socrates, unable to appreciate in its totality the greatness of their master.

They are the early forms of three later schools, with which they correspond, and are causally connected. The Cynics answer to the Stoics, the Cyrenaics to the Epicureans, the Megareans to the Sceptics.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CLIMAX OF GREEK THOUGHT.

SECTION I.—PLATO.

His Character, and that of his Writings.

WE have remarked that the principles embodied in a great life, though they do not allow of repetition, may be carried on and further developed. This was done with respect to Socrates by Plato and by Aristotle. Socrates's life became systematically expounded, and his principles were carried forward to high and fertile developments. But this active pulsating philosophy, which was a life, a fact, must pass through intermediate stages of form before it becomes a thoroughly systematic representation, before it passes from a more or less subjective state into an objective cognition—a *system* of philosophy. And whatever be the depth and vastness of Plato's work, however great its own right of existence, and however beautiful and admirable and exalting its poetic form, still, viewed from this point, he is but a stage in the ascent of which Aristotle is the climax.

The philosophical doctrines of Plato are no longer a life, but a kind of representative life. They are dramatic in form. They are laid down in dialogues. And

though Plato himself has well remarked that thinking is but an inward conversation, an inward dialogue ; yet an inward dialogue differs from a dramatic dialogue in that it can go the shortest way, leaving aside the disturbing peculiarities and individual differences of numerous persons and characters, and can be constructed, while the other is subject to accidental enviroing encroachments.

This fact makes it a very difficult task to give a systematic account of Plato's views ; though at the same time it makes him the incomparable poet-philosopher, who stands as the grand type of Athenian Greece, clothing in robes of beauty all depth and grandeur of their life ; whose Faith, whose Gods, whose Virtue (*καλοκάγαθία*), and whose Truth could only enter the sacred domains of their soul after passing the propylaea of the Beautiful.

Then too there are so many remarks casually thrown into the dialogue, which appeal to our attention and approval even to-day, and which in a systematic treatment, should shine forth from their secure position in the whole train of thoughts ; but which could not be given here even were there space for a complete delineation of Plato's philosophy. As one instance of anticipation let us take a short passage from the dialogue called the 'Theætetus.'

Socrates.—'Certainly not, Theætetus. . . . For heat and fire, which begets and directs everything, is itself begotten through circulation and friction. But these are motion. Or are these not the origin of fire ?'

Theætetus.—'They certainly are.'

Socrates.—'And even the race of the living spring from these,' etc.

Through Plato's extensive travels, and his acquaintance with the preceding systems of Philosophy, we find in him that width of Intellect, that thorough sympathy with all ways of thinking, which with a shallow nature may lead to superficiality, but with a deeper nature brings forth an intellectual contemplation of phenomena, free from passions and the bias of immediate interest—the chief element in a philosophic mind. And this gave him a large field and numerous instances out of which to form his generalisations. But still, in Plato's highly emotional nature, admiration and disapproval were strongly influencing elements, and we do not yet find in him that highest scientific contemplation of former thought and present phenomena which we shall meet with in Aristotle.

Principles of his Philosophy.

Three positive currents and one negative current drive him to his central doctrine, the doctrine of 'Ideas.'¹

The negative current is in the Sophists (Protagoras), the positive currents are the Eleatics (Parmenides), Heraclitus, and Socrates.

Parmenides held the One and Unmoving to be the true existing, and the Manifold and Moving to be a deception of our senses.

Heraclitus maintained that Manifoldness and Motion were the truly existing, and the Enduring and One were deceptions of our senses.

¹ The word 'Idea' (*ἰδέα*), as used by Plato, must not be confounded with the same word so differently used, or rather misused, in modern languages.

Protagoras said that Parmenides and Heraclitus were both right and wrong; *i.e.* right when they believed the others were mistaken, and wrong when they considered their own views to be true. Each man is the measure of all things, and things are for what he at every moment takes them to be.

Socrates considered truth as a thing to be sought for in common, and to be found in the common conceptions of the human mind.

Plato refutes the Sophists' views and shows their absurdity and self-contradiction.

The principles of Parmenides and Heraclitus do not clash so as to destroy one another. Through the Sophists negatively, and Socrates positively, Plato had gained the firm footing of *human mind* from which to view all things. And from this point he sees that the doctrines of Parmenides and Heraclitus are but two different views of the whole universe: arising from the two different functions of human mind, Reason and Sense-Perception, the world of Thought and the world of Sensation.

Truth is simple; opinion and impressions are manifold. Truth is unvarying; opinion and impression *become*, move and change. Every single thing has in our mind a twofold nature: it has existence in regard to itself, its being—rest; it has existence in regard to other things—motion, action. The world of Reason, of Pure Thought, is the world of Rest, of the One, of 'Being;' the world of Sensation and outer experience is the world of Motion, of 'Becoming.' He also calls these two worlds the 'One,' the Identical (*ἓν, τὸ αὐτὸν*), *i.e.* bearing its rela-

tion in itself and to itself; and the 'other' (θάτερον), *i.e.* having relation to other things, therefore ever changing and relative. Only in so far as the world of Reason pervades the world of Sensation have we truth, *i.e.* existence in the outer world. But truth must be sought for, must be found.

This process will now resolve itself into finding the lasting, *i.e.* the unit, the 'oneness,' in the manifoldness of phenomena,—finding that which is common to different things,—genus and species. This process of ascending from the particular to the general Plato tries to make systematic. This is his Logic, or, as it is called (though with different signification from what it has had in former systems), Dialectic.

We have already mentioned the disturbing influence on philosophic precision of both the highly sympathetic nature of Plato and his adoption of the dialogue as the form of exposition. To these two points is chiefly to be attributed the great gap and flaw in his philosophy. He has not yet the *thoroughly* scientific manner of viewing past philosophy, as we find it in Aristotle.

When, *e.g.* he puts his *own* opinions on the 'One' into the mouth of Parmenides, he does not always adhere to this manner of conveying his own views, and to his stand-point of *human mind*, but his dramatic sympathy carries him away, so that at moments he allows Parmenides to express his own views: and Plato is often unwittingly drawn down to the stand-point of Parmenides. And so there ensues the following result:—We have seen how he makes the Eleatic 'One' the principle of human reason and pure thought; but when subse-

quently he transplants himself into the thoughts of Parmenides, he transforms his own 'One' in the form of pure reason (a principle of cognition) to a 'One' wider than the former, encompassing human reason (a principle for cognition)—an *objective existence*. Truth and real existence are thus whittled down into reason and pure thought, without individual peculiarities of bodies and things, *i.e.* into *general concepts* (as, horse, and not *this* horse); but these concepts will have *objective* existence, they will be real. These general concepts, with objective existence, are Plato's '*Ideas*.'¹

And now Plato, with his grand artistic and plastic talent, builds up a world of Ideas, an intelligible world, in which the fantastic and rational are peculiarly blended. There are gradations in this intelligible world, and the summit of the whole is the Idea of the Good.²

These Ideas are not transcendent, *i.e.* cut off from all interaction with the sensible world, but, as we have already seen, things of that world have claim to truth, existence, merely by means of Ideas, in so far as ideas have influenced them. But how can the essentially different interact, how can things be influenced by Ideas?

Plato's philosophy, so far, involves a kind of Dualism (Ideas and Things); and we shall now follow him in his attempt to resolve this dualism.

¹ We may anticipate, and point out that in the Middle Ages one school of the Realists, as opposed to the Nominalists, adhered to this view.

² If the reader finds difficulty in conceiving Ideas as used by Plato, let him recall to mind the sense in which he uses the word *ideal* as opposed to *material* (an ideal nature, or striving, etc.), so firmly imbedded in modern language in that meaning through the Platonic philosophy.

The question, What is Plato's conception of nature, of the soul, of the good, and the good state, etc. ? can be best answered by showing how he conceived nature, the soul, the Universe, to have *been formed* ; for the plastic views of the plastic mind, on these subjects, are *constructions*.

Plato's Cosmogony.

The world, according to Plato, is not the result of an act of absolute creation (out of nothing), but is the work of a *forming* principle which, out of certain material, makes the Cosmos—as the artist finds his raw block of marble and forms it into a beauteous statue. This principle is called the *δημιουργός*.

The material the Demiurge finds comprises the contradiction which pervades the universe (*ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*), Ideas and Matter, and out of these, by infusing Matter with Ideas, he forms things. But he needs an intermediate principle between these two opposed elements. This principle is the general soul, the world-soul. By means of this world-soul order was brought into space, and the principle of order and proportion gave form to matter and made things. Here Plato is influenced by Pythagoras. This world-soul maintains order, keeps planets and bodies in their proper distances, and causes the periodical recurrence of their movements. The world-soul in fact is this principle of order and mathematical proportion which moves all and gives life to all.

The Human Soul.

Human souls are homogeneous with the world-soul ; they are individualised portions of this world-soul. The

soul is immortal and godlike, but having been combined with matter in a human body, it is affected and degraded by the lower, by matter—becomes full of passions and mastered by them, so that the only purely godlike and ideal in soul is *ἔπος*, love,—love and striving for the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. The soul is immortal, and has had existence before this earthly life. Plato, with Pythagoras and others, believes in Palingenesis. Our thinking is in fact a remembering (*ἀνάμνησις*) of what we knew before this life. Our striving must be to counteract the degrading influence of matter upon us, and to draw nearer to the highest idea, the Good. This leads us to his Ethics.

Ethics and Politics.

Ethics and Politics with him are closely related ; for like a true Greek he can hardly conceive man without a State. Reason is the highest attribute of man ; Character and Will the second ; Bodily Desire the lowest. Corresponding to this triple division are three virtues. The highest virtue is the virtue of Reason, Wisdom ; the second, aiding her, is the virtue of character, Courage ; and the last is the virtue of desire, Temperance. His Politics rest upon his Ethics. The individual is the unit *of* the state ; and *for* the state he must devote himself to the furtherance of the interest of the whole. In order that the state may prosper, Plato demands a classification of citizens according to their merits, their virtues. Corresponding to the highest virtue, Wisdom, are the wise men, who are to rule ; corresponding to the virtue of Courage are the brave men, who are to assist the

rulers in furthering the good ; to Temperance corresponds the third class, who are to obey. Justice he held to consist in each of these classes knowing its own place and discharging its proper functions.

Plato's construction of the universe is typically teleological. The Demiurge formed the universe to the best of his ability, and it was his aim to approach the highest Idea, the Good, towards which all strives.

This 'construction' is not a satisfactory solution of the question, How can two essentially different elements, as Ideas and Matter, form and matter, influence each other ?

The answer to this question we must seek in Aristotle, and leave Plato, who after having taught for many years in a property he had in Athens, the Academy gardens, died at eighty-one years of age (347 B.C.), as Cicero reports, still writing.

He had many followers, forming the so-called Old Academy, among whom *Speusippus*, *Xenocrates*, and *Crantor* were prominent.

SECTION II.—ARISTOTLE.

Plato's attempt to reconcile the two opposing elements, unity and multiplicity, failed. His doctrine of Ideas is a compromise, but no explanation : he shows us how things might have been, but not how they must have been, or even how they most probably might have been.

This was keenly felt by one of the greatest minds in history, Aristotle.

Aristotle was born in *Stagira*, in the colony of Thrace, 384 B.C. His family was in close connection with the Macedonian court, his father, Nicomachus, having been physician to Philip of Macedon. At the age of seventeen he came to Athens, and remained a pupil of Plato for twenty years. In 343 B.C. he was called by king Philip to instruct his son Alexander, and, no doubt, the man whose domain was universal knowledge greatly influenced the boy whose domain was the world which he ever strove to conquer. Though Aristotle did not master all that man can know, and though Alexander did not conquer the whole world, yet the one exhausted the knowable of his time, and the other subjugated all states that in the eyes of his age constituted the world.

Later on he returned to Athens and taught philosophy while promenading in the avenues of the Lyceum, whence the name of the Aristotelians,—Peripatetics. Alexander maintained continual intercourse with him, and assisted him in every way in his scientific researches. After twelve years of teaching in Athens Aristotle was accused of atheism (his relations with Alexander were probably also of influence), and he left Athens for Chalcis in Eubœa, where he died, 322 B.C.

Every reader of Aristotle must feel how imposing is the vastness and depth of his thought and his knowledge. Of his writings there has come down to us but one-sixth (according to most accounts). But it may fairly be said that these works have been the efficient groundwork of all subsequent systematised science, not only in regard to Logic, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Poetics (*Æsthetics*); but

also the different branches of natural history. In my attempt to give a short sketch of his philosophical views I cannot do justice to his many great achievements, which are more properly dealt with in the special histories of Logic, Psychology, Politics, Natural History, etc. ; but must content myself with giving the salient points of his philosophical principles in connection with the great chain of thought, as I have expounded it up to this point.

Let us turn to the centre of interest, the *Metaphysics*, his 'First Philosophy.'

Aristotle's Metaphysical Principles.

I have already mentioned his disapproval of Plato's doctrine of Ideas ; he has also left a systematic criticism of Plato's views :—not only that the conception of these Ideas is superfluous and roundabout, but Plato has not shown how these transcendent beings, having all reality in them, could distribute their reality among individual things, and so he took recourse to a *deus ex machina*. His Ideas, in truth, were the individual things posited as transcendent, with the attribute eternal affixed to them (*αἰσθητὰ αἰδία*). They are, he says, like the common conception of the gods : 'eternalised human beings.'

Plato placed in strict antithesis the General and the Individual ; but he individualised the General.

Aristotle recognises the General : it is that by means of which thought and language is made possible, but it only has *existence in* the Individual.

The question may now be asked : 'If the General is

only conceivable *in* the Individual (if that which makes things is indissolubly and ever connected with them),—how can one speak of them as separate conceptions at all ?' This question is justified, and leads us to consider Aristotelian philosophy in the one light in which, I think, it alone can become clear to us.


The two different *aspects* of things result from our viewing them from different points. This brings us back to the great question which we have so frequently met with before : the question of Rest, Being, Existence, on the one hand, and Motion, Becoming, Not-Existing (as *opposed to Rest-Existence*) on the other hand.

If I wish to know the wealth of a person, and consider this merely from the point of his *existing* wealth, his Debit and Credit *together* show me his wealth. Credit by itself and Debit by itself can never give me his existing wealth.

But if I make it a point to ascertain the *process* of acquiring this wealth, and make the process the point of interest, then have I to deal with two distinct powers whose reciprocal relation and influence upon one another is what I wish to ascertain. This might be graphically illustrated thus :—



Existence.



Process.

Let us view our question from these two stand-points.

a. *Form and Matter from the 'Being' stand-point.*

Suppose we were sitting in a dark room in which there was the statue of the Venus of Milo. The room, otherwise dark, admits one ray of light which falls on our statue. Our whole attention is engrossed by this *one* beautiful phenomenon. This unit consists of marble, in the beautiful contours of our Venus, and we could not conceive that marble without its form (that of a Venus); nor could we conceive those beautiful lines without the marble, Form and Material *together* make the statue. We conceive the marble only inasmuch as it has a certain shape, and we conceive shape only inasmuch as it is in marble.

With Plato, the General, Form stood *by the side* of Things.

With Aristotle, Form is *in* the Things, that which makes the Indefinite Definite and Cognisable.

b. *Form and Matter from the 'Becoming' stand-point.*

If we view objects in their genesis, Things are composed of two principles: Form (*εἶδος, μορφή*) and Matter (*ὕλη*).

Matter.—If we abstract from Things form, there remains the Indefinite, Undefined. Matter is this Indefinite, Formless, which however is capable of acquiring form: it has no difference in it—it is that which is the *unknown* substratum of all Things. It is the *actually*-nothing and the possibly or *potentially*-everything.

Form is that which makes the Possible Real, the

Potential Actual. But *how* does the Potential become Actual?

A process means change of some sort, and change is always motion somehow or somewhere.

Motion (*κίνησις*) is therefore that which makes the Potential Actual. But Aristotle's conception of Motion is not mechanical (as, *e.g.* it was with the Atomists, whom he endeavours to refute). The *end* determines the motion, is at once cause and aim. The essence of motion is its direction, the whither; as the goal is at once the aim of the runner and the cause of his running. The aim of the Potential is the Actual, *i.e.* the Form.

Form causes the Indefinite to become definite, the less-definite to become more-definite.

The form of Hermes in the thought of the carver caused the block of wood to become a Hermes-statue. The block of wood was potentially a Hermes-statue (*δυνάμει εἶναι*), the statue with form and wood was the actuality (*ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια*).

The difference between this and the mechanical conception of motion is that this is definite motion—defined by its aim. Therefore there are different kinds of motion, as there are different aims or forms. These numberless forms are not co-ordinated, but there are higher and lower, and these higher and lower forms make a continuous chain. What before was the Actual to a lower Potential may now become Potential to a higher Actual. The block of wood was the actual for the potential block, namely, the unhewn wood; this actual block, however, is again potential in respect to the statue of Hermes.

We can represent all these principles in the following schedule :—

BEING, EXISTENCE.		BECOMING, MOTION.	
FORM and MATTER.		FORM.	MATTER.
(Together, not conceivable as existing apart.)		ACTUAL.	POTENTIAL.
		MOTION.	
		(Not mechanical, but in which form is cause and aim.)	

WORLD OF DIFFERENT THINGS =

A continuous chain of lower and higher, so that each lower thing is the potentiality of the higher (its Actual).

Physics.

Having thus viewed things metaphysically let us view them as they present themselves to us when we merely perceive them with our senses.

All things are in Space and Time. Space, according to Aristotle, is that which comprises things, which hedges them off. Time is the measure of motion in respect to before and after,—succession. Space is finite, for being the property of bodies which are essentially finite it must also be so; time is infinite. Though Space is not actually infinite, it is potentially infinitely divisible. He divides motion into three kinds:—*1st*, quantitative—increasing and decreasing; *2nd*, qualitative—change, the becoming-other, transmutation; *3rd*, change in respect to direction, as to the 'where,' change of situation. The two former, however,

can be reduced to the latter, as both increase, decrease, and transmutation are change of situation of the parts or the whole of a body.

All things are in continuous gradation, including the different great bodies of the universe, the planets. The higher we rise the more perfect everything becomes. The upper spheres are those of the unvarying existence, while the sublunary world, the earth, is subject to continual change.

In the more restricted sense of the word, nature is to Aristotle the organic world. Nature here progresses from the less perfect to the more perfect, until it arrives at man.

The organic is distinguished from the inorganic, in that it has power of motion in itself; the organic has a soul, as well plants as animals and man.

Soul is the moving principle of life; it is to the body what form is to matter. Soul is immaterial; but, though different from the body, it cannot exist without the body, and perishes with bodily death. Plants have merely the power of nutrition and propagation; animals have in addition the power of feeling; man of reason. I cannot here do justice to the physiological and psychological research of Aristotle. He divides the mind into two great spheres, passive and active (*νοῦς παθητικός* and *νοῦς ποιητικός*), and out of these two sides he builds up its different powers.

Ethics and Politics.

The aim we strive for in life is happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), and this state is to be found in Action, especially of the

mind. To act and to accomplish what one strives for—this is the vital element of human happiness. This happiness is acquired by virtuous action, though Aristotle admits that outward accidents, such as health, wealth, family, friends, etc., are not indifferent, though not vital elements.

Virtue is that state of mind which causes us to act rightly, and to find the right path without going astray. The right path in Action lies in a mean between two extremes, midway between the too-much and the too-little; as moderation is midway between excessive seeking of pleasures and apathy; courage between foolhardiness and cowardice; liberality between prodigality and avarice. Intellectual virtue strives for wisdom and the discovery of truth.

Politics.—Man is not an isolated being, he is essentially social. Aristotle calls him (literally translated) a 'political animal.' Man needs community, it is the fundamental element of his nature. This community is found—*1st*, in the family, *2nd*, in the community (in its political signification), and, finally, in the state. The aim of the state is not one-sidedly to further wealth, power, commerce, etc., or, negatively, protection against illegal infringements,—but it is to further happiness in furthering virtue and all that is good.

In reviewing the different types of government Aristotle has expressed thoughts extremely instructive for modern students of political science.

Poetic.

Aristotle's *Æsthetics*, theory of the Arts (*ποιητική*),

has come down to us in a very imperfect condition. It comprised the principles of all Art, but we have left only that part which deals with Poetry—and even this is fragmentary. It deals chiefly with the laws governing the drama, but is of such depth that it lies at the basis of all *Æsthetics*.

Theology.

Aristotle's philosophy is markedly teleological. The Actual was the cause of motion for each Potential, the *Aim* was also the *Cause* of Motion. The question, What is the first moving power, the first cause? will be identical with the question, What is the highest Actuality, the highest and most general thought?

It is evident that the first cause of all motion cannot itself be in motion, and that the highest Actuality cannot have another actual beyond it, to which it is potential. The Potential is material; therefore this first cause must be immaterial, unmoving, unchanging, simply Being. This is Aristotle's God (*ὁ θεός*). God is the cause of motion and life, but merely the first cause, and then the world goes on in action and reaction of matter and form.

But, on the other hand, God is immaterial and unmoving. How can this Being, essentially different from all existing things, outside of the universe, transcending it, still influence the universe? Aristotle's critics urged that influence implies contact; and, further, some sort of action, motion, change; whereas God is to be unmoving, unchanging, everlasting.

They maintained therefore that he did not entirely

solve Plato's difficulty, but merely put it further back.

This problem in Aristotle gave rise to much speculation in later times; and the Neo-Platonist's theory of Emanation may be most clearly understood when one bears in mind this conception of the Godhead and the problem it involves.

With Aristotle we have reached the climax of Greek Philosophy, and the following rapid sketch will comprise its decadence, as in that period the Greek polity crumbles into ruin.

CHAPTER VIII.

POST-ARISTOTELIAN AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.—STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SCEPTICS.

PHILOSOPHICAL thought, after Aristotle's great effort, seemed exhausted. It was (if I may use so bold an analogy) like unto a great general who has grown old, has lost his power of strategical oversight, of mental far-sightedness, and whose brain has grown too weak to grasp the complicated movements of a whole campaign, or even a whole line of battle; whose dwindled military capacities allow him to oversee but one single engagement, and to lead but one brigade into immediate fight. Mind could no longer grasp the whole field of human knowledge and thought, which, discovering truth, ultimately tends to make man happy, but could merely direct its attention to *immediate* human happiness.

The question now no longer is: What is truth and man and nature? but: How can the individual become happy?

This question allows of many answers, and so we find three great schools. Their physical and metaphysical doctrines are almost all contained in the

former philosophy, though somewhat differentiated. They correspond in their chief traits to the three schools which we have called the Incomplete Socratics: the Stoics to the Cynics; the Epicureans to the Cyrenaics; and the Sceptics to the Megareans. Their philosophies have been well illustrated epigrammatically in their relation to the central question of happiness:—

‘The Stoic makes Virtue his Happiness; the Epicurean makes Happiness his Virtue; the Sceptic finds his Happiness in Ignorance.’

The Stoics.

From a historical point of view the Stoics present a grand and imposing aspect. It is the face of Virtue which peers forth out of the surrounding frivolity and moral decadence. Old Greece and the virtue of its citizens were in a state of dissolution, and Stoicism attempted to bar the progress of the disease,—not merely by its doctrines, but by the model life of its professors. They led model lives. On the monument of Zeno were hewn the words: His life was like his philosophy. The name Stoic is derived from one of the arcades (*στοά*) in Athens in which Zeno and his followers used to teach,—*στοά ποικίλη*, one of these arcades decorated with fresco paintings.

Zeno of Citium (born 340 B.C.) was the founder of the school. His follower and successor was *Cleanthes*. But the brightest light in the Stoic school was *Chrysippus* (born in Soli, 280 B.C.). To Chrysippus the school chiefly owes its scientific development. The rigoristic tone of the older Stoics was somewhat modified by the

later philosophers of the school, among whom *Panætius* (born in Rhodes, 185 B.C.) and *Posidonius* (born in Syria, 135 B.C.) are most conspicuous. In Rome Stoicism found numerous adherents, and many of the greatest names in Roman history were its ardent professors. So great was its influence that *Domitian* ordered a wholesale expulsion of philosophers. Among its adherents were *Seneca* (born 58 B.C.), *Epictetus* (born about 68 A.D.), and the Emperor *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (born 121 A.D.), with many others.

Aristotle's god, we have seen, transcended the material world, and still was the cause of motion and life in it. The god of the Stoics does not transcend the universe, he *is* the universe itself. God is Nature. This is what is called Pantheism. Nature is all; and all is good. Follow Nature and you will do right. Nature is the most general; it is continuous, with unvarying laws, which admit no particularistic striving,—all works in one great harmonious concert.

Pleasure (in its restricted sense) is that which tries to sever us from the general course, that which gives rise to difference, and which divides men from each other and from nature,—that which mars the whole harmony. The striving and wrestling for outward, worldly goods gives rise to all trouble and contest. Transplant this harmony into your own soul and acquire the harmony of your soul's forces. Follow Nature like a god, for she has shown you your destiny. The good depends upon knowing the good; it is that which is unvaryingly and absolutely good for every one,—not immediate pleasure, which is relative, and

varies in its results upon individuals, and the same individual at different times. Be indifferent to outward goods, they must be worthless to you (*ἀδιάφορα*). In acting in accordance with this knowledge of the good, in accordance with nature, you will be the wise man. The 'wise man' is the ideal of the Stoics, whom they paint in the brightest and finest colours, showing how he will be both loving and loveable, happy, and spreading happiness about him.

Later on they modified their rigid views concerning worldly goods, and admitted that, though they were not essential to the happiness of the wise man, they differed in degree as to their value, or rather their worthlessness. Some were desirable, but merely as means to enable the wise man to pursue his great aim more freely.

Epicureans.

Epicurus (born in Samos, 342 B.C.) has received severe ill-treatment at the hands of many of his contemporaries and of historians; but there is hardly a doubt but that these are calumnies, or erroneous estimates of character founded upon a mistaken view of his doctrines. It is more probable that that view of his character which sees in him a high and noble nature, is the correct one. He taught in a garden in Athens, and had a great number of followers who assembled around him, forming a sect somewhat similar to that of the Pythagoreans, and who were all devoted with great reverence to their master. Among his immediate followers were *Metrodorus* and *Hermachos*. Later on, Epicureanism found a fertile soil in Rome, having

professors like *Lucretius*, who had studied with the Athenian Epicureans *Zeno* (of Sidon) and *Phædrus*.

The Epicurean philosophy, as already remarked, corresponds to the Cyrenaic. The chief difference is to be found in their fundamental point of view. The Cyrenaic conceives life in its parts, and therefore conceives happiness, which is the ultimate aim, as the sum of immediate pleasures. Epicurus views life as a whole, and the aim which is to be striven for as lasting pleasure. Therefore he warns us against the numerous immediate pleasures which bear their reaction in themselves. They are admissible inasmuch as they satisfy a want, a craving, and thus remove pain. But true and lasting happiness is to be found in the peace and quiet of soul (*ἀταραξία*). The art of conforming to circumstances must be learnt; to know how to enjoy prosperity, and to be contented in want and adversity. This supreme happiness is the essence of virtue. One is to be virtuous, not for virtue's sake, but because it leads to happiness. Science is to be acquired, not for its own sake, but because it is conducive to happiness. Logic is to furnish man with a 'canon' of true cognition. Physics is to show man nature as it is, so that he may be free from superstition, and happy. In their natural philosophy they adhered to the atomists, and gave a clear exposition of the doctrines of Democritus.

The aim of their philosophy was not merely to teach man how to enjoy, but also how to make enjoyment lasting; and this lasting enjoyment they found in the highest pleasures which are identical with virtue, because they are conducive to happiness.

Sceptics.

The highest aim of life, happiness, which consists of peace of soul (*ἀταραξία*), can only be attained by desisting from all attempts to discover truth; for such attempts are futile. This is the keynote of the most pronounced and consistent development of Scepticism, *Pyrrhonism*. *Pyrrho*, born in Elis, a contemporary of Alexander the Great, is the founder of systematic Scepticism. None of his own writings have come down to us; but we have his views contained in the writings of his pupil and follower, *Timon* the Sillographer (from *σῖλλος*, a satire), who lived about 270 B.C. *Pyrrho* maintains: There is no true cognition, because—1st, things have no essential relation to us, and so we can predicate neither truth nor untruth concerning them; 2nd, sense-perception cannot furnish us with objective knowledge of things, because we perceive them only as they appear to us, according to our impressions, not as *they are*; 3rd, Reason can also never furnish us with objective truth, for all conceptions, even those of Good and Bad, are results of habit. One cannot predicate anything with certainty concerning another thing. Therefore are we to refrain from judgment. He preaches total abstinence from judgment (*ἐποχή*, *ἀφασία*, *ἀκαταληψία*). In *practising* (in this necessary action of all mental life lies their weakest point) this abstinence we acquire the happy mood of total apathy. In freedom from positive opinions, passions, and cares is true happiness to be found.

The Later Sceptics begin with the Christian era.

First, *Ænesidemus* of Cnossus, then *Agrippa* (contemporary of Cicero), and *Sextus* called *Empiricus* (because belonging to the empirical school of physicians), made a systematic attack upon all former philosophy, and brought forth proofs (τρόποι), which they found in the relativity of all knowledge, that objective truth was not to be obtained.

The *Academics* were a subsequent development of the Academy (founded by Plato), which pursued a course of Scepticism. The so-called Middle Academy was founded by *Arcesilaus* (born 316 B.C.). He maintained that we had no criterion of truth; we could be certain of nothing, not even of our ignorance. He therefore also recommended suspension of judgment. His doubt did not extend over the field of Ethics. Here he advised men to follow that alternative which had more reasons in its favour than against it.

The *New Academy* was founded by *Carneades* (born in Cyrene, 214 B.C.). He was a man of great mental power. He too brought forth all sorts of arguments to show that there is no criterion of truth. But in practical life he did not preach suspension of judgment, and maintained that, though there was no truth, there was probability, and that probability sufficed for all practical purposes.

The last outgrowth in this sceptical direction were the *Eclectics*, of whom *Cicero* is the type. Their philosophy arose chiefly from a literary, æsthetic interest—they admired *philosophers* objectively. And loving them all well, they could be faithful to no one alone.

SECTION II.—NEO-PLATONISM.

With the Eclectics, philosophy had become an *object* of interest ; they no longer studied Philosophy, but Philosophies. Philosophy had grown old—it was a matter of archæology. To express it in terms of Psychology : Philosophy was no longer presentative, but representative ; its own aims no longer drove man on to thought, but to the already expressed thoughts of others.

Old Greek philosophy was as the Greek state, and it had almost ended its grand career. After Aristotle, there was not sufficient mental energy to think for truth's sake, and everything was viewed immediately in its bearing upon personal happiness, which was now the only motive that could furnish sufficient stimulus. In Carneades, speculation, which had originally arisen from common life and thought, returned to its origin in the immediately-practical. Truth is a chimera ; we must compromise and take the greatest probability, which is to be judged in each case by the reasons *pro* and *con.* ; it is our look-out to find the best course in each case. This is a very round-about way to arrive at the conclusion—

Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Thor !
Und bin so klug, als wie zuvor.

Scepticism and absolute faith are of very near kinship. If man cannot know by natural means, there still lies before him the unknowable region of the supernatural. He who cannot know, must believe !

From another direction faith had had its influence

upon Greek philosophy. The Oriental religions, powerful as they were, could not but influence the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophers, who lived in great numbers in Alexandria; and when we hear of the Jewish Platonist *Philo* (contemporary of Jesus of Nazareth), we can appreciate how, on the one hand, Greek philosophy diffused its influence in all directions; and, on the other hand, how it must have been influenced by the Oriental religions. Of the greatest influence, though negative, was the Christian Faith, which bore in it the germs of universality, of catholicism, and was daily gaining in power; repressing the weak old Greek philosophy and mythology, and hastening the rapid decease of that huge body. Greek philosophy must once more struggle to wrench its lost domain from this new spiritual power; and, on the one hand, still remaining *philosophy*, it must, on the other, meet its great adversary on its own field of *faith*, and imbibe a strong religious element. Adding to this circumstance the already-mentioned inward development, or rather decadence, of Greek philosophy, we can well understand how that philosophy of *knowing*, which had passed through the questions, How can we know man and nature? and How can we become happy? now asks, How can we be *made* happy, can we be saved? What is God, and hence man? It becomes a philosophy of supernatural *feeling*, a religious philosophy.

In this religious philosophy, the philosophical element is derived chiefly from Plato and Aristotle, while the religious element is an outgrowth of the opposition to Christianity. The Stoics had taken the one of the

alternatives left by Aristotle's conception of God, and had posited God as natural, as Nature ; the Neo-Platonists take the other alternative, and conceive God as the supernatural, while Nature is an effluence from the supernatural. The process is not one of natural, physical Becoming ; but a direct Causing without exertion, or motion, or change, or expenditure of energy. Such is the theory of *Emanation*. To enable us to conceive it, they have recourse to a simile which, with our physical and astronomical knowledge, does not hold good. The world, they say, is an emanation of God, as the sun's rays emanate from the sun, without robbing that body of its light, without expending aught of its energy. But these emanations of God are graduated, higher and lower, according to their proximity to God. The first and highest emanation is Mind, Thought (*νοῦς*) ; in which *Thought* and that *which is Thought*, subject and object, are already distinct, while in God there is no such difference. Then follows from the *Nous* the contents of this great Thought, namely, Plato's Ideas. The third is the principle of *real* life, Soul : the World-soul, comprising also the individual souls which spring from it.

Soul is the combining link between the higher intelligible and the lower material world ; soul can still see the Godhead, but on the other hand transfuses matter, and forms the world of things. Matter is the principle of evil, opposed to the great existence of the supernatural world. Man's soul is thus polluted by matter ; but, inasmuch as it is soul, it has a spark of the Godhead in it. By leading a life of asceticism, and severing

one's thoughts from all that is bodily and material, one can purify the soul (*κάθαρσις*), and arrive at that elevated mood of divine inspiration (*ἔκστασις*, *ἐνθουσιασμός*), in which the human soul can hold communion with God, *see God* (*θεᾶσθαι*).

These are the vital points of Neo-Platonic philosophy. The school was founded by *Ammonius Saccas* (200 A.D.) in Alexandria. The central figure of the school was *Plotinus* (born in Lycopolis in Egypt, 205 A.D.). Later on its character became more and more antagonistic to Christianity, and attempted a revival of Greek Mythology and a criticism of the Christian faith. *Porphyry* (born in Syria, 233 A.D.) wrote fifteen books 'Against the Christians.' None of these books are extant; but we partly know their contents from the reply of *Eusebius*. It appears that he strongly accused the apostles, and maintained that Christ's belief was not the belief in Christ. He wrote a life of Plato, to show that there could be salvation before Christianity existed. Plato was made an Antichrist. But Mysticism seeks the remote, and the Antichrist was continually pushed further back. *Iamblichus* (died in the reign of Constantine) wrote a life of Pythagoras, with the express purpose of showing the divinity of that philosopher, the Empress Julia Domna having ordered him to hold up before the eyes of the Christians one of their divine men. This motive has caused so many myths to be connected with Pythagoras, and his life to be pushed further back to remote ages, so that it is very difficult to sever the true from the mythical. The mental contest between Christianity and Greek Mythology was an

exceedingly ardent one ; the Greeks rallied all their forces, called forth all their numerous gods, and drew them up in line before the great foe. Even the temporal power vacillated between the two camps : now ordering the Greek gods and philosophy to be adopted ; now expelling Greek philosophers. Neo-Platonism subsequently made the struggle with Christianity the essence of its philosophy, and united its gods with the different spheres of Emanation. Occasionally the Neo-Platonists even indulged in magic, mantic and spiritualistic tricks.

In this final struggle Greek philosophy was defeated. *Proclus* (born 410, in Byzantium) was the last of the great Neo-Platonists ; and when about 526 A.D. an edict closed the schools of Philosophy, John Damascius and Simplicius fled to Persia.

CHAPTER IX.

B. THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

SECTION I.—GENERAL CHARACTER OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

GRECIAN Philosophy had ended its course. Bút in surrendering its vital breath, it had diffused its fading animus far beyond the boundaries of Greece, and infected even the conservative spirit of Jews. And here, in *Philo*, the idea of the *Logos*, which at the earlier stages of Greek philosophy had merely meant the rational principle of order in the world, and later on had developed into a *preconceived* idea, to the realisation of which this order led as a mean, to the idea of the salvation of the world—this Greek *Logos* became blended with the idea of the Jewish Messiah. The Messiah was the personification of this idea of salvation, towards *which* (or now *whom*) all the natural and orderly flow of events in the universe led. We have seen Greek philosophy gradually sink from the objective task of truth to that of personal happiness, to that of personal and universal salvation—losing more and more faith in its own power to cognise and form, and surrendering that power to the essences further

removed from human exertion (past thought with the mystical halo of remote ages), until it was given up to the transcendent, to the supernatural. Knowledge expires and faith supersedes it. The moving idea of minds is now salvation, and at this moment presents itself to man's view in a glorious image. The national Messiah of the Jews, who is to bring fortune and power to the Jewish nation, becomes a more universal and grander Messiah, who is to bring salvation to all nations, to mankind. This great idea finds its personification in Christ. Christianity is not to remain a national, but is to become an universal religion. The two different directions of early Christianity, Judaic and heathen (St. Peter and St. Paul), must be united into one universal all-encompassing faith: it must be universal, *catholic*. But this spirit of unity must find its way into the various Christian congregations; they must constitute an *orderly whole*. This whole is found in the institution called the *Church*. But in order to form a *lasting* and not only orderly communion, Christianity cannot regard the prophecies of the Revelation concerning the return of the Messiah on the clouds of heaven, the end of the world, and the millennial kingdom as about to be fulfilled at an early date. More and more Christianity liberates itself from the Messianic forms, and more and more it develops the catholic spirit and the constitution of the Church as the *real* manifestation of this spirit.¹ The unity of believers

¹ See Kuno Fischer's Introduction to his *Geschichte der modernen Philosophie*, vol. i. (Mannheim, 1865), and Ferd. Chr. Baur, *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* (1853).

in Christ (which, in spirit, is Christ himself) demands an outwardly-visible manifestation. Each community must be united in a chief, representative of Christ's person: a vicarious office, *i.e.* the episcopacy. But the immediate successors of Christ are the apostles; the bishops can therefore not be the immediate successors of Christ, but the mediate, *i.e.* the successors of the apostles. But this, again, is not complete unity, there must be a chief bishop, a successor to the chief apostle, St. Peter, and that is the origin of papacy. Rome, the centre of the world and the capital of the empire, is the seat of most of the struggles of this great faith, about to become a world-religion. Politically, also, all is predisposed to further the constitution of this great body. The capitals of the provinces become the seats of the bishops; the metropolises of the metropolitans and patriarchs; the capital of the world, of the supreme bishop, the Pope. Like everything in history, this grand edifice did not spring into existence as the fully-mailed Athene out of the head of Zeus, but was the result of some contest in which it proved to be the stronger. The great organism, the Roman state, was dying the death of dismemberment, and statesmen saw that its only hope lay in the reinstitution of former centralisation. The interests of the Roman state and of the Church were in this vital point identical. When this is recognised they will unite. So Constantine the Great is converted to Christianity, which becomes the religion of the Roman state.¹

The further development of Christianity is a matter

¹ See Fischer and Baur.

for Theology and not for Philosophy, though the dogmas of the faith, inasmuch as they had to be made accessible to human beings, needed an intellectual form, and in so far theology became philosophical. But this element of cognition was merely a matter of outward necessity; and when Kant says that 'philosophy was the serving-maid of theology; but it remains to be considered whether this serving-maid is to carry the train after, or the torch before her mistress,'—he characterises the subordinate position of philosophy in the following periods.

The Fathers of the Church.

The Unity of the Church demands, above all things, unity of creed. The creed depends upon that which has been handed down by the apostles, the apostolic tradition. But this tradition again is susceptible of different conceptions and interpretations, *e.g.* Christ may be conceived as man, at the expense of the Godhead, and Christ may be conceived as God, at the expense of his earthly sojourn, etc. So we have, in this early period, the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The dogmas which constitute the creed must be laid down once for all, so that there can be no questioning and no difference of opinion. This was done by the Œcumenical Councils. But, in order that the severely contending parties may elucidate their opinions, they need philosophy. So, *e.g.* the question of Free-Will will be discussed; but not on its own account, as an element of cognition, which when thus solved may have its bearing upon practical life, but as a means to

constitute the doctrine of Predestination and of Grace. So the doctrine of the Trinity arises from the contest between Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, and the presbyter Arius; the union of God and man in Christ, after Cyrillus, Patriarch of Alexandria, is victorious over Nestorius, the Patriarch of Constantinople; the doctrine of Predestination and Hereditary Sin is established by Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, after defeating the monk Pelagius with his numerous followers. After this severe contest Christian Dogmatic was well founded, and in St. Augustine was systematically developed in his *Civitas Dei*. A decisive line is now drawn between the terrestrial and heavenly kingdom, and the Church is the only road which leads to salvation.

SECTION II.—THE SCHOOLMEN.

Though we have just noticed the application of philosophical method as means to elucidate the dogmas, still, as was natural, there was a feeling of opposition to the old enemy, Greek heathen philosophy—in fact all philosophy—as not identical with Faith. And this utter separation between human knowledge and faith is best expressed in the rigid but consistent proposition of Tertullian: ‘*Credo quia absurdum*’ (I believe *because* it is absurd).

But these dogmas are not merely to remain with those in whom they originated; they are to be transmitted and diffused. They are to be taught to all Christians, and are to be conceived in all their bearings by Chris-

tians. The dogmas are to be received and not contested, but they are to be taught and understood : the fathers of the Church gave the dogmas (*patres ecclesiæ*), the learned, the schoolmen, propound them (*doctores ecclesiæ*). 'The Church-fathers tell us what is to be believed, the schoolmen why that, which is believed is true.'¹ Philosophy and Christianity are now bound up in one, *i.e.* no philosophy is recognised but that which serves the Church. When once a philosophy not recognised by the Church becomes known, when once the philosophical development does not keep pace with the theological, but hurries ahead and beyond its mistress—then the two elements must sever, be it in friendly tolerance, be it with a feeling of opposition : scholastic philosophy (philosophy of the schoolmen) has then ended.

Scholastic philosophy proper stretches from about the end of the eleventh to the middle of the fifteenth century, though there were stray beginnings as early as the ninth century. Its site is no longer Greece, but with the great change in the political constitution of Europe it flourishes in England, France, Germany, Italy. There are no special schools of philosophy : no Academy, no Lyceum, no discourser along the shady walks and arcades of Athens ; but the clergy monopolise learning, and the clerical schools (the first in England and Ireland) cultivate knowledge and thought in the interest of religion.

But to prove the articles of faith there must be a test of truth and a guide to truth, the schoolmen need some logical code. And according to their need do they

¹ See Fischer.

adopt the views of the two great Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. The elements of difference which arose between these two philosophers will also influence the leanings of the schoolmen, and give rise to that element of discord which is the precursor of independent thought. According to Professor Fischer there was a period of scholastic philosophy in which Plato gave the leading tone; one in which Aristotle marked the character of speculation; and finally, the difference of opinion and the ensuing debate led to a more independent philosophical development, which in concert with other influences gave the first impulse to a still more independent direction of speculation, until there resulted a pronounced rupture between theology and philosophy.

a. *The Platonic Realistic Period.*

The first and most vital article of faith that is to be proven is the existence of the Deity. And here, at the very outset of scholastic philosophy (with *Anselm* Bishop of Canterbury, born about 1035), we meet with the ontological proof of the existence of God: *i.e.* the attempt to prove the objective, independent existence from the idea in us. Because we have the idea of God in us, therefore God really exists above us. Now, we have met with a philosophy which conceives the 'ideas,' the general concepts, to be the truly existing essences, while the individual things are the mere copies of these existences. This was the Platonic philosophy. We can well perceive the intense affinity which must obtain between a philosophic system which conceives one supreme idea, the Idea of the Good, recognises the

reality of 'Ideas,'—nay, which recognises only them as real,—and a system of philosophical theology which wishes thus to prove the *existence* of the Most High from the *idea* of God. And furthermore, Prof. Fischer has well pointed out how the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, hereditary sin and vicarious suffering, can only be held if 'humanity' have existence, *i.e.* if the general concept 'humanity' be real. And is not the Church an Idea? Must we not believe in its objective existence? All this tends to the proposition: general concepts, Ideas, have objective existence, are real (*universalia sunt realia*). This is what is called *Realism* as regards scholastic philosophy. But as yet it is Realism in the sense of Plato; it is Platonic Realism. Already at this early period Realism thus pronounced evoked its contrary. Roscellinus opposed Anselmus, maintaining that Ideas and General Concepts were mere names, mere common terms without objective existence (*universalia sunt nomina*). Here is the beginning of *Nominalism*. This contest between Realism and Nominalism runs through the whole of Christian philosophy, determines its different directions, and is efficient in its dissolution.

b. *Aristotelian Realistic Period.*

The transition from the Platonic to the Aristotelian period takes place in the monk *Abelard* (born 1079). Plato conceived Ideas as realities above and before individual things. Aristotle gave Ideas form, existence, only *in* things. The general concepts, with the second group of schoolmen, are considered as objec-

tively existent, not before things, but in the thing (*universalia sunt realia, non ante rem, sed in re*). Before this, Aristotle had been known merely in a Latin translation of *Boethius*, and of his writings merely the *Logic*. The schoolmen and the Church had repudiated the teachings of this heathen philosopher ; now he becomes legitimate, and his views of nature are adopted as totally consistent with religion. Strange to say, the writings of this great mind, which had been carefully preserved at Alexandria, came to the Christian world through the Arabian philosophers, who, in the course of historical events, had settled in Spain, and brought their learning with them from the East. Among these philosophers, well worthy of notice, the most prominent names are *Avicenna* and *Averroes*.

In spite of these suspicious antecedents Aristotle is now made 'the precursor of Christ' in regard to the cognition of natural subjects, as John the Baptist was with respect to divine subjects (*præcursor Christi in rebus naturalibus, ut Johannes Baptista in rebus divinis*). As we have seen, the world of Aristotle consisted in a vast gradation, culminating in the final aim and first cause, God. The affinity between this view of nature and Christian dogmas is evident. The great names of this period are *Albertus Magnus*, *Thomas of Aquino*, a Dominican, and *Duns Scotus*, a Franciscan. Scotus leads over to the last period. Thomas of Aquino, adopting the Aristotelian view of the world, considers this to be the best world possible, the result of the divine insight, *i.e.* necessary and determined by that insight. This is the *determinalist* view. Scotus shows

that this view would lead to hateful pantheism, and takes the indeterminalist view ; maintaining that God's action was one totally free and arbitrary. Thus the question of Free-will again presses itself before the notice of thinkers. As Prof. Fischer has pointed out : 'If the manifestation of the Divine Will is not a necessary and rational one, then it cannot be an object of cognition, but of faith.' This is the incipient dissolution of scholastic philosophy, and leads us to the last period.

c. The Nominalistic Period.

The representative of this period is *William of Occam* (died 1347). The '*universalia*' are in several things at the same time ; nothing real can be in several things at the same time ; therefore the universalia are not real. Only the individual things are real. But inasmuch as cognition depends upon names which are general, there is no cognition of the 'real.'¹ There is but faith, and that is given in the Church. This we must receive. The dogmas, the existence of God, etc., cannot be proven—they must be accepted.

Nothing more can be said to bring scholastic philosophy to a close, whose existence, we have before seen, depended upon the amalgamation of philosophy with theology. It has undergone a process of dissolution ; but we shall presently notice other factors which essentially contributed to its extinction, and to the birth of a new era.

¹ See Fischer.

CHAPTER X.

C. THE RENASCENCE.

THERE are historians who think that all historical events, all thoughts and acquirements of humanity, are amply accounted for by the merely physical, or physical and political, preceding circumstances. They forget of what influence upon politics—nay, upon the physical environments of man—are and have been the inventions of obscurely-living men, secluded monks, and ardent youths who study the laws of nature and of thought, invent the printing-press and gunpowder; who discover the hidden properties of steam and electricity, or lay down sanitary regulations, which can convert the sickly and will-less inhabitants of a district into steady, vigorous, enterprising citizens. On the other hand there are historians who consider all events as the immediate results of preconceived ideal and logical constructions. In the middle, between these two extremes, lies the true path. Of no period in history is it so difficult to ascertain the 'prior and posterior' in the vast interaction between Thought and Events, as of the Renaissance or Renascence. Even its exact date is a matter for different opinions. Some let it extend from

the thirteenth to the sixteenth century ; but according to the better view its full vigour and influence extend from the second half of the fifteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth.

The Renaissance is an age with a distinct and marked character of human thought in general, namely, width, universal sympathy, universal interest, universal toleration. So long as the Church maintains rigorous sway over man (to use a modern colloquial term, its *prestige*), it will have power to enforce its laws, to prescribe to mind the limits within which it may roam, and to exclude all other thought, at least the open pursuit of other thought. But in the period of which we are now treating, and especially in Italy, the Church had lost its claim to reverence, was standing before the eyes of the people as the hot-bed of vice, of voracity, and even frivolity. Men arose who waged open warfare against the Church, and pointed to the moral simplicity of the fathers of Christianity as opposed to the luxurious dissipation of the clergy of their own days. In Florence, Savonarola thrilled his audiences with his powerful invectives against degraded priests. Thus the negative groundwork was prepared for width and tolerance. Positively, too, all contributed to heighten the feeling of freedom and individuality. The petty republics and principalities, with their strong feeling of independence, nurtured and continually kept alive through the menacing proximity of jealous states, cultivated this feeling of individuality in the single citizen. The Church, which, like old Greek states, did not recognise individuals as such, but as members of the great Kingdom

of God, for a moment relaxed its pressing hold upon men's minds. Men burst forth in the feeling of their young, *new-born* strength, in the feeling of the adventurer, who beholds the wide world stretched out before his forward-pressing feet, and imagines that he could throw his personality into one scale against the whole world in the other (a great time for heroes of tragedies!) Columbus is driven to the discovery of America, with its widening effects upon human vision. Personalities rise in the consideration of men. The worship of gods is repressed by the worship of heroes. Each man wishes to be original, to become a hero, to become immortal. So we see numerous vast edifices rise, built to bear into distant ages the stamp of their actual or mental constructors; collections bearing the name of some family. Adventurers of all types crop up; men try to shine before the world, notwithstanding disadvantageous birth—the time of Macchiavelli. And all is accompanied by the feeling and spirit of universality.

It is a strange phenomenon, that whenever the individual is submerged in a state, where the spirit of generality prevails at the expense of individuality, the single citizen's range of thought is far from being universal, but rather narrow and particularistic; whereas when a state is particularistic the feeling of 'generality' is in the ascendant. Even in Dante we have this wide feeling: 'My fatherland is the world, the stars shine everywhere.' The psychological characteristics of that age are not simply summed up in the words 'feeling of width and universality,' but the feelings and thoughts

themselves are in their substance wide and universal. No specialisation in mental work—they do all, and can do all. Leonardo da Vinci (born 1452, died 1519) and Michelangelo Buonarotti (born 1475, died 1564), are true figures of such a grand time ;—the former possessed of all graces, advantages, and attainments ; beautiful, strong, and graceful, a great painter, sculptor, poet, musician, philosopher, chemist, physicist, and mathematician ;—the latter the great sculptor, architect, painter, and poet. These are the typical men of that time. Add to all historical predispositions the ‘second birth’ of classic Greek and Roman studies, the disinterment of old manuscripts, studied, read, copied, and collected with ardent zeal, the many Greek refugees chased from Greece by the Turkish conqueror, and bearing with them their traditions and the great treasure of their mother tongue, and we can comprehend the enthusiasm which arose for classic learning, for the classical spirit. Art sees before it nature, cultivated, idealised, and adored in the relics of Greek and Roman sculpture and architecture, now dug up, collected, and restored ; and nature in and through Greek art fills the breasts of artists until they cast off the emblematic and traditional form of church-ornamentation and substitute for it Beauty. Venus sits beside St. Mary—nay, often replaces the Virgin,—the Heathen world is worshipped, and there is in many cases a strong reaction against Christianity—for worship is tyrannical.

Only through the laxity and inner decadence of the Church and its philosophy was this great time permitted to renew ancient learning and art ; but, as we

have mentioned above, the study of other philosophers besides the 'licensed' portions of certain favoured sages, powerfully attracts men's thoughts, and as the spirit of undogmatical inquiry prevails, scholastic philosophy receives its final death-blow. A Greek named Gemisthus, surnamed Pletho, brings Platonic philosophy to Florence and wins the ardent interest of Cosmo di Medici, who wishes to found another Academy in Florence. Henceforth Plato is assiduously studied in Florence. Bessarion, the pupil of Gemisthus Pletho, differs from his master, inasmuch as he wishes to reconcile Plato with Christianity. But the spirit of inquiry will not remain contented with the study of only one philosopher: Marsilius Ficinus adds to the study of Plato the study of the Neo-Platonists, and translates the works of Greek philosophers. Whilst clinging to Plato, the range of inquiry is continually widened, and all learning is interpreted in the spirit of Plato.

Pico of Mirandola, pupil of Marsilius, turned his eyes eastward, and became a Jewish Platonist, *i.e.* a student of Hebrew literature in the Platonic interest. He gave a great impulse to the study of old Judaic and Rabbinical literature, and turned the interest of the age upon the Talmud and the Cabala. These Jewish writings had their influence upon Pico's thoughts, and their pantheistic, mystical, and magical character is to be traced to the similar element of the Jewish books. The interest in Jewish literature found an echo in Germany in Reuchlin, and in Holland in Erasmus. To the vast range of thought before cramped and fettered was added this other great field, widening in its influence.

In Padua Aristotle is studied, not as before, as an unquestionable authority, but critically; and we have two sections that combat each other, the Averroistic and the Alexandrine Aristotelians. The former party had for its representatives Alexander Achellinus (1512), Augustinus Niphus, Andreas Cæsalpinus, and Cæsare Cremonini (1614). The representative of the Alexandrines was Leonicus Timæus. But the difference between Christianity and Aristotle, the incompatibility of the two, was strikingly shown by Pietro Pomponatii. He treated of the immortality of the soul, and studied the Stoics, Epicurus, and the Sceptics. In Valla there was a resuscitation of Cicero, and he opposed himself to Aristotle; and finally, Pierre de la Ramée openly opposed the logical authority of the Church, Aristotle, notwithstanding all animosity, which finally found vent in his murder.

But thought is not murdered with one thinker. It is continually growing in immensity and intensity. Mysticism and Magic in men like Paracelsus was the incipient study and science of nature, and Alchemy was the beginning of Chemistry. The love of nature again moved the philosophic mind. Cardanus, Campanella, Giordano Bruno, and Vanini were the forerunners of natural philosophy. The pantheist Bruno and Vanini were martyrs in the cause of knowledge. Add to all this the German Reformation, with its vast and advancing influence; the spread of knowledge by means of the printing-press; the large vista of new countries in the far West: the new conception of the universe through the revelations of Copernicus (+1543), and later on Kepler and Galileo;—

if we grasp all this in one mental embrace, we can conceive how the billows of thought and research pressed and beat against the dams that for ages had imprisoned them, until they burst through and flooded Europe.

This was the opening of the new era, of modern time, which gave a new impulse and direction to Philosophy.

CHAPTER XI.

D. MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THINGS, events, and thoughts are not isolated, and in reflecting on things, events, and thoughts we are not able to draw absolutely hard and fast lines of distinction. Though we have characterised the Renaissance as the period of transition and introduction to modern time, still no man can pretend to point out the exact moment at which, or the individual in whom, the old time ends and the new time begins. It may justly be questioned whether a man like Giordano Bruno, with his independent spirit of research and his comparatively unprejudiced study of nature, ought not to be classified among modern philosophers. But things, events, and thoughts have a tendency in themselves to consolidate and centralise, if not to isolate themselves. Moreover, our subjective spirit of order and method, the desire to grasp and conceive clearly, justifies classifications without which our conceptions would be chaotic. Modern Philosophy begins in France and in England with Descartes and Bacon. With the former opens the rationalistic, with the latter the empirical, direction in philosophy, and these two directions

proceed in a very normal and logical manner to the numerous developments of modern thought. Although there has been some interaction between the two, they have still been so far independent as to admit of our dealing with the period from Descartes to Leibnitz and from Bacon to Hume quite separately.

The nearer we draw to our own time, the more we find that the details of a philosophic system are still of importance and interest, and the more difficult it is to give an adequate outline. I shall therefore not undertake to give a full account of the philosophers and their systems, but shall rest satisfied with a short illustration of the general direction of thought, and must leave it to the interested reader to resort to the works themselves or to the fuller Histories of Philosophy, such as those of Mr. G. H. Lewes, of Professor F. D. Maurice, etc.

SECTION I.—DESCARTES.

To understand Descartes (born at La Haye in Touraine 1596) fully, we must bear in mind (1) that France was vividly moved by the new spirit of independent inquiry, that sceptics like Sanchez, Montaigne, and Charron had preceded him; and (2) that, though philosophy was comparatively emancipated from theology, still the philosophical mind was not free from strong theological influence and interest. So his very first stage of thought and method, doubt, has a theological character. As with every thinker, his philosophising begins with the 'thirst for truth' and with

discontent with the traditional and that which is merely given instead of proved. Where is the criterion of truth? Who can help me out of this chaos of opinions? Who tells me whether it is not an evil demon who deceives me and leads me along wrong paths when I believe him to have endowed me with the cognition of truth? He begins philosophy with universal doubt. '*De omne dubito.*' This doubt, however, is not the final goal of thought, but the stimulus to subsequent inquiry; it is not Scepticism. In fact, Descartes's '*de omne dubitate*' corresponds to Bacon's 'idols,' which we shall meet with later on. It indicates simply the first stage in his method, and means, in other words: To begin philosophy you must rid yourself of all prejudices, and rather than allow one misconception (a misconception such as those with which common life and the teachings of masters, parents, and other authorities abundantly supply us) to creep in and vitiate your reasoning, you must cast off all ornaments and ballast and start anew!

But in all this uncertainty there remains one fact which with all abstraction I cannot put aside, the fact that it is I who doubt, that it is I who am thinking (*sum cogitans*), and thus he comes to his famous proposition, the ultimate proof of personal existence from the fact of consciousness, the *cogito ergo sum*. This one proposition is beyond doubt,—something he so ardently desired to save him from absolute Scepticism: and now he begins to deduce. But here the theological interest manifests itself. It is not a demon who wishes to deceive me; there is a God. He argues: Out of

nothing nothing can come ; the effect cannot contain more than the cause—for then the ‘more’ would arise out of nothing ; the original of an idea must contain as much as, or more than, the idea. Now, I have the idea of Completeness, of Perfection, whilst I and all human beings are incomplete and imperfect. This idea of completeness must have its origin in the perfect, that is God. There is therefore a God, and no demon misleads me : the belief that my mind is made to know truth is not fallacious. Now it is observable that those truths of which we feel most assured are characterised by their great clearness and distinctness, *e.g.* the propositions of Geometry. Generalising this observation, we may lay it down that whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive is true.

Thus Descartes reaches his famous criterion of truth, and can now proceed to construct his universe. There are Substances, Attributes, and Modes. Substance is that which exists absolutely and for itself (*per se*) without any necessary relation to anything else. An Attribute is that which exists in relation to a Substance, and Modes are the particular manifestations of some Attribute. Hence, strictly speaking, God should be the only Substance : Mind and Matter, however, are admitted to be secondary or created Substances. The Attribute of Mind is Thought, the Attribute of Matter is Extension.

Out of these definitions arises the most controversially fruitful problem of the Cartesian Philosophy ; that, namely, which concerns the interaction of Mind and Body. How are objective Cognition and Volition

possible? For Thought and Extension cannot, according to Descartes, be conceived to have any relation to one another: consequently Mind and Matter, of which Thought and Extension are the essential Attributes, cannot be conceived to affect one another. In Man, however, we find a body which is a Mode of Extension, united with a Soul which is a Mode of Thought; and it seems as if the soul were affected through the body in Perception, and acted through the body in Volition.

Such is the problem which he left to his successors. In his own attempt to solve it, he anticipates to some extent certain of the later psychological theories on the subject; but he never succeeds in reconciling this fundamental dualism of Body and Mind, Thought and Extension.

Descartes has done very important mathematical work, such as the introduction of Algebra into Geometry. In Physics, Mechanics, etc., his research brings us far away from the old time and nearer to modern science.

SECTION II.—THE OCCASIONALISTS.

Descartes's philosophy ends with numerous chasms, which, by his method, cannot be bridged over. He leaves certain absolute differences, and these differences are essential to his thoughts, whilst in nature they are not separated, but are concomitants that influence one another. According to him, Thought and Extension, Mind and Body, are absolutely different: how can they interact?

This is the burning question which supplies moving power to the systems of Geulinx, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.

With Geulinx (born at Antwerp, 1625) and Malebranche (born at Paris, 1638) we have a supernatural solution of the problem. Mind and body are essentially different and separate. But our daily experience provides us with the undeniable fact that there is a causal connection between the two. Being absolutely different, we cannot see a natural causation—it must be supernatural. God at every moment is the *cause* (*causa occasionalis*) of the accord between our thoughts and things, and their relation *is at every* moment made, created by God. In other words, Perception and Volition are a continual miracle intelligible to—Geulinx. I have before mentioned the strong influence which Theology still had upon a still untheological thinker Descartes; now we have the stranger interfusion of independent methodical thought with a mind still strongly biassed and influenced by theological training. In Malebranche we have the desire of a uniform conception which leads him very near to Pantheism; but in his breast the struggle between faith and thought results not, as with Spinoza, in the victory of the latter but of the former. There are not, he says, numerous substances, but only one, that is God. His doctrine is Pantheism, but not with the accent on the ‘Pan,’ but on the ‘theism.’ ‘Extension, Matter, or Nature, is God,’ he would have us think; and not, like Spinoza, ‘God is no more nor less than Nature.’ Malebranche, in order to bridge over the chasm left by

Descartes, supernaturalised Nature ; Spinoza naturalised God.

SECTION III.—SPINOZA.

Baruch Spinoza (born at Amsterdam, 1632), as we have already indicated, solves the vexing problem in a naturalistic, pantheistic manner. Thought and Extension are opposed attributes ; their union would be inexplicable if they were not attributes of *one* substance. This one substance is the wholeness of Nature, is Nature or God (*Deus sive natura*). Thought and Extension are the attributes of this one substance, which is the cause of all things. Descartes's 'created substances,' the single minds and bodies, are not substance (*i.e.* that which is conceived purely as itself, without the aid of any other conception), but modes (*modi*) of the one substance. God is Nature in its wholeness, and the cause of itself and of all things (*natura naturans*). Nature is the sum of all *modi*, of all single existences (*natura naturata*).

In truth, these are merely the two different aspects of the one substance: the moving and active world, and the world of existence and rest (Heraclitus and Parmenides); the concept of all causes is God as *natura naturans*, the concept of all effects is God as *natura naturata*.

One sees that there is no room in this system for chance or caprice. All is in necessary connection of cause and effect, and whatever is free (in the common sense of the term) is outside of this chain, is outside of Nature. When man supposes that he has a free will

he transcends Nature, he believes that he is there where he never could have been,—‘he is like unto the stone that is thrown and fancies that it flies.’ All is strict order and submission to a general law. Accordingly is his method the most necessary and orderly, taken from that science that knows of no exceptions to its rules, of no vacillation, namely, mathematics. He demonstrates all according to the geometrical method (*more geometrico demonstratum*). And this character is to be found in his Ethics. To know the All is to love God, to rid one’s-self of Passion and of Egoism; to *know* one’s passions and vices, and thereby to rid one’s-self of them; ‘Not to weep, not to laugh, not to admire, not to contemn,—but to know’ (*neque flere, neque ridere, neque admirari, neque contemnere, sed intelligere*). And the life of this lonely, suffering, but truly joyful man, from the moment when he began to think and to struggle, until his quiet pleasant death, was a sinless life of knowledge.

SECTION IV.—LEIBNITZ.

Fichte says that a philosophic system is essentially dependent upon the subjective character of the philosopher, and this aphorism strangely applies to Leibnitz (born at Leipzig, 1646). The man Leibnitz is a strange mixture of the conscientious secluded student and the busy diplomatist, the frequenter of courts, the amiable *homme du monde*, so that his contemporaries can hardly say what part of the man evokes

their admiration, the student or the diplomatist or the *causeur*. His mind combines the most contradictory elements into an admirable and extensive whole. The hard and fast rules of mathematics and physics run parallel with the compromising, twisting, haphazard rules of social and political expediency, his worldly sense with a strong sympathy for religious feelings, his careful sifting of experience with the vague hypothesis of transcendent intuition. According to the above aphorism we cannot be astonished to find in this man the philosopher of the 'Pre-established Harmony.' But while critically weighing this tempting analogy until we reject it, we can arrive at the inner disease of Leibnitz's philosophical productions. The different antagonistic elements in this philosopher's mind are not in a pre-established harmony, but the result of their struggle is now a prevalence of the one, now of the other element; and the methodically trained reader of his works is thrown from deep admiration at the keen reasoning, the fine subtle instinctive anticipations, the wealth of his productive imagination,—to a healthy anger at the vitiating influence of the heteronomous, the unphilosophical, conscious or semi-conscious interests, which draw his mind to the most fantastic conclusions, overpowering his strong logic and scientific sense.

In solving the dualism left by Descartes, Spinoza took the one alternative, and found unity in the all, the Complete-Infinite; Leibnitz takes the other alternative, and finds unity in the Infinitely-Small, not the Whole, but in each complete individual. With Spinoza

there is but one substance, and all things and concepts (*modi* and attributes) are modifications of the *one*,—they have existence, but in this one substance. With Leibnitz there are innumerable substances, each of which is a whole of extension and thought, and the universe has existence but as the sum of all these '*Monads*.' These monads have their points of difference and similarity with atoms. They are indestructible simple beings; and if we abstract from the difference between the Potential and Actual, they are all alike. Each monad contains the whole world, past and future, in germ. But difference in the universe rests upon the very difference between the Actual and Potential, the fully conscious, and the imperfectly, dimly, and incipiently conscious (*perceptions petites*). One of the greatest merits of Leibnitz is the introduction of the higher mathematics into philosophy. It is of vital importance for his philosophy and for psychology, and from him dates the beginning of Herbart's psychological and mathematical investigation, and of the modern school of German psychology represented by Fechner and his followers.

The step from the Potential to the Actual in the monads is never a jump, but one of infinitely small gradations. And so is it with consciousness in monads. The difference between the organic and inorganic is not that of consciousness and unconsciousness, life and death; each monad somehow or other contains all others in different degrees of actuality, has more or less actual life and force (the sum of which force is a constant quantity). Nor is there, as Descartes maintains, a hard and fast line of distinction between animal and man (the actions of animals being purely-mechanical,

while man is possessed of consciousness). According to Leibnitz there is power to represent (to conceive) everything in the world in all things, as well in animals, plants, and minerals, as in man. But these representations (conceptions) vary in infinite gradations of clearness, so that the higher monad (*e.g.* man) clearly conceives the lower (*e.g.* animals), while the lower represents dimly, almost unconsciously, the higher, down to the infinitely dim and incipient form of mental representation, the *perception petite*.

Human beings, Leibnitz would say, have the faculty to actually represent a stone. Now the stone is not, as we commonly believe, *absolutely* devoid of all power to represent man; he holds that the stone can, at least potentially, represent man (though the degree of actual representation in it be infinitely small); it is not absolutely devoid of consciousness. Man, high in this scale of monads, can represent *far* less dimly the most High Monad, God.¹

God, this highest monad, representing clearly the whole world, has so united soul and body in all monads, so formed thought and fact, that they occur in order in unvarying harmony; each thought having its corresponding fact, each fact its corresponding thought; there is a pre-established harmony. There is no preponderance, no before or after of fact and thought (against Locke's Sensualism), no precedence of sensuous facts evoking sensuous experience. All Ideas are innate, and facts occur parallel with them.

¹ Though Leibnitz likens himself to Plato, and this has been done by many others, the careful reader will see that the monads, containing soul and matter (form and matter), and the world of gradation ending with the highest monad make it more suitable to compare him with Aristotle.

CHAPTER XII.

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.

SECTION I.—BACON.

BACON the man and Bacon the philosopher have both had many antagonists, who not only dispute his claim to moral toleration, but also to philosophical importance. But there can hardly remain a doubt, that with Francis Bacon (born 1561, subsequently Lord Bacon) begins a new era in philosophy, and that he has introduced or markedly furthered the new and peculiar direction of English thought.

In Bacon, the rupture between the old scholastic train of thought and modern investigation, and the antithesis to the old school, is more pronounced than in Descartes. And we can grasp the numerous threads of Bacon's thoughts most easily and uniformly, if we view his philosophy from the opposition to the schoolmen. We can distinguish four salient points in this general opposition: *1st*, Like Descartes, he opposes himself to the hasty credulity and the blind following of authority; to this corresponds his doctrine of 'idola.' *2nd*, Opposed to supernatural guesswork, he concentrates all attention

upon nature, not theological philosophy, but natural philosophy ; to this corresponds his 'Regnum Hominis.' 3rd, Against the degradation of philosophy to dialectic disputes and quibbling with words, he holds that the criterion of truth is not formal, but material, *i.e.* Experience ; its test is the Experiment. 4th, Against the great authority Aristotle, and his deductive method, Bacon introduces the inductive method.

1. If we wish to grasp truth and avoid error, we must, before all things, rid ourselves of those numerous sources of errors, our prejudices, which do not allow us to see things as they are, but as we wish them to be. We must enter the temple of truth pure, with clear eyes. Before, we have paid our devotion to idols, and they have so impressed us that they pollute our vision of pure truth. Therefore begin with ridding yourself of these idols, these prejudices, and contemplate nature as nature and nothing else. He enumerates four classes of idols : (1) the idols of the Tribe (*idola tribus*) ; (2) the idols of the Den (*idola specus*) ; (3) the idols of the Forum (*idola fori*) ; (4) the idols of the Theatre (*idola theatri*).

The idols of the Tribe constitute that prejudicial manner of contemplating nature, which cannot sever things from human interests ; as when, for instance, one wishes to see order and symmetry where there is no such order. Mr. Lewes has remarked that the propensity which Bacon thus characterises may be called the 'spirit of system.' Professor Fischer has well illustrated this 'idol' by the argument brought against the old Ptolemaic system, that 'Nature *cannot* be so complicated.' There is no reason why nature should not

be complicated, though our logical spirit demands clear classification. A brain is very complicated.

The idols of the Den are that class of prejudices arising from the peculiar physical and educational disposition of the individual.

The idols of the Forum are those arising from a special social surrounding, and from language. 'Men think that their reason governs their words, whereas words govern their reason.'

The idols of the Theatre are those arising from the different dogmas of certain schools. They are the numerous *imitations* of reality on this great stage, and each actor retains the peculiar stage-walk and gesture and accent of his play, in work, promenade, and conversation of common life.

2. All human thought, all mental energy, is to be directed not upon futile attempts to cognise divine things, but mentally to reflect nature. And Bacon is not satisfied with the mere cognition of nature—he has an immediate aim for this study, the aim to him of all philosophy, namely, to subject nature to human use, to acquire mastery of nature, the *regnum hominis*. The eminently practical character of English thought is manifest in this conception.

3. But we must not trust to mere verbal investigation in order thus to gain power over nature; nor must we depend upon chance, stray experience—but we must seek for experience and discovery, wittingly and systematically: we must make *Experiments*. Our senses again deceive us, and this fact has ever been the great buttress of Scepticism; therefore do not trust merely

to your own impressions, but call upon *Instruments* to aid and rectify the evidence of your senses.

4. Experimentation is to be practised methodically. This cannot be carried on according to the Aristotelian deductive method, which begins with general truths and reasons down to particulars. In opposition to this old method, Bacon now develops his inductive method, which aims at acquiring general knowledge from particular cases. Bacon observes that the enumeration of all the cases in favour of a supposed law is not enough : we must also look for negative instances, *i.e.* those which may disprove the generalisation. A person (*e.g.*) finds that on several occasions some member of his circle of acquaintance dies at the moment a piece of furniture cracks. He thinks of all the instances which manifest this strange contiguity of events ; and if he be a superstitious person, he will make a hasty generalisation upon these few positive instances, and say that 'whenever a mirror cracks, some misfortune is sure to befall him.' In this case the generalisation has been made on the strength of several, perhaps of five, instances in the person's life. He has neglected to subtract the numerous, it may be a hundred or more, negative instances, cases in which a piece of furniture cracked, and still no person of his acquaintance died. It is not surprising that I should meet friends fifty times after thinking of them, when I have thought of friends without meeting them many thousand times.

But it is impossible for us, limited in time and physical power as we are, to enumerate all instances relating to a certain case. We must therefore choose

those which tend especially to elucidate the point; these are 'prerogative instances.'

Thus following a prescribed path, we come to a general law of nature, or axiom, and from several laws one still more general, and so on to the highest laws, which do not float in the air, but are firmly founded upon a large collection of objective instances. From this axiom we can now safely deduce, arrive at new and before unseen cases (invention and discovery), we can curb nature to our service and use.

This, in short, is Bacon's philosophy of natural experience, which has for its aim the growing power of man over his natural environment—by means of the thorough knowledge of nature.

SECTION II.—HOBBS.

The before-mentioned repudiation of the supernatural and turning towards nature is carried still further by Thomas Hobbes (born 1588). The disturbed state of that period of English history directs the attention of the philosopher to social and political matters, and these are made subjects of philosophical disquisition, whilst the strong naturalistic tendency of the age leads to a naturalistic solution of the great social and political question.

He invests the state with all power (as a remedy against the revolutionary spirit of his time), and traces this to the origin of social and political institutions which arose out of a primitive state in which each man was the enemy of the rest (*homo homini lupus*).

For a long while the name of Hobbes has been almost exclusively associated with the political theory of his 'Leviathan,' and even to the present day he is not sufficiently recognised in all his importance as a philosopher (in the restricted sense of the word) by the authorities of the Continent. We can best render his opinions by quoting his own words from *Human Nature*, chapter vi. :—

'There is a story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by St. Alban or other saints, at the town of St. Alban's, and that the Duke of Gloucester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle, asked the man, What colour is this? who, by answering it was green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit; for though by his sight newly received he might distinguish between green and red and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was called green, or red, or by any other name.

'By this we may understand there be two kinds of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else but sense, or knowledge original and remembrance of the same; the other is called science, or knowledge of the truth of propositions, and how things are called, and is derived from understanding. Both of these sorts are but experience; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from without; and the latter experience men have from the proper use of names in language; and all experience being, as I have said, but remembrance, all knowledge is remem-

brance.' . . . 'When a man upon the hearing of any speech hath those thoughts which the words of that speech in their connection were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it; understanding being nothing else but conception formed by speech.' . . . 'Words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.'¹

Hobbes is thoroughly nominalistic. Reasoning to him is nothing more than computation of these signs, words. The act of thinking is an addition or subtraction of words. The aim of all this reasoning, of all philosophy, is power (like Bacon). We arrive at knowledge by experience; experience is derived from sensation; sensation depends upon motion. Hobbes is the precursor, and to some extent the anticipator, of Locke.

SECTION III.—LOCKE.

John Locke (born 1632) is the true founder of the Sensationalist school. Mr. Lewes has shown that Locke has been misunderstood by many applauders of Leibnitz's epigram,² inasmuch as Locke distinguishes two sources of experience, Sensation (outer experience) and Reflection (inner experience). But it seems to me that Locke lays greater stress upon sensation, and that his inner experience is an inner sensation, which perhaps corresponds to the organic and muscular feeling of modern psychology.

¹ These passages are quoted by Mr. Lewes in his *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 234, 235.

² To the sensationalist principle, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,' Leibnitz added, 'nisi ipse intellectus.'

There are no innate ideas : the Mind is at first *tabula rasa*, or as we say, white paper. The first mark is made by the senses. However rapid the origin of ideas and reflection may be after this first mark on the unwritten page, we cannot conceive that it should be entirely simultaneous. If we consider the elements contributed by reflection to lie dormant, and that they are awakened by the first sensation, we have preformed ideas which would in Leibnitz's view be innate. There must be a beginning, and this Locke gives to sensation.

With the aid of the two elements, Sensation and Reflection, Locke surveys the whole region of human experience. (1) Simple ideas, *i.e.* those arising *immediately* from sensation or reflection, or both together. They may arise from one sense (as a certain colour, sound, smell, touch, etc.), or from several senses (as space, motion, rest, etc.); from reflection alone (as will and thought), or from sensation and reflection together (as pleasure and pain, unity, existence, etc.). These simple ideas are the letters of knowledge ; but thought and language consist of combination of letters into words, of words into phrases, of phrases into sentences and periods. The beginner in reading stammers letters, then single words, until he almost unconsciously combines letters into words and phrases, and reads and thinks fluently. (2) Similarly we combine simple ideas into complex ideas, of which there are three classes : ideas of modes, of substances, and relations.¹ Our

¹ These classes might best be referred back to one, namely, that of relation between ideas (in the modern sense of that term), but some of his simple ideas presuppose relation between feelings.

simple feelings are retained by memory, and then we constitute certain relations between these simple ideas, we grasp several together and give them one name, a general name, which is merely a sign for several similar simple feelings. The modes are the different modifications of simple ideas: modifications of space (distance, measurement, figure, depth, etc.); of time (as succession, infinity, duration); of thought and its modifications (will, existence, perception, memory, etc.). These he calls simple modes. Mixed modes are those in which different qualities are combined. All actions are such modes, *e.g.* speech consists of thought and motion.

The conception of Substance is the result of a tendency of the mind to find something underlying all simple ideas, a substratum of which all feelings are the attributes. We collect the different ideas into a whole;—all bodily ideas into the idea of ‘body,’ all mental experiences into the idea of ‘mind,’ and combining attributes such as will and knowledge with infinity, we form the conception of God.

There are two remarkable kinds of relations between things within the numberless mass: necessary connection (=causation) and comparison. Comparison of a thing with itself gives identity, with other things the numerous relations of similarity and difference. The idea of morality depends upon the relation between actions and the rules set by law, public opinion and religion.

In Locke we have the psychological method in philosophy, which has ever after influenced English

philosophy. It has been very fruitful, but many subsequent errors arise from an unconscious shifting from the psychological to the metaphysical standpoint, and *vice versa*.

Locke is one of those philosophers whose immediate influence has most widely manifested itself. His ethical views affected positively or negatively the works of Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Helvetius; his religious writings resulted in the deistic movement in England, and so led over to Voltaire. His political and educational works stimulated Jean Jacques Rousseau; and he thus contributed in various ways to the mental upheaval which terminated in the French Revolution. On the other hand, his strictly philosophical inquiries gave rise to the pronounced Sensationalism of Condillac, and later on the Materialism of Diderot, D'Alembert, and La Mettrie, while it also led to Berkeley's Idealism.

Materialism.

Granted certain fundamental misconceptions in subsequent philosophers, I agree with most historians of philosophy in maintaining that the germs of materialism lay in Locke, as they do in all Sensationalism. These germs were still more pronounced in Hobbes. Granted that sensation is the only and sufficient cause of all knowledge, the step to the following fallacious conclusion is but a short one: as sensation is always accompanied by a stimulation of the nerve-fibres and some action, some motion of the nerve-centres, sensation and all resulting thought consists entirely of such motion of the nerves.

Now there are two kinds of materialism,¹ whose element of difference depends upon the general point of viewing things, held by us on speculation.

a. If we take the psychological standpoint, *i.e.* in which we are the topographers of mind, and attempt to cognise the organs and functions of thought, we may come to the conclusion that all thought, all mental action, is *entirely* and *sufficiently* explained by certain motions of nerve-matter, and moreover that such motion (which *is* thought) is identical with mechanical motion. Man with his power of reasoning is nothing more than a complicated machine, which, strangely enough, is a mechanical automaton (*l'homme machine*).—La Mettrie (born 1709).

b. From the metaphysical point of viewing things (*i.e.* viewing the world, including Man and Reason, as a human cognition) we may conclude that *all* is matter and motion of which all things are modifications; and that human thought is the result of an interaction between such force-containing matters, is itself the resulting motion. So the French Encyclopædists (Diderot, D'Alembert, etc.).

SECTION IV.—BERKELEY.

Some historians of philosophy suppose that the link between Locke and Berkeley is to be found in

¹ The time has come when this word should be used in its correct signification, and that people should *first know* the meaning of words they use (be it with a connotation of praise or of opprobrium) before they express or even have in mind the pleasurable or painful feelings which such words appear to evoke in them.

Locke's insistence on Reflection as an element of experience. But Berkeley's Idealism is better regarded as the direct outgrowth of Locke's Sensationalism, and ought correctly to be called Sensational Idealism.¹

All knowledge, according to Berkeley, consists of ideas. Even the consciousness of so-called external objects is nothing but ideas (in our terminology, perception). When we hear a sound or see a sight, we have sensation and nothing more. We are conscious, *e.g.* of sound, *i.e.* the sensation called sound, and not of something else, something 'outside.' There is no existence besides ideas and the spirits that perceive them : to be is to be perceived (*esse* is *percipi*). There is no matter in the abstract—no material substratum, but only mind. All existence is in the perceiving minds, and the cause of ideas in perceiving mind is God.

Berkeley unconsciously shifts from the psychological to the metaphysical standpoint. As long as he is psychological, and maintains that we only are conscious of what is in our consciousness (the thoughtful reader will not consider this a mere tautology), he is consistent ; but as soon as he predicates anything concerning the existence or non-existence of matter, he is no longer psychological—nay, he is not even metaphysical, but 'metempirical' (*i.e.* he transcends the limits of his possible experience). For my own part, I venture to think that Mind and Matter *must* be assumed as the fundamental elements, so long as we have not succeeded in deposing

¹ For a total dissipation of the commonplace misconceptions of Berkeley's idealism, see Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii., Fourth Epoch, chap. i.

one or the other of those fundamental conceptions, Time and Space, from their co-ordinate position, and of proving that either Space is a modification of Time, or Time a modified conception of Space. Then, and not until then, can pure Idealism or pure

- Materialism hold its ground. But until this is done we must consider the philosophical question as wrongly posited.

The combination of Sensationalism and Idealism in Berkeley leads to the negative philosophy of Hume, which (for reasons which I cannot enumerate here) may be called Anti-Dogmatism, in preference to the term Scepticism, which is commonly used to denote Hume's philosophy.

SECTION V.—HUME.

David Hume (born 1711) divides 'all objects of human reason into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.' All mathematics are such relations of ideas, 'in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. . . . Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.' 'Matters of fact are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of them, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing (Relations of Ideas). The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so

conformable to reality.’¹ We should in vain endeavour to demonstrate the falsehood of the assertion that the sun will not rise to-morrow. Now, all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded upon the relation of Cause and Effect. But this is not so, inasmuch as our idea of this relation is itself a result of experience. The idea of causation arises in us by the frequent recurrence of certain events in a certain succession. If I find that in a hundred cases one event follows upon another, I judge that the one is the *effect* of the other, that there is a necessary connection between the events themselves,—while in truth the connection is merely that engendered in my mind, and fixed there by Custom and Habit. There is no ‘because of;’ it is merely a more or less unfailing succession between two events or things. The ‘one thing is *because of* another’ means ‘we have ever found one thing to follow, to come *after*, another.’ The *propter hoc* is only a *post hoc*, —‘there is no so-called *necessary connection*.’ The law

¹ I quote from the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (section iv. Part I.). Hume’s earlier, more compendious work, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, is continually being held up as the true expression of his opinions, not merely because it is more exhaustive, but chiefly because it contains more pronounced Scepticism. Hume has once been pushed into the category of Sceptics, and therefore the test for the true expression of his opinions is to be found in the propinquity or remoteness from Pyrrhonism. This manner of dealing with philosophical systems is a striking illustration of a mixture of Bacon’s ‘idols of the Tribe and of the Den.’ The philosopher must be placed somewhere, and since a great deal he says is very inconvenient, so much the more reason for seating him among the Sceptics, since Scepticism is such a bad thing! We can well understand this when Professor Pfeleiderer (*Empirismus und Scepticism in D. Hume’s Philosophie*) makes it an aim of his book to counteract the dangerous tendency of our time, by letting ‘Hume’s bottomless (*bodenlose*) Scepticism’ shout with a warning voice.

of Causation (that nothing can be without a cause) is, according to Hume, the *effect* of experience, and of that experience that one thing is always followed by a certain other thing. The frequent recurrence of such experience engenders Custom and Habit, engenders Belief and Expectation.

If Hume at all admits that certain things are demonstratively and intuitively true, as he does in regard to mathematical truths, and if he limits this to Relation of Ideas, the question is whether all propositions concerning Matter of Fact are not also *based* upon Relation of Ideas? The question must be put: Whether there is not just as much contradiction contained in the proposition, 'an effect can be without a cause,' as there is in the assertion that 'twice two are five'? In other words, whether the law of causation is not just as *a priori* (not depending for its verification upon experience, in that sense, before experience), as all mathematical truths?

The great merit of Hume, and the great negative merit of his opponents (the Scottish common-sense philosophers), Reid, Oswald, Beattie, is, that they brought forth in clear terms the great question of causation, and overthrew dogmatic philosophy. Hume forced Kant to his formulation of the great philosophical question as to the conditions of cognition, and has influenced modern thought by his searching spirit and his unprejudiced manner of toiling in the discovery of truth.

CHAPTER XIII.

‘CRITICISM’ IN GERMANY.

KANT.

THE age of Immanuel Kant (born at Königsberg, in Prussia, 1724, + 1804) was one of the most important in German history. It was the age of German general ‘Enlightenment’ (*Aufklärung*), in which German freedom of thought and the widespread education of the people was effectually begun; in which Science and Art together poured forth their ennobling teachings into the willing ears of a hero-worshipping people. The poets were read by the people; and the German poets had the great gift of combining two elements in their nature,—thorough natural sympathy with the people, so that they could feel their feelings and speak in their tongue; and a wide and deep culture which, directed through the channel of popular sympathy, carried the thought of the philosopher to the heart of the peasant. It was the age which opened with Frederick the Great and Lessing, and culminated in Goethe and Schiller,—an age full of great historical events and with the power to influence futurity,—an age assimilating the great

Revolutionary War in America with the violent upheaval in France,—an age which caught the glaring rays of the French period of enlightenment, but toned down that blood-red sunset into a widespread rosy after-glow. And one of the heroes of this time, who modified and elevated the thought of this period, who brought forth that time, as much as did Frederick the Great, was Kant.

It is impossible, in a mere outline, to do justice to a giant whose mind extends over so wide a field. It is enough if I succeed in elucidating Kant's fundamental method of speculation, and thereby contribute to counteract the vulgar misconception of this philosopher, who is generally bundled together with 'other German Transcendentalists who are peculiarly unclear and peculiarly useless.'

When Hume deduced all reasoning concerning Matter of Fact, and the Idea of Cause and Effect, from Experience, he neglected to investigate the essential nature of this experience. The question which he did not clearly posit, but to the positing of which his investigation drove Kant, now is, What is Experience, and how is it possible? How does human or rational or conscious Experience (and before the adoption of the doctrine of Evolution this was the only meaning of 'Experience') differ from our conception of irrational unconscious Happening? The answer to this is, In that it is twice-two-is-four experience, or also there-is-no-effect-without-a-cause experience, and no other. In other less uncommon words, In that it is not unconnected Happening, but Happening linked together with a necessary chain,

so that our thought is not like that of an irrational being, or of a *perfect* specimen of a madman, disjointed, uncognisable by ourselves and by others. It is on account of this necessary connection that we become conscious of our own thoughts, that other people can understand our thoughts expressed in language (which otherwise could not be the case), that our actions are directed to certain results, and that we generally attain these results, or if not, may know why we have not succeeded. Call this true, logical, necessarily-connected, sufficient to guide us in action,—what you will,—without this we cannot conceive Experience. The idea of Causation is not, as Hume supposed, the result of Experience; but Experience, as Kant holds, presupposes the idea of Causation. Inasmuch as Experience presupposes an experiencing mind, a mind capable of experience, in so far is it based upon such laws as $2 \times 2 = 4$, and there is no effect without a cause.¹ The question How is Experience possible? is now answered: Only by assuming that certain necessary and general laws of the reason, which precede Experience, are *a priori*. When Hume says the ‘because of’ (*propter hoc*) is arrived at through a succession of experiences (*post hoc*), Kant says the *propter hoc* alone makes it possible for you to perceive the *post hoc*.

But how are we to ascertain whether any element of cognition is *a priori* or not? What is the test of these

¹ It must not be supposed that a child at a certain period philosophises about Causation, or lays down the *law* of Causation; but experience implies (in Mill’s terminology *connotes*) mind, reason; and reason does not merely *contain* such facts, but reason in fact is $2 \times 2 = 4$, and ‘there is no effect without a cause.’

'necessary and general truths'? Kant's answer is very simple. It is the 'transcendental proof' of a-priority. Any element of cognition, without which experience is impossible, is an *a priori* element of cognition. Of such nature is the law of Causation. One must not attach too much importance to this method; it is a final test, not a guide to discovery.

All cognition is cognition of something. We cannot call knowledge the mere repetition of what is already in consciousness. If I make a merely analytical proposition, such as, A body is extended, I cannot call this a cognition; it is tautology, for extension is an attribute contained in the very representation of all bodies. It is repetition of the same thing, not a step from what is known to what was not yet known. If I say, A body has the attribute of weight, then I am really cognising, for weight is something not contained in the definition of a body. Kant calls this a synthetic proposition, in contrast to the above, which he calls analytical proposition.¹ Even in mathematics cognition is synthetical. To say a triangle has three sides would be analytical, but it is no cognition, for having three sides is contained in every representation of a triangle; but the proposition that the sum of the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not analytical; we have 'put together' the two different things, angles of a triangle and two right angles. This Hume did not see, and therefore he could say (to use Kant's terminology), mathematical propositions, being analytical, are necessary and uni-

¹ In our Logic we call this difference the difference between Verbal and Real Propositions.—See *Mill*, vol. i. chap. vi.

versal, but propositions concerning Matters of Fact, being synthetical, are not necessary and universal. But since both mathematical and Matter-of-Fact truths are synthetical there is no reason to assume any difference in the nature of their evidence.

We can distinguish different stages of this synthesis, this putting together.

I. We have a putting together of mere impressions to form perceptions, of stimulations to form the consciousness of being stimulated. Stimulations would be chaotic, and therefore never perceptions, if there were not 'forms of reason' which make cosmos out of this chaos, which give Objectivity and orderly *Existence* to this unintelligible mass; first of these are the forms of perception, Time and Space. Space is the form of mind which gives a stimulus locality, makes it to be right or left, up or down; whilst Time makes it possible for us to perceive a stimulus as existing now, before or after another—Succession and Duration.

Time and Space are not themselves things without, perceived by us, as we perceive a house or a block of wood; but they are the necessary mental conditions of all perception. This Kant enlarges upon and demonstrates in his Transcendental *Æsthetic* (*Æsthetic* in its original sense of Science of Sensation).

But Perception is not the only faculty of the mind. We also reason, remember, connect, compare these perceptions. Time and Space are the forms of mind that 'put together' the single impressions; impressions are the material of Perception. But Perceptions again form the material for our higher Reasoning; we can put

together perceptions to form judgments, and judgments to form syllogisms. This we do by what Kant calls the Categories, or pure Concepts of the Understanding, which he divides into four classes: Categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Each of these has three sub-classes, according to the Scholastic Logic. The most important are the Categories of Relation, which deal with Substance, Causality, and Reciprocity (Interaction). These Categories, as we have already shown with regard to Causation, are not results of Experience, but are necessary conditions of all Reasoning; though he seems to have been driven more by a sense of system and architecture than by motives of true simplification. This Kant treats of in the first part of his Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental Analytic.

In the second part of his Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant shows that there is no Cognition of the *Supra-Sensible* (Uebersinnliche), since all Perception is limited to impressions, and all Experience is made up of perceptions, put together to proposition by means of the Categories. There is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, *i.e.* things independent of impressions, perceptions, etc.,—things independent of our consciousness. We cannot descend lower down in our analysis than to impressions. The absolute source of these impressions is to us an x , an unknown something of which we cannot predicate anything.¹

¹ Whatever may be the difference on this point between the first and second edition of Kant's Critique, which has caused so much contention

Finally, let us review the main feature of Kant's philosophy, those points which distinguish it as a whole from other systems.

The *Dogmatic* philosopher assumes the fact of human Cognition, and immediately proceeds to practise it. He finds truth either in thought itself, in 'clear and distinct thoughts,' or in things themselves, in our Experience concerning them. The former is the Rationalist, the latter the Realist. Whether we are capable of cognising at all, and how much we can cognise, is a question he does not put—he proceeds to speculate.

The *Sceptic* also presumes unlimited Cognising power, transcends the limits of our possible knowledge, and then concludes with elaborate, and, as he must believe, truthful arguments that there is no cognition at all. Or he finds one of the limitations of human cognition, and jumps to the conclusion that therefore there is no cognition. In truth the Sceptic is a reversed Dogmatic. The Dogmatic says 'Ay,' the Sceptic 'Nay.'

The *Critic* does not give an unqualified ay or nay ; but before philosophising he examines the limits and powers of human cognition, marks out the field of

among philosophers ; however much Kant himself has elsewhere transcended the sensible world, *e.g.* in his theory of the 'Intelligible Character of the Will ;' I must hold this view as the correct rendering of the relation in which Kant stands to the question of Things *per se*. Kant may have become 'uncritical ;' but as long as we recognise 'criticism' as the leading feature of his philosophy, we make 'criticism' the main point of our judgment. The philosopher of Criticism does not say ay or nay concerning things-in-themselves, he acknowledges his incompetency to predicate anything concerning their existence, he is *agnostic* as to this point. Call this Scepticism who will ; only then he cannot apply the same name to Pyrrho !

possible knowledge, limited by the Things-in-itself and the Supra-Sensible, and then proceeds to philosophise within these limits. He first asks what is cognition, and how is it possible. He is conscious that all subsequent apprehensions only are valid within these limits of human knowledge. He is not like the philosophers who say: 'We must contemplate the world as if we were demigods, just hurled down from above;' but 'No, we cannot cognise the world as demigods, but merely as men, *i.e.* beings with such and such power of cognition.' Furthermore, the Critic does not remain contented with the mere indication of errors in other thinkers; but he lays open the sources of errors, and shows how they spring from certain tendencies or habits of mind.

Those philosophers are transcendent, they transcend possible Experience and their own human nature. The critical philosopher is *transcendental*, *i.e.* he holds that higher point from which he perceives all objects of cognition, but at the same time sees the bounds beyond which nothing is visible.

I have given the leading traits of Kant's Philosophy, which will live as long as men think about these matters, whatever changes of detail it may undergo.¹

¹ For fuller knowledge the reader must be referred to Kant's own writings, or, as these are exceedingly difficult reading, to Kuno Fischer's *Kant*; or the English version of Fischer's *Commentary of Kant's Critik of Pure Reason*, by J. P. Mahaffy; or Professor Edward Caird's work.

CHAPTER XIV.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SECTION I.—GERMANY.

KANT'S teaching was further developed by Carl Reinhold in his *Elementary Philosophy*. But it contained numerous problems, which could not let the philosophical spirit rest. One of these vexing points was the Thing-in-itself. Kant himself had given occasion for a debate upon this matter in the difference between the first and second editions of his *Critique of Pure Reason*: in the latter of which he *affirms* the existence of the thing-in-itself, and thereby becomes uncritical. As soon as anything is predicated concerning the thing-in-itself as existing, the question follows, if it is, it must be somewhere, *i.e.* in Space, then Space is not a mere form of the mind, and the Transcendental Æsthetic, the main pillar of the Critique, falls. A sceptical warfare was carried on against the Critical Philosophy by G. E. Schulze (known as Ænesidemus Schulze, from his having adopted the name of the old Sceptic, Ænesidemus, on the title-page of his book) and by Salomon Maimon, an extremely subtle opponent. Maimon's theory is

a reaction against Kant, in the direction of Leibnitz, but modified by the critical philosophy and the critical standpoint. Jacobi also criticises Kant, and with a primary impulse from Hume (but merely an impulse) led all philosophy back to the fundamental principle of Belief. As the question of Kantian philosophy then stood, there was but one escape, and that was to Idealism: the thing-in-itself as the material of impressions must also be regarded as furnished by the mind. This is done by Sigismund Beck, who leads over to the most important further development of philosophy in J. G. Fichte.

One great point in which Fichte improved upon Kant, a point which can scarcely be overvalued in its importance to philosophy, is, that he lays stress upon the fact, that all philosophising must begin, not with an axiom or a proposition, not even with Descartes's '*cogito ergo sum*,' but with an *act*, a postulate. 'Posit thyself.' Beyond this philosophy can never go. Any *proposition* bears a question, a 'why' and 'wherefore' in it; but philosophy as Science must begin with an act of Self-Consciousness. The Ego posits itself, and out of the self-conscious Ego he deduces the Non-Ego and the whole world of knowledge. This is Individualism, and it has been appropriately said of Fichte that his philosophical activity was like unto that of the spider, spinning its web out of its own self; not like that of the bee, making honey out of the dew of flowers and its own inherent force. But later on he seems to substitute for individual consciousness a sort of general or perhaps the divine consciousness. Such a supposi-

tion is incompatible with the first, positing of one's-self.

By *Schelling* Fichte's views were further developed and carried out into Pantheism ; but at the same time removed further and further away from the sober thinker Kant ; from an unprejudiced contemplation of things as they are, to a *construction* of the world out of the philosopher's poetic brain. The sober Kant has beautifully said, alluding to this manner of philosophy in Plato : 'The light dove, while cleaving the air in free flight, and feeling its resistance, might suppose that she could fly still more rapidly in empty space. So Plato left the world of sense because he thought that it forced the mind within too narrow bounds, and ventured beyond, on the pinions of ideas, into the empty space of Pure Reason.'

Subject and Object, the cognising mind and the cognised nature, are not parts of the particular Ego, but both are correlatives in the one universal Ego, the Absolute, the Infinite World-Soul. Nature and Mind are two different aspects of the one Substance. All single things and events are modifications of the one great Force and Entity, which endeavours to 'objectify' itself. It is a philosophy made for poetry, as it was the emanation of a philosophical mind in whom poetic imagination, though paired with analytical genius, preponderated.

Hegel.—It is impossible to deal shortly with Hegel. His system has so much good and so much that must be repulsive to the sober mind, that one can as easily be unjust to it as it was easy for its many admirers and adherents to extol it beyond its merit. The results,

both positive and negative, of this system are so widespread and important that here in our mind lies its weight. It was a *courageous* system, which suited the time of its glory, and was formed to evoke not so much approval as fervent attachment. It construed the world systematically, affirming the identity of thoughts and things, and even of contradictories, and in this systematic construction it drew its conclusions boldly, unflinchingly—not fearing the jarring sound of contradiction, and with its strong spirit of opposition delighting in shocking common sense, delighting in paradox. It had a religious cast: it was like a great personage who forces himself upon the admiration of his auditors and works upon their intellectual emotions. The age in Germany was tired of political bureaucracy and sobriety, the philosophical mind was exhausted with and tired of Kant and Fichte's orthodoxy, they wanted something new politically and philosophically, something extraordinary and grandly-emotional. Yet the grandly-emotional, though it be extreme, has generally in history contained true and far-reaching instincts. There is a grand foreboding in such extremist reasoning, frequently more fruitful than many a steady and dry disquisition. So one can see nearly all great truths imbedded in Hegel's works. For this reason has Hegel's school been so productive in all branches; and secondly for the reason that it had such a self-asserting system, which claimed catholicity and infallibility in its architectural construction. This last fact of an unvacillating method, however extravagant the method as a whole may be, is very important for all research. It is a

guide to investigation, and gives man the power of seeing, grasping a subject in some one light, while the methodless have no light whatever, or cannot seize things which change in appearance as often as they change their light. Then too the system itself was full of vigour, all was life and motion and becoming, it dealt not with hard and fast substances, but with relation, by a process of development which bridged over and gave reality to contradictories.

In Germany, Hegel's sway, which for some time ruled the German mind, and called forth such violent and more personal than philosophical contest, may fairly be said to have ended, though there are still some adherents in German universities. In fact, though by the revival in our days, or almost the first birth, of *Arthur Schopenhauer*, the metaphysical question concerning the thing-in-itself, which he finds to be the will, has again come to light, and though the works of that keen mind contain much that is admirable and useful, and with a little interpretation and change might be suited to the requirements of our time, it seems to me that the rule of 'metaphysical' systems in the spirit of a Schelling or Hegel is over. For though Schopenhauer and his new disciple Hartmann have elicited great attention and admiration in Germany, I think this is to be accounted for by reasons other than their strictly scientific merit, and I believe that this 'excitement' is not a marked drift of German philosophy, but a transient and temporary 'rage.'

The main currents that have their important and lasting influence are—(1) a reaction toward Kant in

metaphysics ; (2) a historical school of Philosophy ; (3) pre-eminence of Psychology and speculation influenced and modified by modern Natural Science.

1. Germany, tired and relaxed by the many systems, all of which attempted to develop and complete Kant, found that the master himself was still preferable to the rebellious disciples, and that his system bore the germs of perfectibility and adaptation to investigations ; that its fundamental truths were valid, its limits of investigation justified, and its method useful ; whereas the other guides had all led the way into blind alleys. And it is true. If it is allowable to modify a system according to the changes of time, Kant's system is most capable of such alteration, in fact invites to such use. It favours scientific investigation by hedging in the mind and warning it off from the dim regions where the searching spirit is apt to run astray ; whilst it leaves ample space for positive investigation.

2. The history of philosophy, of human thought, has been cultivated to that high stage, in which it becomes an effective education to the whole educated population of Germany, who again, as teachers or writers or simple members of the great social body, transfuse this ennobling and invigorating spirit into all strata of society.

3. Though *Herbart*, *Lotze*, *Beneke*, and *Fechner* were also metaphysicians, their importance and the main drift of their doctrines runs towards Psychology. Mathematics and Physical Sciences are introduced into philosophy, not as objects of inquiry, but as constituting parts of the whole method of inquiry. Psychology affords the bridge between the exact sciences and specu-

lative philosophy, and the more philosophers become conscious of this, the more do they court and favour the intercourse between these fields of thought. With what result, is proved by the physiological philosopher *Wundt* and the philosophical physiologist *Helmholtz*. Even the more strictly speculative investigators of the Theory of Knowledge (*Erkenntnisstheorie*) are most of them men conversant with the results of the investigation of modern Physics.

Then too philosophy is no longer strictly national and German, but it is becoming more and more cosmopolitan. Philosophy in Germany to-day has been influenced to no small degree by English philosophy, chiefly because of its naturo-scientific spirit. Natural Sciences need the living, and in so far they are in favour of what is 'modern' and opposed to what is 'classical.' This leads to a cosmopolitan spirit (different from the old monkish and Renaissance cosmopolitanism, in which all erudites met and joined hands on the ruins of Athens and Rome), a meeting of energetic, forward-striving men in London, Paris, Berlin, etc. There is a silent but no less ardent warfare now being carried on in Germany between the philological and historical spirit, with the Classic on the one side, and the spirit of exact Sciences, with the living Present, on the other, and there can be no doubt that the *Naturwissenschaftler* are gaining ground. We live in an age similar to that of the Renaissance, in which a great change is taking place in the whole *character* of thought. Although ever since Bacon a certain stress, which bore opposition in it, has been laid upon the study of nature, ours is the

age in which the decisive issue is to take place. As in the Renaissance, there is a great uprising against an old habit of thought, but this time it is directed against the main feature of that very Renaissance, which feature still manifests itself in our days: it is against the spirit of history, of interest in what is past, interest for what is gone and dead, interest which bears its *raison d'être* in itself. All science of Letters stands in the way of the science of nature, opposing it with its method of thought, or in filling the mind of the individual, limited in its power of receiving and giving, with its matter, which power might be applied to the study of the quick.

But let us hope that the partisans of the science of the Living may gain by the very study of History, and in seeing how men and man's mind ran from one extreme to the other, until a correct mean was found, may apply this very truth to the present contest; though positively advancing their own cause and its just claims to their utmost power, may they bear in mind that our knowledge of the present and future is based upon knowledge of the past, and may they avoid the extreme, and not fall into that blind passionate antagonism, in which they see a foe in their own ally.¹

SECTION II.

2. *In France.*²—In the first half of our century, philosophy in France was not a science actively cultivated,

¹ Professor Wundt has written a sketch of the present state of Philosophy in Germany in No. VIII. of *Mind*, remarkable for its objective tone.

² See M. Ribot's article on 'Philosophy in France,' in No. VII. of *Mind*.

i.e. developed to higher stages. Those professedly occupied with philosophy seemed to hold that 'there is nothing new under the sun,' and the only advantage men of later periods had, was that they could collect all the wisdom of their forefathers, and choose from this mass what seemed fittest; though, as has been remarked, they must first establish a criterion by which to determine the fittest. This mode of philosophising is called Eclecticism, and had for its leader *Victor Cousin*, and for supporters men like *Guizot*, *Villemain*, and *Royer-Collard*. The supreme reign of this school has ended in France, and its substitute, as *school-philosophy*, is a system of spiritualistic Realism, represented by men like *MM. Ravaisson*, *Lachelier*, and *Fouillée*.

But the philosophical movement which promises to enlarge its already considerable influence most effectively is Positivism, whose founder, *Auguste Comte*, was far from receiving widespread recognition during his lifetime. It is a grand system, which bases its general principles upon the knowledge of all special sciences and all that is past, and is well adapted to further investigation in all directions. Its followers have split up into two camps, of which the one is headed by men like *MM. Laffitte* and *Robinet*, the other by *M. Littré*. Its influence has reached beyond the boundaries of France, and there is a Positivist school in England.¹

In France, too, the influence of modern scientific investigation has strongly acted upon philosophical minds. On the one hand eminent naturatists, such as *M.*

¹ Comte's philosophy has been expounded by J. Stuart Mill, G. H. Lewes, F. Harrison, etc.

Berthelot and the recently deceased *Claude Bernard*, are taking interest in philosophical questions ; whilst philosophers are turning their chief attention to psychology ; and by such eminent men as *MM. Taine* and *Léon Dumont* English and German contemporary philosophy has been introduced into France. As more or less influenced by German philosophers, especially Kant, *M. Ribot* mentions *MM. Renouvier, Vacherot, Renan, and Cournot*. They seem to have great affinity with the German inquirers into the Theory of Cognition. A pleasing phenomenon, which manifests itself in France, as it does in all other countries, is the growing desire for an interchange of knowledge between all nations.

SECTION III.

3. *In England* philosophy has been taken up with renewed energy, and on a basis which, in point of width, has been unprecedented in this country. To *Sir William Hamilton* belongs the merit of having contributed to this width of knowledge and sympathy by his vast erudition. He has negatively influenced *John Stuart Mill*, who, with the wider knowledge of Post-Humian philosophy and Kant's arguments, together with great insight into the natural sciences, revived and developed the doctrines of Hume. He has given a methodical guide to Experience and a test of truth. Psychology has been cultivated with the most brilliant results. Among others, *Professor Bain* stands forth as an advancer of philosophical knowledge. In Psychology one of his chief merits is his treatment of the

Muscular Sense, of which he has established the great importance. *Mr. Darwin's* achievements, so influential upon all branches of science, in themselves philosophical, have brought the great fact of Evolution before the consciousness of our time. *Mr. Herbert Spencer* in his system is carrying the theory of Evolution into every branch of philosophy. *Mr. G. H. Lewes* has lately contributed to the systematisation of the widespread knowledge of our time, and is still engaged in surveying the whole field of the 'Empirical.' We must also mention, besides the Positivists, a strange revival in England of Hegelianism, chiefly represented in Scotland and at Oxford. Besides Psychology, Logic and Metaphysics (in a new sense of the term), the study of Ethics and Sociology, is receiving great attention, and the fruits already gained allow of hope for much that will contribute to the extension of our knowledge, and the advancement of society.¹

We must finally revert to the question with which we began this sketch of a History of Philosophy: the question of rest in the eternal flux, of a resting-point in this vast relativity. But with what greater and deeper store of knowledge does this question present itself to our mind from that with which it stood before the vision of a Thales or a Heraclitus. Were our mind not so essentially positive in its character and strivings, we might be justified in fearing that the Scepticism which arises when we face the great problem will for ever prevent our finding rest and certainty in the endless motion and

¹ Mr. David Masson has written a review with criticism of 'Recent British Philosophy.'

change of Evolution, and of ever-varying relations. But the great minds of our time will solve this question without falling into apathetic despair ; and if new times with new necessities and new problems present themselves, new men will still be ready to meet them, as the active man does not shrink from the new task of the morrow.

CHAPTER XV.

‘DISCIPLINARY’ CHARACTER OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF ALL THEORY.

I HAVE thus roughly traced the History of Philosophy, *i.e.* the history of the highest attempt on the part of the human mind to reflect the ever-changing conditions of life.

Besides the intrinsic value of philosophy, there is one resultant of the study of its history to which we shall now direct our attention.

A father may forbid his child the eating of certain fruit, because it is his conviction that such fruit at such a time is deleterious to health. The aim of this prohibitive act of the father lies proximately in the fruit, or rather in the desistence from eating that fruit. But the father may forbid this act in order that the child may learn the power of renunciation and of self-control, or the great science of obeying: the aim would then be the lasting formation of character—it would be disciplinary. Similarly we may study the history of philosophy with the immediate aim of knowing what great men thought, or we may recommend this study for its disciplinary results.

One of the most important of the results derived from the study of the history of philosophy is a cultivation of Intellectual Sympathy. It is the power of transplanting ourselves into the different modes of thought of different individuals in different ages and climes, of thinking with and in others ; and in thinking with others we can learn to feel with others. Intellectual sympathy is the highest stage of general sympathy. And as we are most likely to undergo readily the lesser renunciations of life if we have practised renouncing the greater pleasures that fill our whole heart, so it is highly probable that we can best intensify and widen lower stages of sympathy by cultivating this highest development. A man who can not only follow his different contemporaries in their peculiar directions of thought, can not only comprehend a Mill and a Spencer, but also think with a Plato and a Democritus, a St. Augustine and an Abelard, a Locke and a Kant,—such a man can in all probability 'live himself into' the thoughts of his next-door neighbour.

How closely allied is this intellectual sympathy with that toleration and tact which makes life agreeable ! Nay, this toleration and tact is the very outcome of putting one's-self in other people's place, or imagining them in our own position. All the petty annoyances of life, which cause us so much vexation, and waste a great part of our vital energy, so much needed for more earnest struggles, are to be traced back to our incapacity, first to think with others, and then to feel for them. Here a person condemns an action, and despises or even hates another, while he or she, under similar circumstances,

would have acted in the same manner, and while his ardently-loved own person is no better or worse than the culpable objects of his disapproval. There a weak-minded individual becomes a misanthropist because he is thwarted in his expectations of all-devotion towards himself on the part of others, while he himself is far from entertaining towards all others the feelings which he expects some to have for him. Here an over-open-hearted youth who pours forth intimate confessions in the ears of all whom he terms friends, or who will listen to him, one day awakes to the consciousness, and thence to a feeling of just indignation, that others do not feel bound to pour forth their intimate confessions in return.

Instances of faults arising from a lack of sympathy abound. Sympathy is the mother of all social justice, the guardian of prosperous society, and the enemy of Egoism. How much evil would be done away with if people could learn to think objectively, and feel sympathetically! Here lies the secret, not only of errors, but of vast excesses and passions and crimes. Spite and malice and vengeance generally rule in our breasts, because we cramp huge things within the lurid vision of our little self. And it is a pleasing fact that sympathy can be taught; that it is not, as many occidental fatalists believe, inborn and not acquirable. All education and knowledge tend to widen our sympathies, all cultivation of our intellect widens the field of our Emotions. Among the studies taught in our schools, History, if properly taught, is the one most effective as a discipline in sympathy; but still more important for this purpose than the history of events is the history

of thought which led to such events. And this study is not taught in schools. In some schools, it is true, pupils of the higher classes learn some elements of Formal Logic and of Psychology, of a dogmatic type, suiting the individual taste of the teacher, and the result is a lasting dislike for such 'abstruse stuff.' But there is no reason for maintaining that the study of the History of Philosophy is too abstract and difficult for young people. Our power of abstraction is sufficiently taxed in learning the rudiments of Arithmetic and Geometry and Algebra. Under normal circumstances, the difficulty of learning Mathematics and Physics, and of reading Latin and Greek authors, is just as great as of studying the thoughts of an Aristotle. Then too this study is relieved and rendered less abstract by the historical element, the personal and biographical part which forms the background. Of course, a great deal depends upon the method of teaching; we can make people learn certain things, and we can cause them to unlearn even the taste for such things. We can thus train ourselves and be trained, to think and feel so that we may be most suited to the great tasks of life. This is most practical.

We have seen how Science is the higher development of common thought, and we have endeavoured to trace the most general science, Philosophy, down to its origin. The results of all these mental processes are most practical; all sciences together form what we call Theory, and Theory is the outcome of all Practice; it is condensed Practice; in so far it is most practical. All Theory is false that will not bear the

test of correct practical application. I say correct, for the faults made are not so frequently faults in the theory, as faults in its application. But that it is wrongly applied is no reason to say that in itself it is wrong or useless—as little as we can deny the utility of an algebraic formula, because we cannot properly apply it. Enough that it is the shortest and best road, for which we are to be grateful and not to inveigh thereat, because, even with good roads, we are not safe from stumbling, clumsy in the feet as we frequently are. We must not expect that we can learn to read by buying a pair of good spectacles, as the old man in the tale did. It is true we may make mistakes in attempting to bring every single instance under a general law, and people who do so are rightly charged with pedantry. We cannot always carry our theories immediately over into life. Life is such a complicated structure, there are so many recondite currents, causes and effects, hidden from sight, which make up a single phenomenon, that though it be not absolutely impossible, it is highly impracticable to find under what generalisation each instance belongs, simply because man's mind is limited in time and in actual thinking energy. But even the recognition of this fact is a scientific generalisation. If the 'unmethodical,' the 'unscientific' and 'practical,' have long recognised this, it is not because they are not scientific, but because in this case they have made a correct generalisation, and in so far are methodical.

Nor are the frequent charges of absent-mindedness raised against philosophers, at all, in every case, a sign of unpracticality. Not all absent-minded people, nor

even all students of philosophy, are philosophers. Absent-mindedness is frequently the result of a highly practical calculation. Nothing is more practical and bears more remarkably the stamp of scientific method than concentration of thought. The highest law of practicality is the law of the Economy of Energy. Instead of diffusing force in various directions without attaining any complete result, it is most practical to concentrate all our strength upon one aim, for then we are most likely to acquire one excellent and entire consummation. This is so with the manufacture of goods; why should it not equally be so with the creation of mental objects? And if a philosopher see this, and come to the conclusion that many things that others value are worthless, while he needs his force for one great object, is he not justified in being highly practical, and concentrating all his mental force upon that object? There is no doubt a 'too far' in this course, as in all others; but the blame cast on such men frequently means merely that they do not value what others esteem of the highest importance in life.

This is one of the true and least condemnable causes of absent-mindedness. A man is absent from one thing, because he is over-present to another. Concentration of thought is a kind of Sympathy, inasmuch as it is a total severing one's-self from one's-self, and the total transplanting of one's self into another object. For Sympathy in its negative aspect is antagonistic to Egoism; it is selflessness. But there exists no doubt an excess of such concentration. Luckily the remedy and punishment generally follow. No doubt Kant (of

whose absent-mindedness so many tales are told) after he had sat down on the stove and put his tea-kettle on the chair, unconscious of the mistake until he missed the habitual singing of the kettle, wrote a reminder upon one of his slips of paper: *Mem.* not to think about the 'Categorical Imperative' whilst making tea!

The true utility of theory is also disciplinary. A theory is to become flesh and blood. If we have once tested a formula, we use it, and cannot and need not go back for every instance to the original steps by which we arrived at the formula. Theory is unpractical unless it be transfused into our very nature, and thus become a safer guide to action than mere instinctive guessing. In other words, all the single intellections which compose theory and Science are to become 'moods,' are to become emotional. Emotion and Intellect, the two great divisions of Mind, are complementary in all correct thought and action.

We have already examined the points of agreement and connection between these two elements of mind, in order to counteract the fallacious tendency to institute antithesis between them; and have shown how they both together bring forth normal mental action. We must now direct our attention to certain cases in which these two elements are so distributed as to disturb normal action—or, more correctly stated, in which abnormal mental states and resulting irrational actions drive us to conclude that the balance between Emotion and Intellect is disturbed.

CHAPTER XVI.

SECTION I.—THE CRITERION OF A WRONG BALANCE OF EMOTION AND INTELLECT.

THOUGH we may say, the steam-engine and the rudder together are the agents which direct a steamer, and though we recommend the improvement of both, still, the steam power may become so great that the rudder cannot direct, and one of the new rudders worked by steam, may absorb so much power that the forward motion of the ship is impeded. Well, the moving and the guiding powers of the mind may also, in special instances, be thus unequally developed: but how can we recognise this fact?

The best, the most tangible measure of the right proportion between these moving and guiding powers in man, is to be found in the aim of the human mind: what the human mind is to accomplish, what work it has to do, namely, according to Mr. Darwin's principles, to adapt itself to the conditions of existence, to attain success in the battle of life. It is good to have as strong arms as possible; but we must expend different amounts of muscular force to lift a five-pound weight and to lift a

hundred-pound weight ; we must know then what the weight is we have to lift.

But the phrase 'human mind' is very vague and general. Humanity is made up of individuals, and 'human mind' is subject to evolution, and is possessed to a different degree by individuals in different ages and in different vocations of life. How then can we speak definitely of its aim, not being able to form a clear conception of it? The more widely we apprehend mind the vaguer will our conception of its aim be : for example, the aim of the world—*i.e.* the universe, past, present, and future—is less easily ascertained than that of a historical epoch ; of such an epoch than of one nation ; of a nation than of an individual ; of an individual than of a special side of the individual, such as, social man, business, professional man, and so on.

I restrict myself to the balance of Emotion and Intellect in the individual and in the nation, assuming that the best aim is sufficiently recognised by common consent. At least we can say in many cases, with practical certainty, that the right balance has *not* been attained. When therefore we recognise an undue preponderance of the moving or the guiding power, how can we restore the proper balance ?

From the nature of these two mental elements it is not possible in every instance to rectify their wrong balance at the moment ; but a man of an extraordinary power of will and habits of introspection may in the course of time train himself. Through repeated action in one direction he may alter *his frame of mind*. This is what we mean by discipline and habit. It is, how-

ever, only exceptionally that the individual can perform this training for himself,—it is the task and duty of parents, of the education of individuals and of nations.

Let us then examine our question in regard to the education of individuals, see what is the wrong balance, and how we can set it right.

SECTION II.—OVER-EMOTIONAL NATURE IN THE INDIVIDUAL.

A mind in which the moving power is too strong, or rather in which there is not sufficient reflection and consciousness, leads, on the one hand to rashness, on the other to phantasy, as opposed to sound methodical thought.

As regards the common field of actions, social intercourse, profession, handicraft, or business, our over-emotional man will be too rash in his judgments, and jump at a conclusion where there is but a shadow of evidence. His likings and dislikings for persons and things will be immediately called forth, without due grounds, perhaps unaccountably to himself, and he will wrongly act upon these shaky likings and dislikings,—stumbling through many false steps, wronging many in his judgments, and accomplishing little. Superstition and prejudice will be his watchword. In fact, he will only be able to act when he is under the influence of such an ill-founded feeling, and then by fits and starts.

In his business he will be led on and carried away by his feelings, lose his head, and though he may

occasionally hit upon the right thing it will be more by chance than by calculation. Some day a hasty business transaction may drive him to ruin. In his handicraft and in his profession the same rashness.

If he be a great artist, he will feel all the beauty of life, but will not be able to grasp it with comprehensive words, or firm brush, or hard marble, or harmonious notes; he will feel and feel, and moan and moan, and accomplish nothing. If he be a man of science, he will not weigh all the evidence, overlook the negative instances, make hasty generalisations and over-generalisations; he will not be able to see things as they are, but as he desires to see them, and thus his views will be untrustworthy and phantastic.

This is the unsound and morbid state of the mind through *over-emotion*. When the moving power is too violent for the guiding power, when emotion runs wild, and we have a mere chronic phantasy:—its end is insanity.

Now, what is the remedy for this malady? Good, thorough, analytical work. A child, man, or woman thus affected must be kept to strict methodical thinking, mathematics and logic, and must be trained in self-consciousness, in introspection. The old Greek's motto—*Γινῶθι σεαυτόν*, 'Know thyself'—must be taught them in order to counteract this morbid tendency, which, besides particular disadvantages, has this great one: it is a destroyer of happiness; for the numerous reactions and compunctions that such an over-excited and over-energetic mind has to experience, and the waste of vital force must tell. Tone down the flaring colours,

and you may have an effective harmonious picture. Action will not then be by fits and starts, but with less cost of energy will accomplish more.

SECTION III.—OVER-INTELLECTUAL NATURE IN THE INDIVIDUAL.

Now let us examine the unsound state of mind which arises from excess of intellect,—Over-thoughtfulness.

A too analytical mind leads to unproductiveness, inaction, finally to *coma*. As before we had hastiness, so shall we now have tardiness, nay, in some cases, total want of action. As a social being, such a person will be in every sense wretched to himself and others. While still a child he will, instead of enjoying, dissect and analyse his objects of amusement,—he will rob play of its very essence, self-forgetfulness. If he play at soldiers, his rapid analysis will show him that he is not a soldier, and the whole drill have to him a ludicrous tinge: 'That's what they call amusement,' our immature philosophers will say. The little girl will hate dolls and toys,—nothing can give her pleasure.

When our young anatomist grows up, he will not be able to feel any of the gentler emotions. In every beautiful face he will distinguish the epidermis and the muscles; a smile will seem to him nothing more nor less than a contraction of the zygomatics. His gentler feelings, love, reverence, will be in danger of extinction by the cold breath of his analysis. Having no affection, he will meet with none; unloving, he will be unloved,

shunned by everybody, for his touch is like ice. He will roam about like the 'Flying Dutchman,' in search of some one to love him,—haunted by the hateful image of his self, his self-consciousness, which does not permit him to be lost in wonderment, carried away with admiration, and filled with devotion. A wretched man this martyr of the *Γνώθι σεαυτόν*! I have before recommended the 'Know thyself,'—this man has too much of it.

And this disease will manifest itself in business, handicraft, and profession, and even in science.

'In science,' one will say, 'there cannot be too much analysis,—this is the true field of conscious knowing.' But analysis should be succeeded by synthesis, and in this he will be wanting; there will be no motor, no action of his instinct which his intellect could have purified and made the proper instinct; he will see difference, but not agreement; all will be disjunctive and nothing comparative. And this will extinguish his power of invention, his productiveness. I have before mentioned how much of the emotional element there is in truth, in a work of science, especially in the composition of such a work. An over-intellectual man will be unproductive; he will not have the emotional and inventive impulse which is needed even for the composition of a treatise on logic; for in invention always something of the poet comes into play.

How is this morbid tendency of the mind to be counteracted? Negatively by discouraging analysis, as well in study as in the daily life of the child, and positively by cultivating the emotions. Many of the

so-called 'precocious children' are of this class. They must have company of their own age, and not continually overhear conversation of their elders. They must be treated with affection, and even demonstrative affection, to awaken in them the same feeling. And especially the æsthetical emotions are to be cultivated. Try to cultivate their ear for music, make them love music. Taste for music is the most general, the commonest enjoyment of mankind. The instances of a thoroughly unmusical man are very rare, and then can generally be traced back to some organic defect of the ear. The beneficial effect of music, in ennobling and properly developing our emotional nature, can hardly be over-estimated. If you have cultivated the child's ear for music, it will almost be forced to feel; and, the emotion following so immediately upon the actual sensation, there will hardly be any room for analysis. One may know all the physical and physiological processes by which we come by our delight in harmony; and yet at the hearing of a fine composition one cannot help being moved.

If the child have no ear for music, try to interest it in poetry, or in painting, or in sculpture. As soon as you can, let him see and hear a fine drama, where the truthfulness of the characters and the true rendering of the whole action bring forth the necessary illusion, and force him to feel compassion, love, hate, admiration—all strong interest with the persons. Thus you will set right the balance between Intellect and Emotion, and make him just and sympathetic with his fellow-beings,—deliberative, and yet in the good sense self-forgetful, cool, and yet active in business; careful, and yet energetic in his

handicraft ; he will consider and act opportunely in his profession ; he will feel what he knows ; and what he feels he will be able to express as an artist ; and he will have the proper balance between thoroughness and productiveness in science.

SECTION IV.—PREPONDERANCE OF EMOTION IN CHILDREN IN GENERAL.

We have examined Emotion and Intellect in their unhealthy manifestations in the human mind. Let us now examine them in regard to the healthy mind, and see if we can find some more definite principle for the guidance of education on this point, than the mere statement that it is desirable to have the proper balance.

Looking at human life in general, we find that youth is more emotional and age more intellectual. When manhood or womanhood arrives there is a certain change. Our unconsciously receptive nature is, as it were, lit up by a sudden spirit of examination, and weighing of what before we have received on good faith. We begin to examine for ourselves, as at that time we are expected to provide for ourselves. Everything drives us on in the direction of analysis : in active life, the hard and stern matter-of-fact cares and pursuits ; in thought, the weighing and sifting of what we have received, and what we must re-learn.

Through our whole life we consume and prepare, and cut into shape the vast stock which we have received in our youth—the vast stock of emotional energy, of

impulse. Unhappy he who has not such a capital, such a stock of ever-full feeling and energy, as a gift from youth ; the happiness and the effectiveness of his life will be sorely affected thereby.

~ He who has emotion can force the mind to see clearly, for where you have open eyes, light and truth must be seen. But where you have too much analysis it is far more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to bring forth the emotions. Give me a boy who is affectionate and frank and admiring, and I will turn part of his great stock of affection to the love of truth, and, as Plato has said, the Love of Truth includes the desire and striving for truth ; and where his conceptions are rendered dim by his over-feeling, I will stimulate his attention, until the excess of feeling has subsided.

· But can I teach a full-grown over-intellectual man how to love and admire, how to feel a certain beam of truth flash through a mist of problems, almost purely emotional, which he can thereafter measure, and weigh, and test, and reject if it prove false ? It will be very difficult, perhaps impossible.

Well, then, what do we gather from this ?

Barring all abnormal states, the child should be chiefly educated in regard to its emotional nature, and the younger it is, the more so. Carefully begin its intellectual training at the age when its emotional nature is well formed ; then let it have the best and soundest intellectual training you can acquire ; but at no time utterly neglect the emotions. Let it read, or read to it, tales in which its imagination finds ample food and stimulant ; make it susceptible to beauty of all sorts ; let it hear music

from infancy ; let it sing loudly and freely ; let it have playfellows, and love and dislike them.

Do not let it feel ashamed of its plays, so that it hides them from you, but be with it, and share with it the illusion of its little house and garden and babies. Make its life as bright and cheerful and happy as you can, that it may have a strong breast of cheerfulness to oppose life's dark hours with. And above all, do not hide *your* feelings, or cause it to hide its own. There will be time enough for it to know that one cannot always show one's feelings, and that the natural law of society forbids those expressions which would lead to a Babel. But you, throw your arms wide open. Demonstrative attachment is not wrong nor hideous ; it is a stern need of society which forces us to hide our feelings in public, but this useful habit must not cause us to unlearn it at home and in the nursery. There, encourage the child to all expressions of the gentle emotions ; it will make them more lasting and deeper.

Thus you will lay a foundation of mental energy, which like heat can be transformed to all forces, and will last a whole life.

Coleridge has summed up the duties of the education of children :—

'O'er wayward childhood wouldst thou hold firm rule,
And sun thee in the light of happy faces,
Love, Hope, and Patience, these must be thy graces,
And in thine own heart let them first keep school.
For as old Atlas on his broad neck places
Heaven's starry globe, and there sustains it—so
Do these upbear the little world below
Of education,—Patience, Love, and Hope :
Methinks I see them grouped in seemly show.

The straitened arms upraised, the palms aslope,
And robes that touching as adown they flow,
Distinctly blend, like snow embossed in snow.

O part them never ! If Hope prostrate lie,
Love too will sink and die.

But Love is subtle and doth proof derive
From her own life that Hope is yet alive,
And bending o'er with soul-transfusing eyes,
And the soft murmurs of the mother dove,
Woos back the fleeting spirit, and half supplies ;
Thus Love repays to Hope what Hope first gave to Love.
Yet haply there will come a weary day,

When overtask'd at length,
Both Hope and Love beneath the load give way,
Then with a statue's smile, a statue's strength,
Stands the mute sister, Patience, nothing loth,
And both supporting does the work of both.'

CHAPTER XVII.

SECTION I.—OVER-EMOTIONAL NATIONS.

NOW let us turn to the second application of the results of our previous investigation: the Balance of Emotion and Intellect in Nations. I shall again begin with the abnormal instances. It is evident that the higher we rise in our generalisations, and the further we have proceeded in our investigations, the more difficult is it to grasp firmly our object, the more moving and fluctuating does it become; and where before, like the photographer, we could get a tolerably accurate specimen, we now have a continually fluctuating and moving object which we can only seize instantaneously (in a special instance, a special feature), and must omit many of its characteristics, which are part of its essence and consist in this very change. In organic life, and still more in social life, many recondite, by us unseen, and very important currents act upon the whole and prevent mathematical precision of treatment.

Some one may say to me: 'A nation consists of individuals; you have given us some rules for the training of the individual; in doing that you have already given

rules for the guidance of nations.' To this I answer, that I now mean to direct attention chiefly to that part of a nation which has not the opportunity of private and cultured training, who must be dealt with more or less *en bloc* through general public institutions—the populace. This class, as a whole, has not acquired that ripeness of mental training which characterises the more educated classes. They do not weigh evidence, but are led on more by a directly instinctive feeling, which may be good or bad, mild or violent.

Here, too, we have two abnormal states. Let us first take an over-emotional, impulsive people—say the Spaniards.¹ On the one hand the unsound state of popular character manifests itself by rapid impulsive outbursts of pleasure and displeasure—frequently quite independent of any closer examination of the object of these sentiments, unmodified by reflection, fickle and dangerous. And though much is desired simply for love of change, when once excitement is there passion may soon follow. When once superstition, which only lives where deliberation is not, is coupled with rapid change of Instincts, society and the state are in continual danger. And so we see the Spanish Empire, which several centuries ago was the mightiest in Europe, sinking lower and lower through incapacity to take care of itself. Every trifling difference gives rise to a desultory civil war. The people's whole instinct, its whole passion, is concentrated upon this one immediate

¹ I hardly need say that I do not mean 'all Spaniards;' but the Spanish people, as much as one can predicate at all concerning a nation in general.

incident and difference, and they see not the common band and needs that link them all together—the greater and more important, though less immediate aim. And why do they not see this all-important aim? Because they are not accustomed to think; what is before their eyes at the moment, engrosses their whole attention, and immediately they throw the heavy weight of their passion into the scales. A little more thinking, a trifle of correct calculation, would enable them to foresee results, have more distant aims, and thus counteract their passions.

What should be the course they have to adopt, whose sacred duty it is to see to the welfare of the nation? How can they remedy such a mental disease?

By counteracting this over-emotional tendency, through furtherance of strict and methodical thought. Institute public education with thorough fundamental training. Lead them in every way to think and to reflect; that will of itself break the sharp point of passion, will drive superstition out of its last loophole, and will bring them nearer to the correct mark. I am not here speaking of the numerous almost insurmountable difficulties which, in special cases, make it impossible for well-meaning public men to carry out their goodwill in this direction. I am setting down what ought to be striven for. But we must not forget that the populace is like a 'rising generation;' they are chiefly emotional, and an intellectual statement has often as little effect on them as this treatise may have on a child, while a good word in their own emotional language strikes the resonant chords.

SECTION II.—NATIONAL DRYNESS.

Finally we come to the second instance of an unsound balance in national character, which differs from the one just mentioned not so much as the over-emotional man differs from the over-intellectual; for both, being the people, are less intellectual. But as the one had a surplus of the emotional element, these of the present instance have their emotions killed and smothered by a sham intellectual element, covering itself with the garb of thought as a Roman sign-dauber might have worn an artist's biretta as well as Raphael. This sham intellectual element is an enemy to feeling and also an enemy to true Intellect—as the sign-dauber was an enemy to true art. I mean the ugly spirit of National Dryness. It stands to reason that this spirit, fondled and nurtured and warmed by superstition and laziness of thought, is well counteracted by good public training, which we have recommended to peoples of the Spanish type; but I am here going to lay stress upon one side of the question, and one remedy which is not equally evident.

The concrete instance of this national disease, to my knowledge the most striking, and to all of us the most familiar, I find in England. It manifests itself by an opposition to all joy and freshness of feeling. It is in another form the same spirit that says: God has given you the highest gift in nature, the most divine power of Humanity—Reason; well, the All-wise has given you this in order that you may *not* make use of it, and that you may smother and kill it by something which is

unreasonable. Similarly they say that man has the beautiful 'God spark' of joy in order that he may kill it and painfully rend it from his breast.

This dryness, so destructive of freshness and joy, arises from two different reasons. Both meet in the idea that this life is a wretched abode of misery and sin, a mere short span of probation for the Life which is to come. On the one hand, joy of this world, being sinful, will be punished. On the other hand, who will battle with earthly joy, and extinguish it, shall be recompensed.

Let us follow up the effects of this discipline, keeping to living instances as much as possible.

First let us examine the more positive influence, and let us ask the question, Does the system ennoble or degrade human nature, develop or repress the human mind? And again, Is it a safeguard against passion and brutal outburst in the people? or does not the very opposite course, while ennobling, pacify passion and make a brutal outburst next to impossible?

In some countries, *e.g.* in England, the social and civil institutions, in many cases, do not tend to further cultured amusement among the people. The day on which the labourer ceases his work, though it give ample food for the religious cravings of the people, does not provide them with opportunities for any mental recreation. And so, many, if they do not feel the necessity of prayer, or after they have sufficiently satisfied that need, are driven to the lowest pleasures. Their emotions are cramped, but not extinguished; or rather, the gentler are transformed to the more brutal and violent ones. In towns especially is this need felt, and here,

strange to say, the objects and places of cultured amusement are generally closed on the very day on which the populace has time to devote to their examination. So far goes the egoism of some people, that some zoological and botanical gardens, public on week-days, are closed to the general public, but open to the few on almost the only day at which the people is free to visit them. The dry and doleful tone of the Sunday in some countries is especially disastrous as regards the emotional education of the people.

And now let us turn our eyes to the banks of the Rhine and the Neckar, or any little village in Southern Germany. It is Sunday, bright and sunny, and to-day in the neighbouring village there is to be Prize-singing. The societies of all the neighbouring villages are invited to make it a real feast. Early in the morning they put on their best, men and women. Those of the military club wear their caps ; the gymnasts their grey linen suits and knitted belts ; the singing club their badges with the silver lyre ; the firemen their costumes and helmets. They form in line, their flags fly in the breeze, and with the clear sky overhead and fertile fields on each side they march on singing to the spot of the day's festivity.

On their way they meet numerous other clubs from other villages, and farmers' wagons, ornamented with shrubs and ribbons, filled with their human loads. At last they come to the outskirts of the town ; they pass under triumphal arches of evergreen and flowers and ribbons, and the country girls all in white await them, and they are received by the committee of reception, and escorted to the common, on which are impromptu

benches and tables and beer-barrels, and a stage for the singers.

Then they begin to sing for the prizes; there is great anxiety felt by each villager that his club may win. And excellent singing it is.

For once or twice a week in the tavern-room they meet and have their paid music professor from town, with whom they study. And they sing the songs of Mendelssohn and Schubert and the great composers, and they can appreciate what they sing;—they sing loudly and they feel happy.

Joy, loud joy—there is no dryness here, but fresh, human joy.

Nor need we, as is so much the case in other countries, turn away from them in disgust; we can sympathise with them; for there is not so much lowness, brutality, and ugliness in their amusements. Let us hear the feelings which Faust expresses on such a day, when he leaves his study and meets the people in the spring fields on their Easter holiday:—

‘Released from ice are brook and river,
By the quickening glance of the gracious spring,
The colours of hope to the valley cling,
And weak old Winter himself must shiver,
Withdrawn to the mountains, a crownless king:
Whence, ever retreating, he sends again
Impotent showers of sleet that darkle
In belts across the green of the plain.
But the sun will permit no white to sparkle;
Everywhere form in development moveth,
He will brighten the world with the tints he loveth,
And, lacking blossoms, blue, yellow, and red,
He takes the gaudy people instead.
Turn thee about, and from this height
Back on the town direct thy sight.

Out of the hollow gloomy gate
The motley throngs come forth elate :
Each will the joy of sunshine hoard,
To honour the day of the Risen Lord !
They feel, themselves, their resurrection,
From the low, dark rooms, scarce habitable,
From the bond of work, from trade's restriction,
From the pressing weight of roof and gable ;
From the narrow, crushing, streets and alleys,
From the churches' solemn and reverent night,
All come forth to the cheerful light.
How lively, see ! the multitude sallies,
Scattering through gardens and fields remote,
While over the river that broadly dallies,
Dances so many a festive boat ;
And overladen, nigh to sinking,
The last full wherry takes the stream.
Yonder afar, from the hill-paths blinking,
Their clothes are colours that softly gleam.
I hear the noise of the village, even ;
Here is the People's proper Heaven ;
Here high and low contented see !
Here I am MAN—dare man to be !"¹

Now fancy a modern Faust on Hampstead Heath some fine Easter Monday or Whitsuntide. We can pardon him if his sympathy for the people cannot stand the heavy tax put on it there. Their natural instinct for joy, untrained and unbeautified, held in check and fettered by institutions and customs and their protracted work in the foul air of their city hovels, bursts forth in ugly excess, and manifests itself in gross barbarity when it means to be playful, in brutality when it means to be fresh and joy-fomenting. Here men with brutally satiated faces, drinking, and shouting coarse jokes ; here wretchedly-happy women and girls with sallow faces, equally untrained in amusement.

¹ From Bayard Taylor's translation of *Faust*.

And the noise and shouting and hoarse laughter—somewhat different from the chorus of Mendelssohn ! Here a barrel-organ playing a dance ; and there the gaudily and cheaply-dressed girls and lads dancing frantically, while heavy eyes and doubtful movements allow of inferences as to the cause of this uncertainty. In immediate proximity stand five men singing hymns, full of menaces concerning future life,—men utterly ignorant of the ridiculous aspect their words and hymns have in such an environment ; with a jig over-riding their voices, and people dancing,—men who think it noble to drag the most intimate and subtlest feelings of devotion through such mire, degrading to the ridiculous what they maintain to be sublime.

And with what effect ? Do they forget that the people have a strong sense of the ridiculous ? Can they not see that they are inevitably making ludicrous to the jig-dancers what they desire to be impressive ?

And do the people want cant words ? No ! not thus can they counteract brutality as well as dryness ; but through exalting joy, through love of all that is humanly beautiful and good. Ethics must not only tell us what not to do—for we may sit and do nothing, and still not be good,—but it must also tell us what to do. People think it sufficient to preach how we are *not* to amuse ourselves, or only how we are to work and be serious ; they think that the tendency to amusement is always existing in excess, and all one has to do is to counteract it. We must not only be taught how not to amuse ourselves, but also how to amuse ourselves. That is no doubt very difficult, and it is not done in one day, nor in one year.

Let us do all we can to cultivate the people's emotions. Not by mere words. We have mentioned in another place what effect a wise commonplace had upon us; it had no effect unless we *felt* its truth. Well, the words 'Be good, be good,' have no effect upon the people. The idea that joy is sinful promotes this pernicious dryness: attempting to counteract and repress the natural instinct of human joy, it may for the time keep the mind in check; but it is no safeguard against passionate outburst, and even stores up a surplus of energy, so that it breaks forth in violence and brutality. Pack powder tightly into a small compass, and if it does explode, it will be violent and destructive; but spread it over a wide space, and, when ignited, it will harmlessly fizz, and its light will even be agreeable. You can do something to diffuse and render more peaceful the emotional stock-in-trade of the people, and you can do something to make them feel, instead of exciting their ear with mere words.

Do not merely open your art galleries to the people,—for, good as they may be, painting and sculpture are not so comprehensible a language to the uneducated; do not merely circulate books, or hold lectures, or organise teas and meetings,—but encourage a more general, humanly-comprehensible language, a part of which I have already mentioned: it is 'Music' in all its forms, and 'The Drama.'

Many, I may say most, German towns of from 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants have theatres, not with occasional money-making troupes, with ranters and trashy plays, but permanent theatres, founded and supported by local or

governmental means: not to make money, but to give enjoyment, with good actors and fine classical plays.

I have this moment in my mind a German town of from 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, which has a most magnificent theatre. The actors, the singers, the chorus, the orchestra—all are of the first order. The *répertoire* is most universal: the Greek tragedies with Mendelssohn's choruses, Shakespeare and Molière, and Schiller and Goethe,—all are brought out in the finest manner and with most perfect conception. It is frequently the first to take up some new drama or opera. It was the stage that brought out Schiller's first tragedy, and it has kept up these traditions to the present day. It is chiefly supported by a city theatre-tax, of which every citizen, down to the poor man, pays his share, and with pride do they speak of 'our theatre.' The poor man pays his four or five pence, and goes to hear a tragedy or a comedy or an opera. Two or three times a week they have an opera of one of the great masters. Besides those that are well known, they have many which the inhabitants of London itself never get a chance of hearing. Every evening a different play or opera,—sometimes whole cycles of Shakespeare, such as all the historic dramas, and whole Greek trilogies. Should I go on with my description I could not do justice to the institution. Every German town of any size is similarly situated.

Well, the poor man pays his fivepence and hears the tragedies and the operas, and he need not have the cant words repeated to him, 'Be good.' He feels elevated, his passions melt into compassion and sympathy, his

soul elates instead of being cramped and repressed, and he is ennobled. A man who is in the habit of hearing such dramas and such music can hardly commit a theft, a robbery, or any brutal outrage.

Dry and theoretical Ethics are very well, but for children it is far more effective to show them the ugliness of the Bad and the beauty of the Good.

A town or country that has given that blessing to the people has counteracted dryness and brutality.

CONCLUSION.

THE leading thought of this Essay has been that Emotion and Intellect are not absolutely antagonistic, but that they are complementary states of mind, and that by cultivating the one element we can also cultivate the other.

From this point I have viewed the origin and nature of Science, Methodical Thought and Philosophy. I have given a brief history of Philosophy, and traced its intricate course from early Grecian history down to our days. The one striking fact we have gathered is, that, though our emotions may be modified, tempered, and elevated through our intellect, still all Knowledge, in order to become truly ours, must be *durchlebt*, 'lived through,' must become a mood, must become emotional.

I have further applied these results to practical education, and indicated a criterion for the proper balance between Emotion and Intellect, and have pointed out the abnormal dispositions of these two necessary elements in certain individuals and nations. And, finally, I have attempted to give the educational remedies for such mental diseases. A man in whom

Emotion and Intellect are properly balanced will feel his thoughts and think his feelings, will be most likely to do the right actions, to be good and wise,—to be a moral and active member of this vast human community.

APPENDIX.

LANGUAGE AND THE EMOTIONS.

THE following passage in De Quincey's *Walking Stewart* is well worth noticing:—"The character of a nation may be judged of in this particular, by examining its idiomatic language. The French, in whom the lower forms of passion are constantly bubbling up from the shallow and superficial character of their feelings, have appropriated all the phrases of passion to the service of trivial and ordinary life, and hence they have no language of passion for the service of poetry, or of occasions really demanding it, for it has been already enfeebled by continual association with cases of an unimpassioned order. But a character of deeper passion has a perpetual standard in itself, by which as by an instinct it tries all cases, and rejects the language of passion as disproportionate and ludicrous where it is not fully justified. "Ah, Heavens!" or "O my God!" are exclamations with us so exclusively reserved for cases of profound interest, that on hearing a woman even (*i.e.* a person of the sex most easily excited) utter such words, we look round expecting to see her child in some situation of danger. But in France, "Ciel!" and "O mon Dieu!" are uttered by every woman if a mouse does but run across the floor. The ignorant and the thoughtless, however, will continue to class the English character under the phlegmatic temperament, whilst the philosopher will perceive that it is the exact polar antithesis to a phlegmatic character."

There is a great amount of truth in this passage. The

too frequent use of strong language may indurate and blunt our feelings, as excessive indulgence in alcoholic stimulants deadens the sensibility of our palate. And there can hardly be a doubt but that the frequent use of words disproportionate in their strength to the thoughts and feelings in whose connection they are used, has detracted from the original strength of the French language. Naturally the strongest word ought to be used to give expression to the strongest feeling. But strong words have been so blunted through frequent use that they have lost their sharp edge, and pass over our thick skin without even pricking our sensibility; while at moments when we expect a heavy blow, the light tickling of the socially-polite feather may far more vividly stimulate our sensibility. It may be said that this disparate use of words is the essence of sarcasm, and that sarcasm is naturally strong. But the use of sarcasm itself indicates an abnormal state of mind, and its frequent cultivation during a certain epoch, or in a certain country, is almost an infallible symptom of disease in some quarter. When polite and otherwise weak words are used in a powerful context, it is almost invariably a sign of over-frequent and hackneyed use of strong words. There are many instances of this in France. Among them let us examine one of recent date and of great interest, because of its publicity and because of its author—the most powerful writer of the age. Of all Victor Hugo's writings this letter is one of the most powerful specimens; not because of the strong words of which it consists, but on the contrary because of the colloquial, polite phraseology with which it begins on an occasion when one would rightly expect the words which are used when—a stray dog has splashed a drop of mud on our newly-blackened boots.

‘MONSIEUR,—Vous faites une imprudence.’ (We expected an outburst of deeply-felt passion). . . . ‘Tout cela a été dit. Je n’y insiste pas. Je dédaigne *un peu* les choses inutiles.

‘Vous insultez Voltaire, et vous me faites l’honneur de m’injurier. C’est votre affaire.

‘Nous sommes, vous et moi, deux hommes quelconque.

L'avenir jugera. Vous dites que je suis vieux, et vous me faites entendre que vous êtes jeune. *Je le crois.*

'Le sens moral est encore si peu formé chez vous, que vous me faites "une honte" de ce qui est mon honneur.

'Vous prétendez, monsieur, me faire la leçon. De quel droit? Qui êtes-vous? Allons au fait. Le fait le voici: Qu'est-ce que c'est que votre conscience, et qu'est-ce que c'est que la mienne?

'Comparons-les.

'Un rapprochement suffira,' etc.

And now he launches into a grand and dignified comparison, in which the words used are quite adequate to the weight of the feelings expressed.

No doubt there are other elements which contribute their share to make this letter so strong in style: as for example, the great *crescendo* of the whole, which gradually and with a continual bridling in shows us the growing speed and bulk of his feelings, until they burst forth in grandeur. Then again, we feel that the person who wrote this is on the one hand a man of the world, who can restrain passionate outbursts, and this prepares us for the subsequent great effect when his passion is let loose; for the man of the world is not the man of the street, who uses weighty language for light occasions. On the other hand, we hardly need fear with Victor Hugo that we may find the 'typical' man of the world who has lost all power of passion in habitually repressing it; and we are prepared to receive the full meaning of deep words when they come.

However, the passage exemplifies what I mean. Instead of the word 'imprudence,' we expect something meaning unworthy, immoral action or insolence. Instead of 'un peu' we expect 'profondément,' etc. It will be seen that the whole beginning is in a tone of lightness which we would almost expect to notice in two gentlemen conversing in some public place quite simply, though without smiling. Still the essence which underlies the form is intensely passionate.

The reaction against this abuse of strong language may lead,

on the one hand, to this disproportionate use of lighter words, or, on the other hand, to a return to coarseness. In coarseness there is still an element of strength; the terse monosyllable which Bayard gave as a retort to the summons of surrender is an instance. Had he said 'Après vous, messieurs!' it would almost have been equally strong. The coarseness of some of the earlier English novelists, I think, was chiefly a reaction against the French manners of former periods. In my limited personal experience, I have found that many young men who had spent their days with the ideal of 'good form' before them, have taken a childlike delight in using vulgar language when free from restraint.

There is a great deal of truth in the passage quoted from De Quincey. Language is to a certain extent an indicator of national character. But we must not be led to a one-sided statement of the case. There is an abuse as well in the neglect or disuse of words expressive of feeling, as in the too facile application of such words. And I believe that there is a faulty implication in De Quincey's remarks, especially in its application to the English character—the implication, namely, that where there is no verbal demonstration of feeling, we may infer a greater depth of feeling. In fact, one frequently hears this asserted, and the proverb 'Still waters run deep' has contributed to confirm such a belief. But this must not be hastily accepted. I believe that it is the extreme and just opposition against the equally faulty assertion that, where there is no demonstrative feeling, there is no feeling whatever. Falsehood, luckily, is not the normal manner of expression, notwithstanding the proposition that '*la parole a été donnée à l'homme pour cacher sa pensée*;' and therefore I am inclined to believe that, *ceteris paribus*, feeling is more likely to be present where we can perceive the outward signs of its existence, than where there is no sign whatever; as I am more inclined to believe that preciseness and firmness of character is more likely to be possessed by the man who takes great pains with the neatness and cleanliness of his person and attire than by one who does not. But

there is action and reaction between the care of the person and the cast of the character: *e.g.* cleanliness may be the outward expression of certain traits of character, and when practised may again produce, or strengthen, or prolong these traits. All education rests upon the fact of this interaction. We see what is the desirable cast of mind by its outward manifestations, and try to engraft such a mental attitude by habitual practice of these manifestations. It has been suggested to me in conversation, that the fact of the lower orders, especially in the country, wearing their Sunday clothes, and generally attending to the neatness of their appearance on Sundays, has a reviving and improving effect upon them. The work-day customs, with rough language and more or less brutal indulgences, are cast away with the work-day clothes, and there is a strong feeling that outbursts would be out of keeping with such fine dress, and that a man must act up to his '*genteel*' appearance.

Words are not merely the indications of feeling, but they may also react upon our feelings, modify them, in some cases even produce new groups of emotions.

If, as we hope to have shown, the emotions are a desirable and essential element of the human mind, and if language can thus react upon our emotional nature, the expression of these desirable emotions ought not to be neglected, but even positively cultivated. If we compare the German language with the English, we are struck by the poverty of the latter as regards the expression of emotions, and especially of those indicating contentment.

The wealth of the German language in expressions of feeling and general moods admits of no doubt. In what language do we meet with such a wealth of words expressing mental pain, from the most marked shadings down to the finest, until pain gently overlaps into pleasure? Let us attempt an incomplete enumeration of such expressions, omitting the numerous foreign words (such as *Melancholie*, *Apathie*, *Misere*, *Agonie*, *Tortur*, etc.), which have been embodied in German idiom:—*Verzweiflung*, *Marter*, *Pein*, *Jammer* (*Herzensjammer*), *Elend*,

Gram, Kummer, Leid (*Herzeleid*), Herzensnoth, Herzensangst, Bangen, Trauer, Harm, Betrübniss, Trübsal, Trübsinn, Unglück, Schmerz, Weh, Unlust, Schmachten, Hinschmachten, Hindarben, Vergehen, Hinbrüten, Schwermuth, Wehmuth, Sehnsucht, Sehnen, Drängen, etc. Besides these there are numerous expressive compounds.

Now, it is true that the German, as well as every language, is richer in words expressive of grief than of joy; and this is a characteristic common to all language, because it springs from psychological facts common to all men. We do not so readily express our joy as our grief, because, in the first place, Grief is more dignified than Joy. We do not like to show our joy, because it is easily unbridled, and the boundless is less comely than the bounded. Joy is elation which implies opposition to the usual fetters and to form; while Grief is a contraction, which implies a closer sinking into form and seeks the plastic. The facial expression of joy and grief corresponds to this—nay, perhaps was a cause in determining our inclination or repugnance as regards the expression of these emotions. Joy manifests itself in an expansion of the facial muscles, and avoids the eye of the sculptor who wishes to render a beautiful harmonious display of features. The sinking and contraction of grief on the other hand brings out more markedly the fine features and the modelling. Then again elation means motion and unrest, it points to restless diffusion, while contraction must end, and points to quiet and rest; and therefore sculptors, to whom to a great extent we owe the creation of the ideal of human beauty, rendered the latter and shunned the former.

In the second place, sympathy, if sought by the happy, is less sure to be obtained; for man has the evil tendency to envy, and though it is easy for him to feel the delight of compassion and pity, he is more grudging with his sympathy with others' joy. He has also the tendency to egoism. Joy has less need of sympathy: the happy are apt to be self-sufficient. Man can afford to share some of his pain with his brethren; but joy is a matter much in demand, and he cannot well spare

a particle of it—that, unless it can be increased by division, is devoured alone.

And finally, there are fewer expressions of joy, because contentment is essentially a unit, is one, or at least is so in its perfect state, towards which we strive. There is a homely German saying, 'Satter wie satt kann man nicht werden.' Satiety is the *one* point, and all that is above or below this point is not enjoyable. When we are contented we have arrived at the normal state of existence, there is no other way of expressing it, for it is unique, and cannot be split into various shadings. And we are generally driven to express different shadings of joy by the physical concomitants of that feeling, as elation, thrilling, etc. It is the one positive point.¹

All these causes will evidently influence lyric poetry, the musically-poetical expression of emotions. It is very difficult to say more than that we are happy, while we may tell many things of our peculiar feelings of misfortune. And we are not inclined to show our smiling face without hope of having it reciprocated; while we may fail to reproduce in our readers the sad mood which drove us to write a sad poem and still not feel ridiculous. The measured tone of sad words and their context is more adapted to musical rhythm than the rapid, short expressions of mirth. As in sculpture the woful expression is more plastic than the

¹ I hold, in opposition to the pessimists, that this fact of the poverty of expressions of pleasure as contrasted with the multiplicity of expressions of pain goes to prove the *positive* nature of pleasure. The pessimists hold that pain is positive and pleasure negative, *i.e.* that pleasure is the absence of pain; the intermissions in the long chain of bodily and mental pains are to them pleasure. In logic the positive thing is definite and one, while the negative is indefinite and multiple. So 'A' would be positive, definite, and would denote one thing; while 'Not A' is negative, indefinite, in fact, denotes anything or all things in the universe excepting 'A.' Therefore, when the pessimist points to the wealth in expressions of pain, and to the poverty in expressions of pleasure, and when he points to the difficulty of defining contentment, while pain comprises so many states, he has not disproved the positive nature of pleasure. On the contrary we find that the simpler and more positive a fact is, the more difficult is it to define, until we are limited to the mere mention of the fact.

joyful, so in poetry the sad strives towards harmonious form more readily than the happy, and therefore we shall have fewer poems expressive of joy than of sorrow.

But to return to the main topic : The greatest distinction between the German and English language is perceived when we compare the expressions of the bright side of emotions. Let us again attempt an incomplete enumeration, omitting the numerous foreign words adopted into the German language, as well as the compounds which express so definitely certain fine shadings :—Entzücken, Ergötzen, Jubel, Wonne, Seligkeit, Glückseligkeit, Freude, Freudigkeit, Glück, Lust, Vergnügen, Frohsinn, Frohmuth, Heiterkeit, Munterkeit, Scherzhaftigkeit, Ausgelassenheit, Launigkeit, Schalkhaftigkeit, Wohlbehagen, Zufriedenheit, Gemüthsruhe, etc.

Now some of these words have been and are still in use in the English language ; but they have suffered strange usage. They have degenerated to lightness, losing their original weight and dignity, or they have been actually lowered and have received an evil connotation. And we generally find that the Latinised words degenerate in the direction of levity, while the Saxon words degenerate in the direction of vulgarity.

As an instance of the first case : the English words corresponding to Glück and Unglück are Fortune and Misfortune. The dark side of these ideas, Misfortune, has retained the strength and dignity corresponding to the German. Fortune, however, does not correspond to Glück as Misfortune corresponds to Unglück. It may be urged that Fortune had already lost its deep meaning in the Latin, perhaps because of the fickle and worldly character which poets attributed to the goddess Fortuna ; but the difference in the comparative depth of signification between Fortune and Misfortune illustrates what I mean. Fortune has more and more turned towards a signification of luck or chance, or to an expression of the most worldly accidents of happiness, as wealth, etc. When the German says, 'Ich bin glücklich,' he means to indicate a state of high satisfaction ; but when we say, 'I am fortunate,' it conveys the impression of a transitory state of satisfaction ;

in fact, we are not necessarily happy or contented, the accent is not thrown upon our own mood, but upon some outer fact, for we would naturally ask, 'Fortunate *in what?*'

As an instance of the second case, we find the word Lust still used in English, but in what an altered meaning from the German! In German, Lust denotes a wide, high, and intense pleasure. It would not be amiss in German to speak of the 'high Lust of converse with God in prayer.'¹ The wide compass of this word is beautifully illustrated in that untranslatable poem in Goethe's 'West-östlicher Divan,' in which Lust is brought into connection with rose-water which cost the life of a whole world of flowers, and with the great historical event of Tamerlane's (Timur) inroad which also cost the life of myriads of existences.

'Dir mit Wohlgeruch zu kosen,
Deine Freuden zu erhöh'n,
Knospend müssen tausend Rosen
Erst in Gluthen untergehn.

Um ein Fläschchen zu besitzen
Das den Ruch auf ewig hält,
Schlank wie deine Fingerspitzen
Da bedarf es einer Welt;

Einer Welt von Lebenstrieben,
Die, in ihrer Fülle Drang,
Ahneten schon Bulbuls Lieben,
Seeleregenden Gesang.

Sollte jene Qual uns quälen,
Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt?
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen
Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?'

It is true, the word Lust in English is not exclusively used in the lowest animal sense, but has been applied in a more intellectual connection; so we speak of the 'lust of empire,' the 'lust of power,' etc. But there is undoubtedly always an

¹ We are reminded of the story of a German missionary who, ignorant of this degeneration of Saxon words, exhorted his congregation 'to do the will of God with *craft* and *lust*.'

admixture of evil and of disapproval, and some hidden analogy to animal desire. With Chaucer, still, 'luste' is used both as a noun and verb to signify wish, desire, pleasure, enjoyment, without an evil connotation.¹ The causes of this degeneration are numerous. But two seem to me most worthy of notice. It is a well-known fact that after the Norman Conquest, the language of the conqueror, French, became the language of the aristocracy. This has manifested itself in the fact that the raw materials of food—cattle, etc.,—retained their Saxon

¹ In the *Canterbury Tales* :—

Clerkes Tale.

His lustes were al lawe in his decree
For fortune as his friend wolde him obeye.
Right as you lust governe this matter.

Wherefore I yow preye
Doth your plesaunce, I wol your lust obeye.
But on his lust present was al his thought
As for to hauke and hunte on every syde.

Squyeres Tale.

But thus I lete in lust and iolitee
This Cambyskam his lordes festeyinge
Til wel ny the day began to springe.
The knotte why that every tale is told
If it be taried til the lust is cold.

If hir lust it for to were
Upon hir thombe.

Man of Lawes Tale.

Al his lust and al his busy care
Was for to love hir while his lyf may dure.

'To do hir lust' (will, pleasure) is very common, and originally lust was used in the sense of list (the *opposite* sense 'listless' still obtains), to do anything with pleasure, enjoyment. The word *lusty* Chaucer also uses like the German *lustig*, meaning merry, jovial (the lusty playne, the lusty somer, etc.). The noun *lustiheed* (joviality) corresponding to the German *Lustigkeit*, is also used :—

Therefore I passe of al this lustiheed.

Squyeres Tale.

names, such as ox, calf, sheep, etc., while the prepared meat is called by the French terms, beef, veal, mutton. Words used by the aristocracy will retain a high and polite signification, while the corresponding words in Saxon used by the vulgar will be spurned by the higher classes, and will receive a vulgar stamp.¹

Another striking instance of the vulgarising influence of the Norman Conquest upon the Saxon vernacular is afforded by the word 'buxom.' In Anglo-Saxon *beogan*, *bugan*, and *bocsum*, it still obtains in the German *biegen*, *biegsam*. In German it has retained its original meaning of bendable, pliable, slender, etc. In a moral sense it meant obedient (pliable), as 'Under obedience to be and buxum to the lawe' (*Piers Plowman*, about A.D. 1362). In Chaucer (*Clerkes Tale*) we have it in its original physical meaning: 'And they with humble entent buxumly—knelynge upon hir knees ful reverently.' But in English we find a strange alteration in its meaning as applied to the human female figure. I may venture upon the following hypothesis with regard to the history of this word. Originally, I believe, this word was applied to the female figure to denote grace, liness, sliness. If I remember rightly, some modern poet uses the word in that sense: the 'buxom willow,' or in some similar context. It would then convey the attribute of pliability and

¹ The other side in this question concerning the history of the English language, namely, the elevation in the signification of words corresponding to the degradation of similar Saxon words, I have found strikingly illustrated in Archbp. Trench's work (*A Select Glossary of English Words, used formerly in Senses different from their Present*: London, 1859). On page 51 he points out, and illustrates with many instances, that words with former significations very similar to the present meaning of 'lust,' such as 'Delicacy,' 'Delicious,' 'Luxury,' have, in the course of time, changed their meaning, until they to-day convey to us attributes of a pleasing nature. Archbp. Trench ingeniously mentions as a cause of this change the 'self-indulgence of human nature.' I believe that we may add as another, and one of the most important causes, the aristocratic turn of English social and political life, which frequently led men to admire even the vices which belonged to and characterised the higher classes.

grace which is given in the words of De Musset addressed to a lady: 'Dans nos valsez joyeuses je vous sentais dans mes bras plier comme un roseau.' So, I venture to say, the word *buxom* was frequently applied to graceful slender girls as a mark of high admiration. After the Norman Conquest, I suppose this to have been the action on the part of those who struck the key-note of *bon-ton*. Consciously, or half-consciously, the following train of thought seems to have pressed itself upon those of a markedly aristocratic turn of mind. The people is essentially a distinct body from us, the aristocracy, especially the woman whom we admire so much. The words of the people must denote the attributes of the people: the lady is graceful, etc.; the woman is healthy, stout, red-cheeked, etc.;—the lady dances, and we can feel her 'se plier comme un roseau,' but not the peasant-woman. Now they found the word *buxom* indicating beauty in the woman of the people, they therefore influenced language, so that 'buxom' conveyed the meaning of the beauty peculiar to the woman of the people.

Such a process is not restricted to the historical development of England; but we meet with it repeatedly in history, whenever there is this bloodless intellectual and linguistic warfare between classes. In Germany, *e.g.*, the purely German words were repressed in meaning in proportion as French gained footing as the language of the courts and of polite society through Frederick the Great and the subsequent Napoleonic influence. The *Frau* and *Frauenzimmer* assumed a lower connotation the more the word 'Madame' was used in connection with ladies. At present there is a strong reaction against the French idiom in German. Politics and Language are closely linked together in their bearing upon one another, and loss in political prestige precedes repression of idiom.

During the time of the Revolution we might have expected a revival of the old word, such as *Lust*; but the Revolution was puritanic in spirit, and so instead of being reinstated it was still more repressed, for Puritanism with its stern features

was ever averse to expressions of joyful emotions. Only such joy as partook of a lofty aspiring character was cultivated, and the amiable and light-hearted was immediately branded as frivolous. I think we must look to Puritanism for an explanation of one curious fact in these expressions. We find many expressions of exalted joy, of temporary pleasurable states (as a contribution from the French), and of the lower pleasure which is to be spurned. But we hardly find a powerful word which expresses a lasting state of pleasure, comprising as well the smallest satisfaction as the loftiest happiness,—I mean a word corresponding to the German *Glückseligkeit* and the Greek *εὐδαιμονία*. In the German word the ‘glück’ comprises all real happiness of life, and the ‘seligkeit’ the most exalted spiritual happiness, and both combine to a lasting positive whole. A person would hardly be shocked were an Epicurean (a follower of the philosophy of Epicurus, I mean) to tell him that ‘Glückseligkeit was the aim of life, for this would include the highest moral satisfaction; while many people would be shocked to hear that ‘pleasure,’ or even ‘happiness, is the aim of life.’ This I attribute chiefly to the fact that the puritan spirit drew a marked line between pleasures: there were exalted pleasures, and there were low pleasures; the first are desirable, the rest are to be repudiated, and there is no middle way.

This spirit of course did not always reign supreme, and the natural tendency is never totally to be extinguished, and we have some Saxon expressions of light mirth. But to this spirit, and other natural and historical causes, I attribute the fact that the dark side of expressions has been developed in England out of proportion with the bright side. So, for instance, we find that the German word *Mitgefühl* is rendered by the English ‘sympathy.’ This word, which means a ‘feeling with,’ originally meant a ‘suffering with.’ But while the German can subdivide this ‘feeling with’ into with-joy, and with-suffering (*Gönnen*, *Mitfreude*, and *Mitleid*), the English have two expressions of with-suffering, ‘compassion’ and ‘pity,’ but have no ex-

pression for with-joy. It may be urged that congratulation¹ conveys this meaning; but, though it originally meant a sharing of joy, it has degenerated into a far lighter sphere, and has become merely a word of polite language, so that the illiterate will hardly recognise the original meaning from its present use. To use that French word to convey a deep feeling would be like using the word 'plaisir' in German to express deep joy. The effect is similar to what it is when Heine after his protestation of deep feeling bursts forth with the French '*Madame, ich liebe sie!*'

Now I am inclined to believe that where there is no expression for such a feeling, and where we rarely find such feelings expressed in other ways, such feelings are not so likely to exist, and, in truth, the ideal of 'good form,' which cripples the nature of many young men at a time when their emotions are still developing, goes to suppress the expression of any such feelings. We may frequently hear young men express their disapproval of others; but I think that I am not making a hasty statement when I maintain that we hear young men expressing their approval of others far less frequently in England than in Germany, though it is not unmanly nor ungainly to express one's liking of a third person, and one's joy with another, and this expression may have good effects, as well upon the sociable character as upon the whole emotional nature of men.²

¹ A curious instance in actual life which corroborates my statement was told me by a friend. A naïve and open-hearted lady was complaining to my friend of the difficulty she experienced in expressing her gratification to a relative who had been blessed with a baby: 'You see,' naïvely said this feeling person, 'I can hardly express to her how truly I experience her joy, how I the-very-opposite-of-grudge (she needed the German 'gönnen') her the blessing. Had her child died, I should have had many expressions at my service.'

² Niebuhr, the great admirer of Englishmen, has remarked: 'It is quite a national trait not to dwell upon what concerns us personally, upon what fills our heart; and it is as unnatural to them to hear me speak of the topics upon which I feel strongly, as it would be to do the same themselves. How I shall bless the time when this constraint will be over,—when in my own land I shall listen to the joys and sorrows of others, not

But 'good form' and other causes are contributing to impoverish the English language in expressions of original emotions. We notice the avidity with which people grasp at slang, because it has such original life. Were it not for the widespread knowledge of Shakespeare, I verily believe that our emotional language would be sorely crippled. There are desirable emotions, and they can be cultivated. Language is a means of cultivating them. There is a great difference in the mental cast of those who know but one language and those who know several, even if they have never left their home. The latter are possessed of broader vision and feeling, they have *learnt* new feelings. When we have learnt the true meanings of the French word 'chic,' and the German word 'Gemüthlichkeit,' we may have learnt something the existence of which was unknown to us before. If we can force people to express 'Mitfreude,' we may perhaps teach some how to feel it. If the language is poor in expressions it can be made richer. Coining of words ought not to be condemned *a priori*. It is self-regulating. If a person thinks something worth thinking, or feels something worth feeling, and cannot find an adequate expression, let him coin a word; if possible, one which manifestly conveys his meaning. He will have to be careful, for the public will reject what is useless, ridicule a blunder,—but perhaps adopt what is suitable.

as a mere piece of news, but as a communication to which I have a right, and be as sure of a welcome when I lay open my own heart! I am far from attributing it to coldness in these good people. It is altogether national, and it is the same with every one I have known here, whatever their rank or calling, learning or sex.'—(From *The Life and Letters of B. G. Niebuhr, with Essays, etc.*, by the Chevalier Bunsen, Professors Brandis and Loebell; translated by Miss Winkworth.)

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